State v. Young ( 2022 )


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  •                                IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    WYTE YOUNG, JR., Petitioner.
    No. 1 CA-CR 21-0413 PRPC
    FILED 7-5-2022
    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Navajo County
    No. S0900CR201500189
    The Honorable Michael D. Latham, Visiting Judge from Apache County
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF GRANTED; REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Coconino County Attorney’s Office, Flagstaff
    By Mark D. Huston
    Counsel for Respondent
    Wyte Young, Jr., Florence
    Petitioner
    STATE v. YOUNG
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
    B R O W N, Judge:
    ¶1            Wyte Young, Jr., petitions for review of the superior court’s
    summary dismissal, based on timeliness, of his first petition requesting
    post-conviction relief (“PCR”) under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
    (“Rule”) 32. Because Young’s petition was timely filed under the prisoner
    mailbox rule, we grant review, grant relief, and remand for further
    proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2            In 2017, a jury found Young guilty on one count of attempted
    first-degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of
    misconduct involving weapons. The superior court sentenced him to
    concurrent prison terms on all counts, the longest of which is life
    imprisonment without the possibility of release until he had served at least
    35 years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See
    State v. Young, 1 CA-CR 17-0413, 
    2018 WL 6241449
    , at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App.
    Nov. 29, 2018) (mem. decision).
    ¶3             Young timely filed a PCR notice, and the superior court
    appointed counsel to represent him. Soon thereafter, the court granted
    Young’s request to proceed pro se. In April 2021, after Young had asked the
    court to clarify the filing deadline for his PCR petition, the court issued an
    order setting a July 26, 2021 due date and warned Young it would grant no
    further extensions. See Rule 32.7(a)(1)(B) (permitting courts to grant
    defendants in noncapital cases time extensions to file PCR petitions).
    Consistent with that order, in June and July 2021, the court denied Young’s
    additional requests for time extensions.
    ¶4            Young then filed his PCR petition, attaching a signed affidavit
    “attest[ing] that everything . . . in the petition is true and correct” and
    indicating he had “submitted” his petition on July 26, 2021. The clerk of the
    superior court, however, did not file stamp his pleading until July 29, 2021.
    Several days later, and referencing the mailbox rule, Young filed a notice
    2
    STATE v. YOUNG
    Opinion of the Court
    stating his petition had been submitted to prison officials on “July 26.”
    Nevertheless, the superior court dismissed the PCR proceeding, stating that
    “no petition had been filed.”
    ¶5            Young moved for reconsideration, citing State v. Goracke, 
    210 Ariz. 20
     (App. 2005), for the proposition that he had timely filed his PCR
    petition because he had “lawfully submitted” it to prison authorities on the
    due date. Young again attached an affidavit averring he had delivered his
    petition to prison authorities on July 26, 2021. In his affidavit, Young
    provided the name and badge number of the prison officer who received
    his pleading.
    ¶6             In denying the motion to reconsider and affirming the
    dismissal, the court found that the “rationale of the ‘mailbox rule’ does not
    apply to this case” because a deadline had been established for filing the
    petition, and by Young’s “own admission, he did not deliver the petition to
    [prison] staff to be mailed until July 26, 2021.” The court explained “that
    waiting until the date the petition was due to place it in the [prison] mail
    system . . . after multiple extensions of time were previously granted and
    clear deadlines set, was not reasonable and would be an abuse of the
    ‘mailbox rule’ rationale if permitted.” The court added, by way of example,
    that it would have accepted his filing as timely had he “delivered his
    petition to [prison] staff by July 24, 2021[,] and [the clerk’s office] had not
    received it until July 29, 2021,” reasoning Young would have in that
    instance “acted diligently and made a good faith effort to comply” with the
    deadline. Young timely petitioned this court for review.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            We will not disturb the superior court’s ruling on a PCR
    petition absent an abuse of discretion, which includes committing an error
    of law. State v. Swoopes, 
    216 Ariz. 390
    , 393, ¶ 4 (App. 2007). Young argues
    the superior court erred by refusing to apply the mailbox rule in his case.
    In response, the State agrees that the rule applies to PCR petitions, but
    “takes no position” on whether Young’s petition was timely filed under that
    rule and defers to this court on whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary
    to determine the date of mailing.
    ¶8              Under the prisoner mailbox rule, pro se prisoners are deemed
    to have filed legal documents if the filing is properly addressed and has
    been delivered “to the proper prison authorities to be forwarded to the clerk
    of the . . . court.” Mayer v. State, 
    184 Ariz. 242
    , 245 (App. 1995). We have
    3
    STATE v. YOUNG
    Opinion of the Court
    applied the mailbox rule to the filing of notices of appeal, id.; PCR notices,
    State v. Rosario, 
    195 Ariz. 264
    , 266, ¶ 10 (App. 1999); and petitions for review,
    Goracke, 
    210 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 13
    . We see no reason to treat PCR petitions
    differently. See Goracke, 
    210 Ariz. at
    22–23, ¶¶ 8, 10 (finding the
    considerations in applying the rule to a notice of appeal and a PCR notice
    are the same as those for a petition for review); Rosario, 
    195 Ariz. at 266, ¶ 10
     (explaining the rule’s rationale is that pro se prisoners are unable to
    ensure pleadings are timely filed because they cannot personally file
    pleadings in the clerk’s office or directly place pleadings in the mail).
    Therefore, assuming Young delivered his PCR petition to prison authorities
    on July 26, 2021, his petition must be considered timely filed.
    ¶9             We next address whether the record presents an issue of fact
    requiring a remand to determine if Young complied with the mailbox rule.
    See Mayer, 
    184 Ariz. at 245
     (“When there is no clear record as to when the
    [filing] was delivered to prison authorities, the proper course of action is to
    remand to the trial court to make this determination.”). Goracke is
    instructive in resolving that issue. 
    210 Ariz. at 21
    , ¶¶ 2–3.
    ¶10            In Goracke, after we denied an incarcerated petitioner relief in
    a PCR proceeding, he sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. 
    Id. at 21
    , ¶¶ 3–4. The petitioner requested several time extensions, and this court
    eventually set an August 30, 2004, deadline for him to file his petition for
    review. 
    Id.
     at 21–22, ¶ 4. When he ultimately filed his petition, it was dated
    August 30, 2004, but the clerk’s office received it three days later. 
    Id.
     The
    petitioner had attached to his filing a “Proof/Certificate of Service” stating
    he placed the petition in the prison mail system on the due date. 
    Id.
    ¶11             After concluding the mailbox rule applies to petitions for
    review, we deemed the petition timely filed, explaining that the record
    before us sufficiently supported the petitioner’s allegation that he had
    tendered his filing to prison authorities by the deadline. 
    Id. at 23
    , ¶¶ 10–12.
    We relied on the following factors in declining to remand for an evidentiary
    hearing: (1) the mailing certificate stated that “on August 30, 2004, [the
    petitioner had] placed this Petition for Review in the institutional mail”;
    (2) the clerk received the petition three days later, reflecting “a time frame
    consistent with petitioner’s certification”; and (3) the State cited “no facts
    that would indicate the petition was not tendered on the date indicated.”
    
    Id. at 23, ¶ 12
    .
    ¶12          As the State acknowledges, those factors—including the same
    three-day delay—are also present here and thus support a finding, based
    4
    STATE v. YOUNG
    Opinion of the Court
    solely on the current record, that Young likewise timely filed his petition.
    Nevertheless, without disputing his factual allegations, the State asks us to
    consider that unlike the situation in Goracke, Young’s “[p]etition did not
    include any official documentation to verify that it was provided to prison
    staff on July 26, 2021.” The State suggests that Young should have further
    supported his allegations by providing proof of service or a copy of the mail
    log showing when he delivered his filing.
    ¶13           Even assuming the better practice would have been for Young
    to provide the listed items, the State has not disputed Young’s assertion that
    he gave his PCR petition to prison authorities on the due date. Nor has the
    State requested an evidentiary hearing or otherwise suggested the current
    record is insufficient for us to decide whether his filing was timely. See
    Mayer, 
    184 Ariz. at 245
    ; cf. Goracke, 
    210 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 11
     (noting the State
    argued that the record did not clearly show the filing had been submitted
    to prison authorities by the deadline). Accordingly, in the absence of any
    conflicting facts or inferences suggesting the factual allegations contained
    in Young’s affidavit are not accurate, and because the clerk’s office received
    his pleading in a time frame consistent with Young’s assertions, we
    conclude that Young’s petition was timely filed.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14           We vacate the superior court’s dismissal order and remand
    for consideration of the merits of Young’s petition.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 21-0413-PRPC

Filed Date: 7/5/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/5/2022