Applied v. Discount ( 2021 )


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  •                           NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    APPLIED MERCHANT SYSTEMS WEST COAST LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,
    v.
    DISCOUNT PAYMENT SERVICES LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellants.
    No. 1 CA-CV 20-0031
    FILED 1-12-2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2019-000922
    The Honorable Timothy J. Thomason, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    DLA Piper LLP (US), Phoenix
    By Craig M. Waugh
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
    Alexander R. Arpad Esq., Phoenix
    By Alexander R. Arpad
    Covault Law, Phoenix
    By Jason Covault
    The Hallstrom Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Kyle Hallstrom
    Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellants Discount Payment Services, LLC and
    Marshall Greenwald
    APPLIED v. DISCOUNT, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    Honor Law Group PLLC, Tempe
    By James M. Cool
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Aimee Greenwald
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Chief Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which
    Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop
    joined.
    S W A N N, Chief Judge:
    ¶1           Appellants Discount Payment Services, LLC (“Discount”)
    and Aimee Greenwald challenge the superior court’s grant of summary
    judgment to Appellee Applied Merchant Systems West Coast, LLC
    (“Applied”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           Discount sells credit card processing solutions to businesses.
    Each business account generates processing fees that merchants pay to
    Discount’s processing servicer, Paya, who pays residuals to Discount each
    month based on the amount of fees collected.
    ¶3            On November 15, 2013, Discount borrowed $475,000 from
    Applied’s predecessor-in-interest, BlueAcre Ventures LLC (“BlueAcre”),
    under a Secured Residual Loan Agreement (the “Loan Agreement”).
    Discount granted BlueAcre a security interest in its agreements with Paya
    and assigned the residuals it received from those agreements “to allow for
    all the Residuals to be paid directly to [BlueAcre] to satisfy [Discount’s]
    Loan Obligations.” Discount, BlueAcre, and Paya also executed an
    Authorization to Pay Residuals (the “Authorization”) under which
    Discount collaterally assigned “all of [its] Residuals due and payable” from
    Paya and authorized Paya “to make payments of the Assigned Residuals
    directly to [BlueAcre].” Discount and BlueAcre also executed an Option
    Agreement granting BlueAcre an option to identify and purchase certain
    accounts from Discount’s portfolio that, when combined, would average
    $18,581.79 of residuals per calendar month, matching Discount’s monthly
    payment on the BlueAcre loan (the “Option Agreement”).
    2
    APPLIED v. DISCOUNT, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶4          Section 1.02 of the Option Agreement provided the method
    by which BlueAcre could exercise its option:
    The Option may be exercised by the Company [BlueAcre]
    delivering a notice of intent to exercise to owner [Discount]
    (a) no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the Owner pays
    the Loan in full (as determined by Company in Company’s
    sole discretion); or (b) subject to Owner’s right to cure under
    the Loan Agreement, upon any material breach by Owner of
    the Loan Agreement or any other Loan Document between
    Owner and Company (as such breach is determined by
    Company in Company’s reasonable discretion) and at any
    time following such breach. Such notice shall identify this
    Agreement and shall be sent to Owner at the addresses set
    forth in Section 2.06. Within a reasonable period of time
    thereafter not to exceed forty-five (45) days (subject to Section
    1.06 of this Agreement), Owner and Company shall execute
    and enter into a portfolio purchase agreement for the
    Purchased Merchants in substantially the form attached
    hereto as Exhibit A (the “Portfolio Purchase Agreement”).
    ¶5            On July 12, 2016, Discount and BlueAcre entered a
    Supplemental Agreement to the Option Agreement (“Supplemental
    Agreement”). There, the parties agreed to reduce BlueAcre’s purchase
    price under the option from $90,000 to $72,000 if paid by the next day, which
    BlueAcre did. The parties also agreed that BlueAcre had given notice of its
    intent to exercise its option:
    By executing this Agreement and delivering said reduced
    purchase price to Owner [Discount], Owner hereby
    acknowledges that the notice of intent to exercise of the option
    granted under the Option Agreement has been given by
    Company [BlueAcre] to Owner as required under the Option
    Agreement.
    The Supplemental Agreement also provided that the parties would “enter
    into a portfolio purchase agreement . . . within thirty (30) calendar days after
    payment in full of the Loan . . . as required by the Loan Agreement” but left
    all other Loan Agreement and Option Agreement terms unchanged.
    BlueAcre assigned its interests under the agreements to Applied in a
    Consent to Assignment Agreement (“Consent to Assignment”) executed by
    BlueAcre, Applied, Discount, and Paya’s predecessor.
    3
    APPLIED v. DISCOUNT, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶6             Discount fully repaid the BlueAcre loan on or about
    November 15, 2016. Applied provided Discount with its selection of
    accounts on December 22, 2016, six days after the deadline to do so under
    the Supplemental Agreement. At Discount’s request, Applied made
    revised selections on or about January 10, 2017, and Discount asked that the
    list “be attached as an Exhibit to the Portfolio Purchase Agreement. The
    parties did not, however, execute a Portfolio Purchase Agreement”
    (referred to hereinafter as “PPA”).
    ¶7            Paya paid the November 2016, December 2016, and January
    2017 residuals to Applied. Discount wrote to Applied on January 18, 2017,
    contending the sale could not close without a PPA but that it remained
    willing to execute a PPA if Applied remitted these residuals. Applied did
    not turn over the residuals; it instead sent Discount a revised draft PPA
    under which it would keep all funds it had retained from when it paid the
    reduced purchase price in July 2016. Discount did not sign the revised
    draft.
    ¶8             Applied sued Discount in January 2019, alleging Discount
    had wrongly instructed Paya to direct March 2018 and April 2018 residuals
    to itself.1 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court
    ruled Applied had properly exercised its option by “[p]roviding the notice
    of intent to exercise,” at which point “[a] bilateral contract was created.” It
    further determined that “[t]he language about signing the [PPA] is in a later
    clause that does not describe the actual exercise of the option” and that the
    parties’ failure to execute any such agreement did not give Discount the
    right to terminate the option. The court ordered Discount “to execute a
    [PPA] evidencing Applied’s purchase and Discount’s sale of the residual
    rights” associated with the accounts identified on January 10, 2017. The
    court also directed Paya to pay residuals it had held pending resolution of
    the dispute on a stipulated list of accounts to Applied and pay all other held
    residuals to Discount.
    ¶9            Discount appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶10           We review the superior court’s interpretation of the parties’
    contracts de novo. Dunn v. Fast Med. Urgent Care PC, 
    245 Ariz. 35
    , 38, ¶ 10
    (App. 2018). Regarding the rulings on cross-motions for summary
    1     Applied also sued on a second option that is not at issue in this
    appeal.
    4
    APPLIED v. DISCOUNT, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    judgment, we review questions of law de novo but review the facts in a
    light most favorable to the parties against whom summary judgment was
    granted. Nelson v. Phx. Resort Corp., 
    181 Ariz. 188
    , 191 (App. 1994). The
    court may grant summary judgment only if it finds there are no genuine
    issues of material fact and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter
    of law. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. James, 
    118 Ariz. 116
    , 118 (1978).
    Summary judgment is inappropriate if the facts, even if undisputed, would
    allow reasonable minds to differ on the appropriate legal result. Nelson, 
    181 Ariz. at 191
    .
    I.     APPLIED PROPERLY EXERCISED THE OPTION.
    ¶11            Discount contends Applied did not properly exercise the
    option, arguing it only could be exercised by (1) delivering notice of the
    intent to exercise and (2) entering a PPA. An option must be exercised in
    strict compliance with its terms and conditions. Best v. Miranda, 
    229 Ariz. 246
    , 248, ¶ 7 (App. 2012).
    ¶12             Section 1.02 of the option states that it “may be exercised by
    . . . delivering a notice of intent to exercise” to Discount, which the parties
    agreed took place. But the obligation to “execute and enter into a [PPA]”
    comes “[w]ithin a reasonable period of time thereafter not to exceed forty-
    five (45) days” and the responsibility to execute the PPA falls on both
    parties, not just Applied. Section 1.02 also references section 1.06, which
    provides:
    If [Discount] the Owner and [BlueAcre] Company fail to enter
    into the [PPA] within forty-five (45) days after Company
    delivers a notice of intent to exercise . . . then, upon Company
    request, the Owner will pay to Company . . . a termination fee
    in an amount equal to $50,000.00.
    And section 1.05 allows Applied to request “such further instruments as [it]
    may reasonably require in order to confirm . . . the rights, licenses,
    privileges and property which are the subject of the Option.” Indeed, no
    part of the option suggests that exercise of the option becomes invalid or
    incomplete if the parties do not timely execute a PPA. Applied therefore
    did not have to complete a PPA to exercise its option.
    ¶13           Discount also contends Applied had to identify the specific
    accounts it would purchase before executing a PPA, citing section 1.04 of
    the Option Agreement. Applied did so on December 22, 2016, and January
    10, 2017. Discount accepted the latter selections, thereby waiving any
    objection to their timeliness under the Supplemental Agreement. And
    5
    APPLIED v. DISCOUNT, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    Discount does not challenge the court’s finding that “when Applied elected
    the purchased accounts, it accounted for and paid [Discount] for all
    Residuals other than those generated by accounts actually purchased.”
    ¶14           Discount also contends Applied could not own the purchased
    accounts until a PPA was in place, again citing section 1.04 of the Option
    Agreement:
    Upon the execution of the [PPA] and payment of the purchase
    price thereunder, the Purchased Merchants, which shall be
    jointly identified by Owner and the Company (subject to
    Company’s final selection) shall be owned by the Company.
    Even assuming this is correct, Discount had already assigned its right to
    receive the residuals. The Loan Agreement authorized “residual redirection
    or assignment” with Applied taking monthly loan payments “upon receipt
    of Residuals and pay[ing] any balance remaining to [Discount],” defining
    “Residuals” as “payments and rights to payments,” not accounts. And the
    Authorization documents Discount’s assignment of “all of [its] Residuals
    due and payable . . . from [Paya]” so that Paya could “make payments . . .
    directly to [BlueAcre].”
    ¶15             The Loan Agreement also obligated Applied, if it exercised
    the option, to “take all necessary actions to assign the non-purchased
    Residuals . . . back to [Discount]” once the loan was paid in full. The parties
    did not agree on which accounts Applied would purchase until January
    2017, and Discount does not challenge the court’s finding that Applied
    subsequently paid Discount for all residuals other than those generated by
    those accounts.
    II.    APPLIED DID NOT BREACH OR REPUDIATE THE PARTIES’
    CONTRACTS BY RETAINING THE NOVEMBER 2016 THROUGH
    JANUARY 2017 RESIDUALS.
    ¶16           Discount’s contention that Applied breached or repudiated
    the parties’ agreements by retaining the November 2016, December 2016,
    and January 2017 residuals fails for the same reason. Discount again argues
    Applied never took ownership of the accounts because there is no PPA, but
    as previously noted, Applied retained the residuals, not accounts.
    ¶17          Discount also cites section 3.1(a) of the Loan Agreement,
    which gave it the right to receive residuals in the time between “the
    payment in full of the Loan” and “the date that said Residuals are assigned
    back to Borrower or purchased by Lender pursuant to the Option
    6
    APPLIED v. DISCOUNT, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    Agreement.” That section also requires, as quoted above, that Applied take
    any necessary steps to assign non-purchased residuals and merchant
    agreements back to Discount if it exercised the option. This requirement
    would be meaningless if Discount would have been entitled to receive all
    residuals upon repaying the remaining balance of the loan. Again, it is
    undisputed that Applied paid Discount the residuals for accounts it did not
    select under the Option Agreement in January 2017.
    ¶18          The Option Agreement calls for specific performance “of the
    terms hereof and the [PPA]” if it is breached. We therefore affirm the
    superior court’s order directing the parties to execute a PPA evincing
    Applied’s purchase of the accounts identified in the court’s amended
    judgment.
    III.   ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.
    ¶19           Both parties request their attorney fees and costs incurred in
    this appeal under the Option Agreement:
    Should suit or arbitration be brought to enforce or interpret
    any part of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be
    entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,
    including expert witness fees and fees on any appeal.
    Generally, we enforce a contractual attorney’s fees provision according to
    its terms. Harle v. Williams, 
    246 Ariz. 330
    , 333, ¶ 10 (App. 2019). Applied is
    the prevailing party in this appeal and may recover its reasonable attorney’s
    fees and taxable costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶20           We affirm the judgment.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 20-0031

Filed Date: 1/12/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2021