State v. Thompson ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    WILLIAM VINCENT THOMPSON, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 19-0329
    FILED 7-30-2020
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2017-145079-001
    The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Joseph T. Maziarz
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Mikel Steinfeld
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Chief Judge Peter B. Swann
    joined.
    W I N T H R O P, Judge:
    ¶1           William Vincent Thompson (“Thompson”) appeals the
    superior court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered by
    police during a search of his home. Thompson argues the search was
    unlawful because it was authorized by a warrant premised on information
    gained in an unlawful protective sweep. For the foregoing reasons, we
    affirm.
    FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2           On October 1, 2017, Tempe police officers responded to an
    incident where a neighborhood resident, Thompson, threatened and
    pointed a gun at several individuals on his street after an argument about
    parking. When officers arrived at the scene, Thompson was inside his
    house. Officers set up a perimeter around the house, contacted Thompson
    by phone, and detained Thompson after he exited his residence. Thompson
    did not have on him the gun used in the incident.
    ¶3          After detaining Thompson, officers conducted a protective
    sweep of Thompson’s residence to assure no one else was inside the house.
    During the sweep, officers observed three jars of marijuana in a bedroom
    closet.
    ¶4           Officers applied for a search warrant to find the gun used in
    the incident and to seize the marijuana observed during the protective
    sweep. The court issued the warrant, authorizing officers to search
    1       “In reviewing a motion to suppress, we review only the facts
    presented to the superior court at the suppression hearing” and view those
    facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s decision.
    State v. Mendoza-Ruiz, 
    225 Ariz. 473
    , 474, ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2010); accord State v.
    Goudeau, 
    239 Ariz. 421
    , 439, ¶ 26 (2016) (citing State v. Manuel, 
    229 Ariz. 1
    ,
    4, ¶ 11 (2011)).
    2
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    Thompson’s residence and the vehicle in his driveway for the gun, firearm-
    related paraphernalia, or items to establish Thompson’s ownership of the
    gun, as well as the marijuana and any drug paraphernalia. As relevant
    here, in executing the warrant officers found and seized a .22-caliber
    handgun, three magazines of ammunition, nine unspent rounds of
    ammunition, and the previously-observed jars of marijuana.
    ¶5           Thompson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized
    during the search, arguing the initial protective sweep was unlawful
    because there were no specific and articulable facts to suggest that anyone
    else was in Thompson’s residence. Thompson contended that because the
    sweep was unlawful, the eventual search was also unlawful because it was
    based on a warrant containing information gained during the unlawful
    sweep.
    ¶6             First, the state contended that the sweep was lawful based on
    the officers’ general safety concerns, and so the resulting warrant was valid.
    Second, the state argued that even if the sweep was unlawful and
    information related to it was excised from the warrant, there was still
    adequate evidence to establish probable cause, and the warrant was valid.
    Finally, the state argued that even if there was not probable cause, the
    evidence should not be excluded because the officers acted in good faith
    reliance on the warrant.
    ¶7             The court denied the motion to suppress, finding first that the
    protective sweep was unlawful because there were no specific and
    articulable facts to suggest someone else was in the home and second, that
    even without the information gained during the protective sweep, there
    was still probable cause supporting the issuance of a search warrant for
    Thompson’s residence and vehicle.
    ¶8            Thompson was eventually found guilty of three counts of
    aggravated assault and pled guilty to one count of possession of narcotic
    drugs. He was sentenced to 6.5 years in prison. This timely appeal
    followed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
    Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-
    120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A).
    ANALYSIS
    I.     Standard of Review
    ¶9            We review a denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of
    discretion; however, we review de novo the superior court’s determination
    3
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    as to the existence of probable cause. 
    Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 439
    , ¶ 26. “A
    trial court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law or exercises its
    discretion based on incorrect legal principles.” State v. Slover, 
    220 Ariz. 239
    ,
    242, ¶ 4 (App. 2009). We recognize that the superior court’s task was to
    “determine whether the totality of the circumstances indicates a substantial
    basis for the magistrate’s decision” to issue the warrant, and we also grant
    deference to the magistrate’s decision. State v. Crowley, 
    202 Ariz. 80
    , 83, ¶ 7
    (App. 2002) (quoting State v. Hyde, 
    186 Ariz. 252
    , 272 (1996)). We “must
    presume a search warrant is valid” and will affirm the superior court’s
    denial of a motion to suppress if it is legally correct for any reason
    supported by the record.
    Id. (citing Greehling v.
    State, 
    136 Ariz. 175
    , 176
    (1983)); see State v. Dugan, 
    113 Ariz. 354
    , 356 (1976); State v. Claxton, 
    122 Ariz. 246
    , 249 (App. 1979).
    II.     Probable Cause
    ¶10           Thompson argues that without the information gained from
    the unlawful sweep, there was not sufficient probable cause to issue the
    warrant to search Thompson’s residence. Specifically, Thompson contends
    nothing in the remainder of the supporting affidavit or warrant suggested
    evidence of the assault would be found in the house; rather, the only
    information officers received regarding the location of the gun was a
    victim’s statement that Thompson had placed the gun in his truck in the
    driveway after the altercation ended. In other words, without the discovery
    of marijuana inside the house, officers would have only had cause to search
    the truck and not the residence.
    ¶11          In response, the state argues the warrant clearly set forth
    probable cause because removing information related to the sweep from
    the warrant would only eliminate information about the marijuana and
    would have no effect on the affidavit as to the gun, related paraphernalia,
    or evidence proving ownership of the gun.2 The state also asserts there was
    probable cause because common sense dictates that Thompson would not
    2      The state’s primary argument is that the search warrant was valid
    because the supporting affidavit did not contain any deliberate or reckless
    falsehoods or omissions. While falsity is one basis to exclude information
    from a warrant, it is not the only basis. Excision is also proper where
    information from an unlawful underlying search is included in the affidavit
    and warrant. See United States v. Karo, 
    468 U.S. 705
    , 719 (1984) (citing Franks
    v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    , 172 (1978)). As the latter is the purported basis for
    excision in this case, we do not address whether deliberate or reckless
    falsehoods or omissions were contained in the affidavit.
    4
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    leave the gun outside, unattended, and in plain view in his truck while he
    returned inside his home.
    ¶12           A valid search warrant requires probable cause, supported by
    an affidavit. U.S. Const. amend. IV; A.R.S. § 13-3913. Probable cause exists
    when, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, “there is a fair
    probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
    particular place” at the time when the search is conducted. United States v.
    Grubbs, 
    547 U.S. 90
    , 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238
    (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 
    Crowley, 202 Ariz. at 85
    ,
    ¶ 12 (citing 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 238
    ). “Probable cause cannot be established
    by mere suspicion that a search will reveal items connected to criminal
    activity.” Frimmel v. Sanders, 
    236 Ariz. 232
    , 241, ¶ 40 (App. 2014).
    ¶13              “[A]ffidavits are to be interpreted in a common sense and
    realistic manner.” State v. Summerlin, 
    138 Ariz. 426
    , 431 (1983) (quoting
    United States v. Lucarz, 
    430 F.2d 1051
    , 1055 (9th Cir. 1970)). If unlawfully
    obtained information is included in a warrant affidavit, the court must
    excise such information from the affidavit and determine if the remaining
    untainted information is sufficient to establish probable cause. See 
    Karo, 468 U.S. at 719
    (citing 
    Franks, 438 U.S. at 172
    ); State v. Gulbrandson, 
    184 Ariz. 46
    ,
    58 (1995) (“The proper method for determining the validity of the
    search . . . is to excise the illegally obtained information from the affidavit
    and then determine whether the remaining information is sufficient to
    establish probable cause.”). “Close cases should be resolved by giving
    preference to the validity of warrants.” 
    Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 272
    (citing 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
    ).
    ¶14           Here, the affidavit established that, after an argument in front
    of his home about neighborhood parking, Thompson went into his
    residence and then brought outside a black handgun. Thompson pointed
    the gun at multiple victims and “pulled the slide of the gun back with his
    left hand to chamber a round,” at one point holding the gun a mere twelve
    inches from a victim’s chest. As the situation deescalated, one of the three
    victims reported seeing Thompson place the gun in his truck in the
    driveway before walking inside his home, where he remained until police
    arrived.
    ¶15           Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
    that the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress because, as
    excised, the affidavit still supported the court’s finding of probable cause.
    On the facts above, there was a fair probability that evidence of the assault
    would be found in either the truck or the residence, or both, as these were
    5
    STATE v. THOMPSON
    Decision of the Court
    locations Thompson accessed over the course of the argument and assault.
    Moreover, the affidavit reflected that Thompson chambered at least one
    round during the assault, which could lead a reasonable person to conclude
    additional ammunition, receipts of purchase, related paraphernalia, or
    proof of ownership of the weapon were likely inside the residence where
    Thompson had retrieved the gun and ammunition.3
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
    denial of Thompson’s motion to suppress.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    3      Because we affirm on the issue of probable cause, we need not
    address the state’s argument concerning application of the “good faith”
    exception to the exclusionary rule.
    6