Jessi N., Ryan J. v. Dcs ( 2020 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    JESSI N., RYAN J., Appellants,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.C., S.J., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 19-0130
    FILED 2-4-2020
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD38029
    The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley
    By David W. Bell
    Counsel for Appellant Jessi N.
    The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale
    By Alison Stavris
    Counsel for Appellant Ryan J.
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Doriane F. Zwillinger
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    JESSI N., RYAN J. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which Acting
    Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Chief Judge Peter B. Swann
    joined.
    G A S S, Judge:
    ¶1             Ryan J. (father) appeals the superior court’s order terminating
    his parental rights to S.J., his biological child. Jessi N. (mother) also appeals
    the superior court’s order terminating her parental rights to two biological
    children, S.J. and D.C. (collectively, the children). Because reasonable
    evidence supports the superior court’s order, the termination of parental
    rights is affirmed.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           Father and mother have a long history of substance abuse.
    Father also has a criminal history predating S.J.’s birth. In 2014, D.C. was
    born substance exposed. The superior court adjudicated D.C. dependent. In
    April 2015, after Mother successfully completed standard outpatient
    substance-abuse treatment, the Department of Child Safety (DCS)
    dismissed that earlier dependency.
    ¶3             During mother’s pregnancy with S.J., mother abused
    substances. Father did as well, even though he was on probation for
    burglary of a pharmacy. Father says he was with mother throughout her
    pregnancy and was present for S.J.’s birth, but he denied knowing mother
    was abusing drugs. When S.J. was born in 2017, mother and S.J. both tested
    positive for methamphetamine. Within two days of S.J.’s birth, father’s hair
    follicle test was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, morphine,
    and heroin.
    ¶4            About three months after S.J.’s birth, the superior court found
    father violated his probation and ordered him held in the Maricopa County
    Jail for forty-five days. After forty-five days, father was released to
    Crossroads, a substance-abuse treatment facility. He remained on
    probation. After father’s release from Crossroads, he continued to engage
    in criminal activities related to his substance abuse.
    2
    JESSI N., RYAN J. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5             In March 2017, DCS began dependency proceedings against
    both parents as to S.J. and against mother as to D.C. The superior court
    adjudicated the children dependent as to mother in June 2017. DCS
    implemented an in-home dependency with mother and the children living
    with the children’s maternal grandmother. S.J. was adjudicated dependent
    as to father in September 2017. Because mother continued to test positive
    for methamphetamine and amphetamine, DCS terminated the in-home
    dependency and placed the children in maternal grandmother’s physical
    custody.
    ¶6            In January 2018, father was charged with dangerous drug
    possession and held at the Maricopa County Jail. He ultimately pled guilty.
    On November 26, 2018, the criminal court sentenced father to concurrent
    terms on the 2014 burglary charge and the 2018 dangerous drug possession
    charge. Father has been incarcerated since that time. Father’s earliest release
    date on those sentences was November 14, 2019; his latest release date is
    May 26, 2020.
    ¶7            In November 2018, DCS moved to terminate father’s parental
    rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) on the grounds of length of incarceration
    and fifteen months-in-care. DCS also moved to terminate mother’s parental
    rights on the grounds of chronic substance abuse, nine months’ in care, and
    fifteen months’ in care. The superior court held a contested severance trial.
    The superior court ordered severance on March 12, 2019. Mother moved to
    set aside the superior court’s severance ruling, which the superior court
    denied.
    ¶8            In April 2019, the superior court issued a final signed order
    finding DCS proved all grounds against father and mother by clear and
    convincing evidence. The superior court also found terminating parental
    rights was in the children’s best interests. The superior court’s initial ruling
    contained an error, so the superior court issued a nunc pro tunc order
    correcting the error in July 2019. Father and mother timely appealed. Father
    challenges the grounds for severance and the best-interests finding. Mother
    does not challenge the basis for the severance but argues the superior court
    erred in finding the severance was in the children’s best interests.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶9             A superior court may sever a parent’s rights if clear and
    convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground. See A.R.S.
    § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 288, ¶ 41 (2005); see also Michael
    J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    196 Ariz. 246
    , 249, ¶ 12 (2000). The superior
    3
    JESSI N., RYAN J. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    court also must find by a preponderance of the evidence termination is in
    the best interests of the child. See Kent 
    K., 210 Ariz. at 288
    , ¶ 41. Because the
    superior court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the
    parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this
    court will affirm an order terminating parental rights if reasonable evidence
    supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    223 Ariz. 86
    , 93, ¶ 18
    (App. 2009) (citations omitted).
    I.     Reasonable evidence establishes termination of father’s parental
    rights as to S.J. was proper.
    ¶10           A parent’s rights may be terminated when “the parent is
    deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony . . . if the sentence
    of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal
    home for a period of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). In assessing such a claim,
    the superior court should consider “all relevant factors,” including:
    (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship
    existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which
    the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured
    during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
    relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that
    incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the
    length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to
    provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the
    deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.
    Michael 
    J., 196 Ariz. at 251-52
    , ¶ 29. The superior court should consider each
    factor, but the absence of evidence on any one factor does not prevent a
    severance based on length of incarceration. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
    Econ. Sec., 
    214 Ariz. 445
    , 450, ¶ 15 (App. 2007).
    ¶11            No one factor in the record is dispositive, but when taken
    together, they establish reasonable evidence to support the superior court’s
    termination of father’s rights. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 
    234 Ariz. 437
    , 441, ¶ 17 (App. 2014). The record establishes father was first
    incarcerated shortly after S.J.’s birth. S.J. was less than a year old when
    father was incarcerated the second time. During his initial release from jail
    until his second incarceration, father had a total of nine in-person visits with
    S.J. In those visits S.J., an infant, only slept and ate. Father slept through
    some visits as well. Because of father’s incarceration, he has no relationship
    to continue with S.J. after his release. See Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    239 Ariz. 212
    , 215, ¶ 14 (App. 2016). Additionally, father still needs to resolve
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    JESSI N., RYAN J. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    his substance abuse issues before DCS could consider anything more than
    resuming supervised visits of the type he had before he was incarcerated.
    ¶12            During father’s incarceration, S.J. had no other parent to
    provide her a normal home life. Mother continued in her own struggles
    throughout the dependency. Mother did not complete any services and has
    not had custody of S.J. since father was incarcerated in 2017. Because of
    father’s incarceration, S.J. is not bonded with him. He has not been able to
    help S.J. with her emotional and behavioral issues. Father has not been able
    to provide for her basic needs.
    ¶13             Father’s incarceration undermined any relationship he might
    have had with S.J. and prevented him from providing for her needs. See
    Jeffrey 
    P., 239 Ariz. at 215
    , ¶ 14; Rocky 
    J., 234 Ariz. at 441
    , ¶ 17; Christy 
    C., 214 Ariz. at 450
    , ¶ 15. Though father’s sentence was only 2.25 years, that length
    amounts to most of S.J.’s life. Despite father’s pending release, the issue is
    how long he has been absent, not how long he has until his release. See Jesus
    M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    203 Ariz. 278
    , 281, ¶ 8 (App. 2002).
    ¶14           Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s order
    terminating father’s parental rights as to S.J. Accordingly, this court need
    not reach father’s challenge to the superior court’s findings regarding S.J.’s
    fifteen months’ in care.
    II.    Reasonable evidence establishes termination was in the children’s
    best interests.
    ¶15            In addition to proving grounds exist for termination, DCS
    must prove by a preponderance of the evidence terminating a parent’s
    rights would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Maricopa Cty.
    Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 
    167 Ariz. 1
    , 4 (1990). If a superior court has found
    the existence of a statutory ground for termination, the superior court “can
    presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge.” Alma S. v. Dep’t
    of Child Safety, 
    245 Ariz. 146
    , 150, ¶ 12 (2018) (quoting Kent 
    K., 210 Ariz. at 286
    , ¶ 35).
    ¶16            When reasonable evidence supports severance, a child’s
    “interest in stability and security” is the superior court’s main concern. See
    Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 
    239 Ariz. 1
    , 4, ¶ 15 (2016) (quoting Kent 
    K., 210 Ariz. at 286
    , ¶ 34). One factor is the bond between the parent and the child.
    Father has virtually no bond with S.J. Mother has a stronger bond with D.C.
    than with S.J., but the bond with both children is weak because of her
    ongoing absence from their lives.
    5
    JESSI N., RYAN J. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶17           Having extended family members, particularly a
    grandparent, supports a best-interests finding. A.R.S. § 8-514(B)(2).
    Maintaining sibling relationships also is a factor supporting a best-interests
    finding. See Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    194 Ariz. 376
    , 378, ¶ 6 (App.
    1998). Maternal grandmother currently has both children, is available as an
    adoptive home for both, and is meeting their needs. She stands in first
    preference as a placement. This factor shows the termination is in the
    children’s best interests, because it would allow the children to secure
    permanency together. See 
    id. Maternal grandmother
    also is well positioned
    to maintain the children’s relationship with extended family members,
    including paternal family members.
    ¶18           If maternal grandmother cannot adopt the children for any
    reason, DCS has a plan in place. Both children are loving, caring, and
    adoptable. DCS proved their adoption is likely, and they likely would be
    adopted together. See Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    244 Ariz. 365
    , 370-71,
    ¶ 22 (App. 2018) (“When . . . the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise
    legally possible and likely, a superior court may find that termination of
    parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.”).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶19             Father failed to show the superior court’s findings were not
    supported by trial evidence or otherwise were an abuse of discretion.
    Further reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s order
    terminating father’s and mother’s parental rights based on the children’s
    best interests. The superior court’s order terminating father’s parental
    rights to S.J. and mother’s parental rights to the children is affirmed.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6