State v. Bagdonas ( 2014 )


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  •                           NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE
    LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    STEVEN T. BAGDONAS, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 13-0826
    FILED 11-10-2014
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. LC2011-164446-001, LC2011-164447-001, LC2011-164448-001,
    LC2011-164449-001
    The Honorable Crane McClennen, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Lisa Marie Martin
    Counsel for Appellee
    Baker & Baker, Phoenix
    By Thomas M. Baker
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. BAGDONAS
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Andrew W. Gould joined.
    T H U M M A, Judge:
    ¶1             In this appeal arising out of justice court matters, Steve Tom
    Bagdonas challenges the superior court’s conclusion that Arizona Revised
    Statutes (A.R.S.) section 44-1627(G) (2014)1 allows the State to file
    misdemeanor criminal charges against an agent based on a corporate
    pawnbroker’s failure to comply with retention and reporting requirements.
    Recognizing this court’s jurisdiction is limited to addressing the facial
    validity of A.R.S. § 44-1627(G), because Bagdonas has not shown the statute
    is facially invalid, the superior court’s order is affirmed.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           Bagdonas is the agent of licensee pawnbroker National
    Lending Group LLC, doing business as Pawns Plus V (NLG). The State
    alleges Bagdonas owns 91 percent of NLG and is the only person whose
    name is associated with NLG on the application for the pawnbroker license.
    ¶3            In September 2011, Maricopa County Sheriff’s deputies
    conducted a routine inspection of NLG, observed violations of statutes
    governing pawnbrokers and issued Bagdonas a pawnshop compliance
    checklist, which stated that further violations would be subject to
    investigation and penalties.
    ¶4            In December 2011, deputies conducted another routine
    inspection of NLG and, again, observed violations of statutes governing
    pawnbrokers. As a result, the State cited Bagdonas with various
    misdemeanor pawn transaction violations under A.R.S. § 44-1624(F) and
    A.R.S. § 44-1625(A) and (C)(5). Although conceding that NLG holds the
    pawnbroker license, the State argues that Bagdonas is liable as NLG’s agent
    under A.R.S. § 44-1627(G), which provides that “[t]he agent is subject to the
    penalties prescribed for any violation of law relating to pawnbrokers.”
    1Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
    refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
    2
    STATE v. BAGDONAS
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5            In justice court, Bagdonas moved to dismiss the charges.
    Although stipulating he was NLG’s agent, Bagdonas argued that only NLG,
    as the corporate licensee pawnbroker, could be charged for the subject
    offenses; the State could not, however, charge him personally. The justice
    court granted Bagdonas’ motion and the State timely appealed to the
    superior court. Interpreting A.R.S. § 44-1627(G) as allowing the State to
    bring criminal charges against the agent of a corporate licensee
    pawnbroker, the superior court vacated the justice court’s order.
    ¶6             Bagdonas then sought special action relief with this court and
    timely filed this appeal. Although previously declining special action
    jurisdiction, this court has jurisdiction over Bagdonas’ appeal pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 22-375.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            Because this appeal arises out of justice court matters, this
    court lacks jurisdiction to consider Bagdonas’ “challenge insofar as it is a
    challenge to [the] application of the statute.” State v. Lindner, 
    227 Ariz. 69
    ,
    70 ¶3, 
    252 P.3d 1033
    , 1034 (App. 2010). Instead, appellate jurisdiction “is
    limited to determining the facial validity of” A.R.S. § 44-1627(G). 
    Id. at 70
    ¶2, 252 P.3d at 1034
    . This court reviews de novo the constitutionality of a
    statute and the party asserting a statute is unconstitutional must overcome
    a presumption of constitutionality. State v. Russo, 
    219 Ariz. 223
    , 225 ¶ 4, 
    196 P.3d 826
    , 828 (App. 2008).
    ¶8             “[P]awnshops exist in a heavily regulated environment.”
    Jachimek v. State, 
    205 Ariz. 632
    , 637 ¶ 19, 
    74 P.3d 944
    , 949 (App. 2003); see also
    A.R.S. §§ 44-1621 to -1632. A corporation may be a pawnbroker, provided
    that the corporation “own[s] the entire equitable interest in its license
    through an agent if the agent is otherwise qualified to hold a pawnbroker
    license.” A.R.S. § 44-1627(G). The agent must independently meet the
    licensing qualifications and the corporation’s license is contingent on the
    agent’s qualifications. See 
    id. In addition,
    the statute provides that “[t]he
    agent is subject to the penalties prescribed for any violation of law relating
    to pawnbrokers.” 
    Id. ¶9 Here,
    Bagdonas argues that the “subject to the penalties”
    language in A.R.S. § 44-1627(G) does not comport with due process notice
    requirements. Bagdonas also contends that the subject language only
    requires the agent to pay monetary penalties if the corporation is convicted
    and fails to pay its fines.
    3
    STATE v. BAGDONAS
    Decision of the Court
    ¶10            Due process requires that a penal statute’s definitions be
    sufficiently precise and definite so that the statute provides “fair notice that
    engaging in the proscribed conduct risks criminal penalties.” See State v.
    Angelo, 
    166 Ariz. 24
    , 28, 
    800 P.2d 11
    , 15 (App. 1990) (citing cases). “‘A
    legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague if it does not give persons
    of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits
    and does not provide explicit standards for those who will apply it.’” State
    v. McLamb, 
    188 Ariz. 1
    , 5, 
    932 P.2d 266
    , 270 (App. 1996) (citing cases).
    ¶11             For an agent of a licensed corporate pawnbroker, A.R.S. § 44-
    1627(G) expressly provides notice that “[t]he agent is subject to the penalties
    prescribed for any violation of law relating to pawnbrokers.” A.R.S. § 44-
    1627(G). Bagdonas has failed to show that, in enacting this express
    provision, the Legislature in fact did not mean to hold an agent criminally
    liable if the licensee corporation failed to follow the pawnbroker statutes,
    especially considering the requirement that the agent independently meet
    the qualifications of a pawnbroker. See 
    id. Entities such
    as corporations act
    through their agents. Braswell v. United States, 
    487 U.S. 99
    , 110 (1988); see also
    State v. Far W. Water & Sewer, Inc., 
    224 Ariz. 173
    , 195 ¶ 77, 
    228 P.3d 909
    , 931
    (App. 2010). The explicit language of A.R.S. § 44-1627(G) clearly gives notice
    that an agent of a corporate pawnbroker may be held personally liable for
    violating the pawnbroker statutes.
    ¶12           Although Bagdonas cites Angelo for the proposition that, as
    an agent of NLG, he cannot be held responsible for NLG’s violations of the
    pawnbroker statutes, the statutory scheme in Angelo only imposed duties
    on the corporate taxpayer, not its 
    agent. 166 Ariz. at 26
    , 800 P.2d at 13. Here,
    by contrast, the statute expressly and specifically subjects the agent to “the
    penalties prescribed for any violation of law relating to pawnbrokers.”
    A.R.S. § 44-1627(G) (emphasis added).
    ¶13           Bagdonas argues that application of A.R.S. § 44-1627(G)
    means he can be found to have committed a misdemeanor without a
    culpable mental state. The statutes applicable here do not require a culpable
    mental state for a misdemeanor violation. See A.R.S. § 44-1631(B) (applying
    to A.R.S. §§ 44-1624 and -1625). That does not, however, mean that A.R.S. §
    44-1627(G) is facially invalid. “Although strict liability criminal offenses are
    disfavored, they are appropriate for regulatory offenses that result in no
    direct or immediate injury to person or property, carry relatively small
    penalties, and do not seriously damage the reputation of those convicted of
    them.” State v. Slayton, 
    214 Ariz. 511
    , 516 ¶ 20, 
    154 P.3d 1057
    , 1062 (App.
    2007). The potential consequences for misdemeanor violations of the
    pawnbroker statutes applicable here are well within the range of penalties
    4
    STATE v. BAGDONAS
    Decision of the Court
    held appropriate for other strict liability crimes. See 
    id. at 516
    24, 154 P.3d at 1062
    (citing various cases giving appropriate ranges for strict liability
    offenses).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14           Because Bagdonas has not shown that A.R.S. § 44-1627(G) is
    facially invalid, the order of the superior court is affirmed. Because
    Bagdonas is not the prevailing party on appeal (and because he has shown
    no substantive basis for an award of attorneys’ fees), his requests for costs
    and attorneys’ fees on appeal are denied.
    :gsh
    5