Firestone v. Safire ( 2022 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    FIRESTONE PIZZA EXPRESS, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    SAFIRE RESTAURANT, INC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 21-0471
    FILED 6-28-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County
    No. S0100CV201900116
    The Honorable Garrett L. Whiting, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Nicholas D. Patton, Show Low
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Hamblin Law Office, PLC, Eager
    By Bryce M. Hamblin
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
    FIRESTONE v. SAFIRE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    T H U M M A, Judge:
    ¶1             Plaintiff Firestone Pizza Express, LLC (Firestone) challenges
    the denial of its motion for relief from an order dismissing this case without
    prejudice and a resulting entry of judgment awarding defendant Safire
    Restaurant, Inc., (Safire) attorneys’ fees and costs. Because Firestone has
    shown no error, the order and judgment are affirmed.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In September 2017, Firestone rented from Safire real property
    in Springerville, Arizona. Disputes arose and, by June 2018, Safire had
    evicted Firestone. In July 2019, Firestone filed this case against Safire for
    breach of contract and conversion. Safire answered in November 2019.
    ¶3             An August 2020 order placed the case on the inactive
    (dismissal) calendar, stating that if “no action is taken in this matter within
    the next 60 days it shall be dismissed without prejudice.” See Ariz. R. Civ.
    P. 38.1(d)(1). Firestone moved for a scheduling conference 58 days later,
    asking that the case be removed from the dismissal calendar. The court set
    a November 2020 scheduling conference and removed the case from the
    dismissal calendar.
    ¶4            At the scheduling conference, the court imposed a December
    11, 2020 deadline for the parties to provide a joint report and scheduling
    order. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 38.1(d)(2)(A). That deadline passed with no
    submission being made. A December 16, 2020 order noted a lack of
    “’substantive progress in the prosecution of the case’” and placed the case
    on the dismissal calendar. That order stated that if “no action is taken in this
    matter within the next 60 days it shall be dismissed without prejudice.” See
    Ariz. R. Civ. P. 38.1(d)(2).
    ¶5              No joint report and scheduling order were ever provided. On
    February 11, 2021, three days before the 60-day deadline, Firestone filed a
    motion to remove the case from the dismissal calendar, also asking for a
    scheduling conference and, in the alternative, that the case be continued on
    the dismissal calender for another 90 days. The motion cited no authority
    for the relief requested. Although Safire did not respond, the court denied
    the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. The court noted that
    no joint report and scheduling order had been provided and the December
    11, 2020 court-ordered deadline had long passed. The court also noted that
    Firestone’s motion did not comply with Rule 38.1(d)(2).
    2
    FIRESTONE v. SAFIRE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶6             A month later, Firestone filed a “Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief,”
    citing on information from 2020 and stating counsel “became ill” on January
    9, 2021 and was quarantined with COVID-19 through January 24, 2021. The
    motion stated that the requested scheduling conference “would have taken
    the place of the scheduling order.” Without discussing Rule 60(b), Firestone
    asked that the case be reinstated or that the court “set a deadline within
    which it can refile the case under A.R.S. § 12-504(A),” Arizona’s savings
    statute.
    ¶7            In a five-page final judgment, the court denied the motion and
    awarded Safire attorneys’ fees and costs. The judgment found Firestone
    failed to prosecute the case before COVID “complications had any effect on
    [the] case or counsel,” failed to show any grounds for relief and failed to
    show any prejudice or impediment to refiling. This court has jurisdiction
    over Firestone’s timely appeal under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
    Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8             The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for an abuse of
    discretion. Ruffino v. Lokosky, 
    245 Ariz. 165
    , 168 ¶ 9 (App. 2018). An abuse
    of discretion “is discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on
    untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Quigley v. Tucson City Court,
    
    132 Ariz. 35
    , 37 (1982). Firestone has shown no abuse of discretion.
    ¶9            The court properly noted that Firestone’s “Rule 60(b) Motion
    for Relief” did not comply with the procedural rules. A motion must both
    “state with particularity the grounds for granting the motion” and include
    “citations to the specific parts or pages of supporting authorities and
    evidence.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(1) & (2). Firestone’s motion failed to do
    these things. On that procedural basis alone, the court properly could have
    denied the motion. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(b)(1).
    ¶10           Firestone also failed to act as required to prevent dismissal of
    the case. The court ordered a joint report and proposed scheduling order be
    provided by December 11, 2020. That did not happen; no report and
    proposed order were provided to the court at any time. Nor did Firestone
    ask the court to extend the December 11, 2020 deadline, either showing
    good cause (if made before that date) or excusable neglect (if made after).
    See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A) & (B).
    3
    FIRESTONE v. SAFIRE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶11            Apart from the December 11, 2020 deadline, Firestone did not
    act to prevent dismissal without prejudice. As applicable here, to prevent
    such a dismissal, by mid-February 2021, Firestone needed to either (1)
    submit a joint report and scheduling order, or (2) file a motion showing
    good cause continuing the case on the dismissal calendar for a specified
    time. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 38.1(d)(2)(A) & (C). Firestone did neither.
    ¶12            Despite this failure to comply with the December 11, 2020
    deadline and the applicable rules, Firestone argues it “acted as any
    reasonably prudent attorney would have under the circumstances” and the
    failures were because of “excusable neglect.” Excusable neglect can provide
    a basis for relief from a judgment or order. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). On
    the record presented, however, the superior court properly could conclude
    that Firestone failed to show excusable neglect.
    ¶13            Firestone argues counsel’s COVID-19 quarantine in January
    2021 is excusable neglect. That argument, however, does not address or
    explain the failure to comply with the December 11, 2020 deadline. Nor
    does it address the failure to provide a joint report and order before the
    January 2021 diagnosis. And Firestone’s counsel filed the Rule 60(b) Motion
    for Relief on February 11, 2021, negating any argument that, on or after that
    time, COVID-related issues mandated a finding of excusable neglect. For
    these reasons, the authority Firestone cites in arguing excusable neglect
    does not apply. See Walker v. Kendig, 
    107 Ariz. 510
    , 511-12 (1971) (attorney,
    who filed an affidavit stating he contracted Valley Fever before the case was
    placed on the inactive calendar, but with symptoms lasting “several months
    thereafter,” and showing “he did not see the notice that the case had been
    placed on the Inactive Calendar” and failed to prevent its dismissal
    constituted excusable neglect). For these same reasons, Firestone has not
    shown that Arizona Supreme Court Administrative Order 2020-197
    required a finding of excusable neglect.
    ¶14           Firestone next argues that the superior court “erred in
    refusing to set a scheduling conference in this matter,” meaning the
    dismissal should be vacated. Firestone argues Rule 16(d) required the court
    to set a scheduling conference any time a party requests one in writing. See
    Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(d) (“On a party’s written request the court must – or on
    its own the court may – set a Scheduling Conference.”). This argument fails
    for various reasons.
    4
    FIRESTONE v. SAFIRE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶15            To the extent Rule 16(d) contemplates setting one (“a”)
    scheduling conference, the court did so at Firestone’s request and held a
    November 2020 scheduling conference. To the extent Firestone argues Rule
    16(d) requires the court to hold a scheduling conference anytime a party
    requests one in writing, such an argument fails. See Reed v. Burke, 
    219 Ariz. 447
    , 450 ¶ 15 (App. 2008) (“We are to construe rules to avoid absurd
    results.”). Finally, Firestone has not shown how the court setting another
    scheduling conference in 2021 would have excused its failure to comply
    with the December 11, 2020 deadline or with Rule 38.1(d)(2).
    ¶16           Firestone argues the court erred in denying its request for
    relief under Arizona’s savings statute. The superior court, “in its
    discretion,” may specify the time “for commencement of a new action for
    the same cause” where a case is dismissed “for lack of prosecution.” A.R.S.
    § 12-504(A). “[T]he very nature of the discretionary portion of the provision
    requires a case-by-case application and evaluation.” Jepson v. New, 
    164 Ariz. 265
    , 271 (1990). Firestone had the burden to present “particular
    circumstances that justify relief” under the statute. See Flynn v. Cornoyer-
    Hendrick Architects & Planners, 
    160 Ariz. 187
    , 192 (App. 1988). In considering
    such a request, the court is to address: (1) whether the movant acted in good
    faith and reasonably and prosecuted the case diligently and vigorously; (2)
    whether a procedural impediment affects the ability to file a second action;
    and (3) whether either party will be substantially prejudiced. Jepson, 164 at
    272 (quoting Flynn, 
    160 Ariz. at 192
    ).
    ¶17           In total, Firestone’s savings statute request was the following:
    “In the alternative, [Firestone] requests that this Court set a deadline within
    which it can refile the case under A.R.S. § 12-504(A).” There is no suggestion
    that Firestone did not act in good faith. As to the other factors, however, on
    “the facts and circumstances presented,” the superior court found Firestone
    did not present particular circumstances justifying relief, concluding it did
    not act reasonably, did not prosecute its case diligently and vigorously and
    presented no proof of any procedural impediment or prejudice. Firestone
    has not shown those findings were an abuse of discretion. Jepson, 
    164 Ariz. at 274
    .
    5
    FIRESTONE v. SAFIRE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶18           The judgment is affirmed. Safire requests attorneys’ fees and
    costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -341.01 and -349. Although Safire’s request
    under A.R.S. § 12-349 is denied, its request under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -
    341.01 is granted. Safire is awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees and
    taxable costs on appeal contingent upon its compliance with ARCAP 21.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6