Hall v. Certified Luxury Auto ( 2021 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    JENNIE HALL,
    Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    CERTIFIED LUXURY AUTO INC.,
    Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 20-0519
    FILED 10-26-2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2019-095980
    The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Thompson Consumer Law Group, PLLC, Scottsdale
    By Russell Snow Thompson, IV
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Elley Law, PLC, Gilbert
    By Richard D. Elley
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
    HALL v. CERTIFIED LUXURY AUTO
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
    W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:
    ¶1           Jennie Hall appeals the superior court’s order granting
    Certified Luxury Auto Inc.’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2           Hall bought a used car from Certified Luxury Auto (“Dealer”)
    in February 2019, signing a six-page Retail Installment Contract and
    Security Agreement (“Contract”) that described and limited the available
    warranties.
    ¶3            On page one, the Contract extended the “Arizona Used Motor
    Vehicle Warranty,” explaining, in bold print, that the Dealer “warrants that
    this Vehicle will be fit for the ordinary purposes for which the Vehicle is
    used for 15 days or 500 miles after delivery, whichever is earlier, except
    with regard to particular defects disclosed on the first page of this
    agreement.”
    ¶4             On page two, the Contract excluded all other warranties
    “[u]nless the [Dealer] makes a written warranty or enters into a service
    contract within 90 days from the date of this contract,” adding “that the
    [Dealer] is selling the Vehicle as is—not expressly warranted or guaranteed
    and without implied warranties of merchantability (except as described
    above) or fitness for a particular purpose.”
    ¶5            On page five, under “Notices,” the Contract stated, “[t]he
    information you see on the window form for this vehicle is part of this
    contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary
    provisions in the contract of sale.” The window sticker, in turn, advised
    that the vehicle was for sale “AS IS – NO DEALER WARRANTY,” adding
    “YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The Dealer assumes
    no responsibility for any repairs regardless of any oral statements about the
    vehicle.”
    2
    HALL v. CERTIFIED LUXURY AUTO
    Decision of the Court
    ¶6            Ten months after buying the used car, Hall sued the Dealer to
    void “the transaction,” alleging the “window sticker violate[d] A.R.S. § 44-
    1267(B) by impermissibly waiving or attempting to waive the implied
    warranty of merchantability.” Hall’s complaint did not allege that she
    asked the Dealer to honor the 15-day/500-mile warranty or that the Dealer
    refused to honor the warranty. The superior court granted the Dealer’s
    motion to dismiss, reasoning that the Contract’s “as is” language did not
    exclude the minimum 15-day or 500-mile warranty but excluded all
    warranties beyond that statutory minimum. Hall appeals. We have
    jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A), -120.21.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7             We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule
    12(b)(6), assuming the truth of all well-pled factual allegations in the
    complaint. Baker v. Rolnick, 
    210 Ariz. 321
    , 324, ¶ 14 (App. 2005). Statutory
    interpretation and contract interpretation are questions of law we review
    de novo. Duff v. Lee, 
    250 Ariz. 135
    , 138, ¶ 11 (2020); Grosvenor Holdings, L.C.
    v. Figueroa, 
    222 Ariz. 588
    , 593, ¶ 9 (App. 2009).
    ¶8           Arizona law recognizes an implied warranty of
    merchantability on all used motor vehicle sales. See A.R.S. § 44-1267(B).
    This statute requires motor vehicle dealers to inform buyers of the
    warranty:
    An agreement for the sale of a used motor vehicle by a used
    motor vehicle dealer is voidable at the option of the purchaser
    unless it contains on its face the following conspicuous
    statement printed in bold-faced ten point or larger type set off
    from the body of the agreement:
    The seller hereby warrants that this vehicle will be fit
    for the ordinary purposes for which the vehicle is used
    for 15 days or 500 miles after delivery, whichever is
    earlier, except with regard to particular defects
    disclosed on the first page of this agreement. You (the
    purchaser) will have to pay up to $25.00 for each of the
    first two repairs if the warranty is violated.
    A.R.S. § 44-1267(G). Moreover, “[a]n attempt to exclude, modify or
    disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability or to limit the remedies
    for a breach of that warranty, except as otherwise provided in this section,
    in violation of this subsection renders a purchase agreement voidable at the
    option of the purchaser.” A.R.S. § 44-1267(B).
    3
    HALL v. CERTIFIED LUXURY AUTO
    Decision of the Court
    ¶9             Hall’s claim was appropriately dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion because the Contract did not attempt to exclude or disclaim the
    implied warranty of merchantability on used vehicles. Arizona courts
    interpret contract “provisions according to their plain and ordinary
    meaning” and “in the context of the entire contract.” See Terrell v. Torres,
    
    248 Ariz. 47
    , 49-50, ¶ 14 (2020) (quoting Climate Control, Inc. v. Hill, 
    86 Ariz. 180
    , 188 (1959)) (“A clause in a contract, if taken by itself, often admits of
    two meanings, when from the whole contract there is no reasonable doubt
    as to the sense in which the parties use it.”).
    ¶10          On its face, the Contract extended the mandatory limited
    warranty to Hall, parroting the “conspicuous statement” required under
    A.R.S. § 44-1267(G). The Contract then disclaimed all warranties, but
    preserved the mandatory limited warranty “described above for used
    vehicles.”
    ¶11            Nor did the window sticker exclude the limited warranty
    required under § 44-1267. Though the window sticker advised Hall the car
    was being sold “as is” with “no dealer warranty,” the Contract explained
    what that meant. In particular, after extending the mandatory warranty on
    page one, the Contract explained on page two: “Making no warranties
    means that the Seller is selling the Vehicle as is – not expressly warranted
    or guaranteed and without implied warranties of merchantability (except as
    described above) or fitness for a particular purpose.”
    ¶12            Reading the provisions in harmony, the Contract recognizes
    the implied warranty required for used cars under § 44-1267 but excludes
    any warranties beyond that statutory minimum. See Lemons v. Showcase
    Motors, Inc., 
    207 Ariz. 537
    , 539, ¶ 8 (App. 2004) (“As a general rule, an ‘as is’
    sale excludes such a warranty after the statutory fifteen-day and 500–mile
    limits.”).
    ¶13            Hall also argues her complaint should not have been
    dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because she alleged the Dealer
    “attempted to waive the implied warranty of merchantability by way of [a
    window sticker],” and the superior court was required “to accept [her]
    allegation of fact.” Not so. Arizona courts assume the truth of all well-pled,
    material allegations in a complaint, but “do not accept as true allegations
    consisting of conclusions of law, inferences or deductions that are not
    necessarily implied by well-pleaded facts, unreasonable inferences or
    4
    HALL v. CERTIFIED LUXURY AUTO
    Decision of the Court
    unsupported conclusions from such facts, or legal conclusions alleged as
    facts.” See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 
    211 Ariz. 386
    , 389, ¶ 4 (App. 2005).1
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14           We affirm. Dealer seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal
    under A.R.S. § 12-341, which we deny in our discretion. We grant the
    Dealer its taxable costs on appeal subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED:    JT
    1     Given our interpretation of the Contract, we do not address Hall’s
    argument on the significance of federal regulations when a window sticker
    and sales agreement have “contrary language.”
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 20-0519

Filed Date: 10/26/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2021