Unemployed Workers v. Ducey ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                  IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    UNEMPLOYED WORKERS UNITED, et al.,
    Plaintiffs/Appellants,
    v.
    DOUGLAS DUCEY, et al.,
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 22-0054
    FILED 9-27-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2021-014027
    The Honorable Katherine Cooper, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Osborn Maledon, PA, Phoenix
    By Joshua David Rothenberg Bendor, Joshua J. Messer
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
    Barton Mendoza Soto, PLLC, Tempe
    By James E. Barton, II
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
    Law Office of Paul Gattone, Tucson
    By Paul J. Gattone
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
    National Legal Advocacy Network, Chicago, IL
    By Christopher J. Williams, Sheila Maddali
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
    Fennemore Craig, PC, Phoenix
    By Timothy J. Berg, Brett Gilmore, Lyndsey Maasch
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
    Community Legal Services, Phoenix
    By Pamela M. Bridge
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae Community Legal Services
    William E. Morris Institute for Justice, Phoenix
    By Andrew P. Schaffer, Brenda Munoz Furnish
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae William E. Morris Institute for Justice
    OPINION
    Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the opinion of the Court, in
    which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
    W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:
    ¶1            Arizona law requires the Arizona Department of Economic
    Security (“ADES”) to “[t]ake such action as may be necessary to secure to
    this state and its citizens all advantages available under the provisions of
    [four federal unemployment acts].” See A.R.S. § 23-645(2). We must decide
    whether that law required ADES to secure unemployment benefits under
    the CARES Act, enacted by Congress in response to the COVID-19
    pandemic. Because it did not, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2           COVID-19 arrived in America and Arizona in the last ten days
    of January 2020, generating twin medical and economic emergencies. The
    economic emergency was abrupt. In April 2020 alone, the nation’s
    unemployment rate jumped by more than ten percent. See U.S. Department
    of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.1
    ¶3            And so, on March 25, 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus
    Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, better known as the CARES Act.
    Among its programmatic reach, the CARES Act created and funded the
    1        See United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment rate rises to record high
    14.7 percent in April 2020, (May 13, 2020), www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-
    rate-rises-to-record-high-14-point-7-percent-in-april-2020.htm.
    2
    UNEMPLOYED WORKERS v. DUCEY, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation program (“FPUC”), a
    supplemental payment of unemployment benefits for qualified
    unemployed workers during the pandemic. All 50 states were invited to
    join the FPUC program, which was voluntary, and the states were assured
    they could leave the program on 30 days’ written notice. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 9023
    (b)(3)(A)(i).
    ¶4           Two days later, Governor Ducey signed into law a directive
    for ADES to join the FPUC program, and ADES entered a written
    agreement with the federal government, which confirmed that ADES could
    leave the program on 30 days’ written notice.
    ¶5           Nearly 64 weeks after entering the agreement, on July 10,
    2021, Governor Ducey directed ADES to exit the agreement. The federal
    government continued funding the FPUC program for 58 more days, and it
    expired nationally on September 6, 2021. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 9023
    (b)(3)(A)(ii),
    (e)(2).
    ¶6             This lawsuit followed in October 2021, seeking a writ of
    mandamus and request for declaratory and injunctive relief against ADES
    and Governor Ducey (collectively, “the State”). The plaintiffs are three
    Arizona residents who lost their job because of the pandemic, and a New
    York non-profit organization named Unemployed Workers United
    (collectively, the “Workers”). The Workers alleged that the State violated
    Arizona law, specifically A.R.S. § 23-645(2), by exiting the pandemic
    unemployment program 58 days before its natural end. They sought a
    court order directing the State to retroactively secure 58 more days of
    benefits for eligible Arizonans.
    ¶7             The superior court denied relief, finding that “Arizona law
    [did] not compel [the State] to obtain FPUC benefits,” which the court
    characterized as “an optional CARES Act benefit that states could start and
    stop at their discretion.” Workers timely appealed. We have jurisdiction.
    See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8             This appeal presents an issue of statutory interpretation that
    we review de novo. Schwarz v. City of Glendale, 
    190 Ariz. 508
    , 510 (App.
    1997). “Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear
    and unambiguous.” BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 
    244 Ariz. 17
    ,
    19 ¶ 9 (2018) (internal citation omitted). “If the statute is subject to only one
    reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis.” Stambaugh
    3
    UNEMPLOYED WORKERS v. DUCEY, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    v. Killian, 
    242 Ariz. 508
    , 509 ¶ 7 (2017) (quoting Wade v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys.,
    
    241 Ariz. 559
    , 561 ¶ 10 (2017)).
    ¶9          At the heart of Workers’ argument is A.R.S. § 23-645, which
    was adopted by the legislature in 1977. Section 23-645 requires the Arizona
    Department of Employment Security to:
    Take such action as may be necessary to secure to this state
    and its citizens all advantages available under the provisions
    of the social security act that relate to unemployment
    compensation, the federal unemployment tax act, the
    Wagner-Peyser act and the federal-state extended
    unemployment compensation act of 1970.
    ¶10          Workers contend this statute required ADES to secure FPUC
    benefits because FPUC benefits were an “advantage[] available under” the
    social security act and the federal-state extended unemployment
    compensation act of 1970 (“1970 Act”). They first argue that FPUC benefits
    were an “advantage[] available under” the social security act because
    Congress directed the Department of Labor to distribute FPUC benefits
    through preexisting “Social Security infrastructure” and “methods of
    administration.”
    ¶11            We are not persuaded. First, the FPUC program and FPUC
    benefits were created and funded by Congress under the CARES Act—not
    the social security act or the 1970 Act. Compare 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 9021
    , 9023, 9025
    (pandemic unemployment benefits), with 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 301
    –1397 (social
    security) and Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of
    1970, 
    Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84
     Stat. 708 (codified in a note to 26 U.S.C. 3304).
    Unlike the social security and 1970 acts, Congress enacted the CARES Act
    to triage the economic catastrophe sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic. See
    Holcomb v. T.L., 
    175 N.E.3d 1177
    , 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (explaining FPUC
    benefits represented a “temporary” measure to “provide[] different benefits
    to more types of people and for different amounts of time,” and its
    unemployment benefits represented “a supplement to traditional
    [unemployment] benefits during an unprecedented pandemic”).
    ¶12           Second, Congress did not amend the social security act to
    fund FPUC benefits; nor did the Arizona legislature amend Section 23-
    645(2) to reach FPUC benefits under the CARES Act. See Canon Sch. Dist.
    No. 50 v. W.E.S. Const. Co. Inc., 
    177 Ariz. 526
    , 529 (App. 1994) (“[W]e are
    reluctant to construe the words of a statute to mean something other than
    what they plainly state.”). By contrast, Congress did amend the social
    4
    UNEMPLOYED WORKERS v. DUCEY, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    security act in the Families First Coronavirus Response Act. See Pub. L. 116-
    127 § 4102, 
    134 Stat. 178
    , 192–93 (amending Section 903 of the Social Security
    Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1103
    ).
    ¶13           Third, FPUC benefits did not morph into an “advantage[]
    available under” the social security act simply because the federal
    government used “Social Security infrastructure” and “methods of
    administration” to distribute FPUC benefits. The pandemic represented a
    hard stop on our state’s economy. It caused an unprecedented spike in the
    unemployment rate, and sparked an immediate need to distribute billions
    of dollars to millions of unemployed persons. Because it had no time to
    blaze a new administrative path, Congress turned to the time-tested, well-
    worn “Social Security infrastructure” and “methods of administration.” See
    
    15 U.S.C. § 9021
    (g)(1)(A).
    ¶14           Fourth, FPUC benefits did not morph into an “advantage[]
    available under” the 1970 Act merely because Congress borrowed seven
    definitions from the 1970 Act when crafting the CARES Act. See 
    15 U.S.C. § 9023
    (i)(1), (2) (defining “compensation,” “regular compensation,”
    “benefit year,” “State,” “State agency,” “State law” and “week”). Workers
    offer no legal authority for the point that two distinct, self-reliant statutes
    become one when they share some definitions.
    ¶15           All but one court presented with this issue has reached the
    same decision. See Brannon v. McMaster, 
    864 S.E.2d 548
    , 550 (S.C. 2021)
    (“The only connection the Programs have to the [social security act] is that
    the funds to be distributed to recipients pass through bank accounts of the
    Social Security Administration. This is not sufficient to render benefits paid
    under the Program to be ‘advantages available under the provisions of the
    [social security act].’”); Holcomb, 175 N.E.3d at 1183 (“Utilizing this
    established accounting system and specifying how funds should be moved
    around and made available for distribution is entirely different from
    creating a new federal benefit program, which the CARES Act is.”); Caron
    v. New Hampshire et al., 2021-CV-00423, slip op. at 7 (Sup. Ct. N.H. Sept. 27,
    2021) (“[S]imply because PUA ‘benefits are distributed by utilizing the
    same accounting systems used to fund the administrative costs of the state
    [unemployment insurance] programs’ under the [social security act,] it does
    not follow that the PUA benefits themselves are ‘advantages available
    under the [social security act].’”). And the outlier has been accepted for
    review. See State ex rel. Bowling v. DeWine, 
    2021 WL 3733205
    , at *11, ¶¶ 45–
    47 (Ohio).
    5
    UNEMPLOYED WORKERS v. DUCEY, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16   We affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED:    JT
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 22-0054

Filed Date: 9/27/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/27/2022