Slater v. Abor ( 2020 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    TIMOTHY SLATER, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 19-0030
    FILED 1-23-2020
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2016-013953
    The Honorable Joseph C. Welty, Judge
    The Honorable Kerstin LeMaire, Judge
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Jaburg & Wilk, PC, Phoenix
    By Kraig J. Marton, Jeffrey A. Silence
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Rachel M. Remes
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
    SLATER v. ABOR
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge David B. Gass joined.
    W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:
    ¶1            Dr. Timothy Slater appeals the superior court’s dismissal of
    his complaint against the Arizona Board of Regents (ABOR) under Arizona
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accepting his factual allegations as true,
    we conclude that Dr. Slater adequately stated his negligence and breach of
    confidentiality claims. We reverse and remand.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            On appeal from a motion to dismiss, this court “assume[s] the
    truth of [all] well-pled factual allegations and indulge[s] all reasonable
    inferences therefrom.” Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
    218 Ariz. 417
    , 419, ¶ 7
    (2008).
    ¶3            ABOR governs and controls Arizona’s state universities,
    including the University of Arizona. A.R.S. §§ 15-1601(A), -1625(A). ABOR
    has “the powers necessary for the effective governance and administration”
    of the University. A.R.S. § 15-1626(A)(1). To that end, ABOR has adopted
    a comprehensive set of regulations, policies and rules for the “institutions
    under its control.” Id. Among ABOR’s policies are Policy Number 1-119
    on “Nondiscrimination and Anti-Harassment,” and Policy Number 6-912
    on “Access to or Disclosure of Personnel Records or Information.”
    ¶4            Dr. Slater was an associate professor of astronomy at the
    University from 2001 to 2008. He received tenure in 2004. Two months
    later, “several individuals” reported Dr. Slater to University officials for
    “continual sexual joking, banter and unwelcome touching,” but “refused to
    file complaints” for fear of retaliation. The University investigated,
    interviewing Dr. Slater and at least 11 unnamed witnesses who interacted
    with Dr. Slater. Before his interview, Dr. Slater was “assured that the results
    of the investigation would be confidential.”
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    SLATER v. ABOR
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5           The University issued a formal 38-page “Investigative
    Report” on March 31, 2005.1 The document described various allegations
    of harassment against Dr. Slater and summarized witness interviews. Each
    page was marked “CONFIDENTIAL” in bold and italics. In the end, the
    report concluded that Dr. Slater violated the University’s sexual
    harassment policy but found insufficient evidence of retaliation. The
    University pursued no disciplinary action against Dr. Slater.
    ¶6            In January 2010, a Chicago-based astronomer submitted a
    public records request to the University for “documents relating to . . .
    charges, investigations, and disciplinary actions against former professor of
    Astronomy Timothy F. Slater.” The University responded in May 2010
    through its Custodian for Public Records in the Office of Institutional
    Research & Planning Support. The Custodian withheld “[m]ost records
    relating to any charges, investigations, and disciplinary actions against [Dr.
    Slater] due to the chilling effect they would have on future possible
    employee investigations,” but disclosed “the final investigative report that
    summarizes the findings” under “A.R.S. § 39-121 and 39-128.”
    ¶7            Around two months later, the same Custodian of Public
    Records asked the Chicago astronomer to “please destroy any copies” of
    the document because it had been disclosed “in error” and “contrary to the
    policies and practices of the university for release,” raising concern about
    the “chilling effect” that releasing the report “would have on future
    possible employee investigations.”
    ¶8            Almost five years elapsed before a United States
    Representative read swaths of the Investigative Report into the
    congressional record to raise awareness about sexual harassment in
    university science departments. From there, the Investigative Report’s
    contents were widely broadcast and published by news outlets across the
    nation. In one article, the University of Arizona’s Vice President for
    Communications said the Investigative Report should not have been
    disclosed and was not a public record. The Vice President lamented that
    “[s]omebody forgot or screwed up,” but promised that “[c]ontrols have
    been tightened on that process since then.”
    ¶9          A few months later, Dr. Slater submitted his own public
    records request to the University, seeking the same documents and
    information produced in response to the initial public records request.
    1    Dr. Slater attached a copy of the Investigative Report to his
    complaint in this lawsuit.
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    SLATER v. ABOR
    Decision of the Court
    ABOR refused, explaining that “the University does not release records of
    complaint investigations because doing so would be contrary to the best
    interests of the state and compromise the privacy interests of the
    complaining individuals and witnesses.”
    ¶10           In November 2016, Dr. Slater sued ABOR for breach of
    confidentiality, defamation, false light, public disclosure of private
    information and negligence. His complaint alleges that ABOR owed him a
    duty of confidentiality “by reason of University policy and practice,
    promises made to [him] and state law and regulation,” pointing to express
    and implied contracts, along with his employment relationship.
    ¶11           ABOR moved to dismiss Dr. Slater’s breach of confidentiality
    and negligence claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),
    arguing that “Slater cannot establish that the investigation report was
    confidential” and “cannot establish that the [University] owed him a duty
    to keep that report confidential.” The superior court granted ABOR’s
    motion, reasoning that “[a]s currently pled, [Dr. Slater] fails to show” under
    either “statute or common law” that ABOR owed or breached a duty of
    confidentiality to him “by the release of [the Investigative Report] pursuant
    to a public records request.” After discovery, Slater voluntarily dismissed
    his remaining claims for defamation, false light and public disclosure of
    private information. The superior court entered final judgment. Dr. Slater
    timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶12             The superior court dismissed Dr. Slater’s negligence and
    breach of confidentiality claims after concluding that ABOR owed no duty
    of confidentiality to Dr. Slater under any interpretation of his allegations.
    We review de novo the superior court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule
    12(b)(6), and only affirm if the plaintiff has no right to relief under any
    interpretation of the facts. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 
    230 Ariz. 352
    , 355-56, ¶
    7 (2012). Our review is limited to the complaint itself and attached exhibits.
    Id. at 356, ¶ 9. We assume the truth of all well-pled factual allegations and
    resolve all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, but “mere
    conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can
    be granted.” Cullen, 218 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 7.
    ¶13           The issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law. Quiroz
    v. ALCOA Inc., 
    243 Ariz. 560
    , 564, ¶ 7 (2018). As relevant here, a duty may
    arise from “special relationships recognized by the common law [and]
    contracts,” including an employment relationship, 
    id. at 565
    , ¶ 14 (citing
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    SLATER v. ABOR
    Decision of the Court
    Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co., 
    179 Ariz. 22
    , 34 (App. 1994); from contract
    Diaz v. Phx. Lubrication Serv., Inc., 
    224 Ariz. 335
    , 339-40 ¶¶ 15–19 (App.
    2010), or from promises of confidentiality, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
    501 U.S. 663
    , 669-671 (1991) (recognizing an enforceable promise of
    confidentiality under promissory estoppel).
    ¶14             We reverse the superior court’s dismissal for failure to state a
    claim because the complaint alleges enough facts, assumed as true, to
    recognize a duty of confidentiality. The complaint alleges: “Prior to being
    interviewed[,] Dr. Slater was assured that the results of the investigation
    would be confidential.” The University’s alleged “promise[s]” and
    “assur[ances]” of confidentiality to Dr. Slater are sufficient to state a
    cognizable duty of confidentiality. Diaz, 224 Ariz. at ¶¶ 15-19; Cohen, 
    501 U.S. at 669-671
    . We cannot say “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
    no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” See
    Newman v. Maricopa Cty., 
    167 Ariz. 501
    , 503 (App. 1991) (quoting 5A C.
    Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357, at 325).
    ¶15           We need not reach whether ABOR’s administrative policies
    create a duty of confidentiality to Dr. Slater, including Policy Nos. 1-119(E)
    and 6-912(C). As the lawsuit continues, however, the superior court might
    conclude that ABOR’s administrative policies represented implied terms of
    Dr. Slater’s employment, akin to personnel manuals that “can become part
    of employment contracts,” Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 
    141 Ariz. 544
    , 548 (1984), or that these policies represented an actionable
    standard of conduct based on their purpose, Lombardo v. Albu, 
    199 Ariz. 97
    ,
    100-101 (2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285).2
    2       We confine our review to the issues advanced on appeal, and
    therefore do not address the affirmative defenses that may be advanced as
    the litigation proceeds.
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    SLATER v. ABOR
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16           We reverse the superior court’s dismissal of Dr. Slater’s
    claims for breach of confidentiality and negligence and remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this decision.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
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