Rodriguez v. Lytle ( 2021 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    LAURA PATRICIA RODRIGUEZ, et al.,
    Plaintiffs/Appellants,
    v.
    JUSTIN ALEXANDER LYTLE, et al.,
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 20-0048
    FILED 2-16-2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2019-010440
    The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders, Judge
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Mick Levin, PLC, Phoenix
    By Mick Levin
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
    Blake Law Firm, PC, Phoenix
    By William W. Black
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP, Scottsdale
    By Lynn M. Allen, Kimberly J. Sayre
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
    RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. LYTLE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.
    W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:
    ¶1           Iran Gamez De La Garza, as personal representative for the
    Estates of Iran Gamez and Roger Gamez (collectively, the “Estates”),
    appeals the superior court’s dismissal of their survival actions under
    Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). We reverse and remand for
    additional proceedings consistent with this decision.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
    ¶2           In November 2017, Justin Lytle was driving his parent’s car
    above the posted speed limit when he “became distracted” and struck two
    brothers crossing Tatum Boulevard in Phoenix. Fifteen-year-old Roger
    Gamez died at the scene from his injuries. Seventeen-year-old Iran Gamez
    was rushed to the hospital where he died a short time later.
    ¶3              This lawsuit followed against Justin and his parents
    (collectively, the “Lytles”) for (1) wrongful death under A.R.S. § 12-612, and
    (2) economic loss on behalf of the Estates under A.R.S. § 14-3110, Arizona’s
    survival statute.2 The complaint identified different named plaintiffs for
    each claim:
    •   Roger and Iran’s Mother—Laura Patricia Rodriguez Vazquez
    (“Mother”)—asserted the wrongful death claims “on behalf of the
    statutory beneficiaries,” seeking damages for the “lost . . . love,
    affection, companionship, care, protection, and guidance Iran and
    Roger provided to them,” the “pain, grief, sorrow, anguish, stress,
    1      A complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true
    under Rule 12(c). Save Our Valley Ass’n v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 
    216 Ariz. 216
    ,
    218-19, ¶ 6 (App. 2007).
    2      Although the complaint was captioned “Wrongful Death,” it stated
    that the Estates “bring their claims pursuant to A.R.S. 14-3110.”
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    RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. LYTLE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    shock, and mental suffering” caused by their loss, and “funeral,
    burial, and memorial expenses.”
    •   Roger and Iran’s Father—Iran Gamez De La Garza (“Father”)—
    asserted the asserted the survival statute claims on behalf of the
    Estates, seeking damages for their “economic loss[es], . . . which in
    present dollars is $306,755 for Iran, and $343,681 for Roger.”
    ¶4              The Lytles moved to dismiss the Estates’ survival claims
    under Rule 12(c) because “a decedent’s estate may bring an action to
    recover damages only if the decedent is survived by neither parents, spouse
    nor children,” and “since all of these damages occurred after the death, they
    are not recoverable under the survival statute.” After oral argument, the
    superior court granted the motion, reasoning that (1) because the
    decedents’ parents could recover damages for economic loss in their
    wrongful death action, they could not recover “these damages twice by
    filing [two] actions pursuant to different statutes,” and (2) the Estates could
    not recover the decedents’ economic damages that “occurred after the[ir]
    death[s] . . . under the survival statute.” The Estates timely appealed. We
    have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A) and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5             A Rule 12(c) motion “tests the sufficiency of the complaint,
    and judgment should be entered for the defendant if the complaint fails to
    state a claim for relief.” Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 
    195 Ariz. 358
    , 359, ¶ 2
    (App. 1999). Our review is de novo. See Indus. Comm’n v. Old Republic Ins.
    Co., 
    223 Ariz. 75
    , 77, ¶ 6 (App. 2009) (dismissal under Rule 12(c) is reviewed
    de novo); Swift Transp. Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    249 Ariz. 382
    , 385, ¶¶
    13, 17 (App. 2020) (issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo).
    ¶6          At issue here are the Estates’ claims for economic damages
    under Arizona’s survival statute, which provides:
    Every cause of action, except a cause of action for damages for
    breach of promise to marry, seduction, libel, slander, separate
    maintenance, alimony, loss of consortium or invasion of the
    right of privacy, shall survive the death of the person entitled
    thereto or liable therefor, and may be asserted by or against
    the personal representative of such person, provided that
    upon the death of the person injured, damages for pain and
    suffering of such injured person shall not be allowed.
    A.R.S. § 14-3110.
    3
    RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. LYTLE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶7             First, the Estates argue the superior court erroneously
    concluded that “the minor decedents[‘] parents . . . cannot recover . . . these
    damages twice by filing [two] actions pursuant to different statutes,”
    namely, the survival and wrongful death statutes. They contend that a
    wrongful death beneficiary’s damages are “separate and distinct” from an
    estate’s survival action damages. We agree. The survival statute, A.R.S. §
    14-3110, empowers a “decedent’s personal representative to pursue the
    decedent’s personal injury claim against a tortfeasor,” excluding damages
    for “pain and suffering” and “hedonistic damages.” Quintero v. Rodgers,
    
    221 Ariz. 536
    , 539 (App. 2009). The wrongful death statute, A.R.S. § 12-612,
    is “an original and distinct claim for damages sustained by the statutory
    beneficiaries and is not derivative or a continuation of a claim existing in
    the decedent.” See Barragan v. Superior Court, 
    12 Ariz. App. 402
    , 404 (1970)
    (a wrongful death action “is for the wrong to the beneficiaries, confined to
    their loss because of the death”). As this court held in Barragan:
    [A] claim under the survival statute and a claim under the
    wrongful death statute are separate and distinct
    notwithstanding they originate from the same wrongful act.
    The former permits recovery for the wrong to the injured
    person and is confined to his personal loss while the latter is
    for the wrong to the beneficiaries, confined to their loss
    because of the death. The latter begins where the former ends
    and recovery on both is not a double recovery for a single
    wrong but rather separate recoveries for different wrongs.
    
    Id.
    ¶8            The Estates next argue the superior court erroneously held
    that economic loss damages were not recoverable under the survival statute
    “since all of these damages occurred after the death[s].” We disagree.
    Although the survival statute’s plain language preserves “[e]very cause of
    action,” and does not exclude claims for economic loss, Arizona courts have
    interpreted the statute, since 1970, to limit the scope of economic damages
    to those “sustained . . . from the time of accident until his death.” Barragan,
    12 Ariz. App. at 404; accord Martin v. Staheli, 
    248 Ariz. 87
    , 92, ¶ 15 (App.
    2019).
    ¶9             Nevertheless, we must reverse and remand the superior
    court’s Rule 12(c) dismissal because the complaint (1) does not assert that
    the Estates’ survival actions only seek economic loss damages suffered after
    Roger and Iran died, and (2) does not allege that either Roger or Iran died
    4
    RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. LYTLE, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    instantly.3 In sum, because the Estates may pursue economic loss damages
    sustained “from the time of accident until [Iran’s and Roger’s] death,” see
    Barragan, 12 Ariz. App. at 404, we remand for the superior court to consider
    whether such damages were incurred.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶10           We reverse the superior court’s dismissal of the Estates’
    survival actions and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this
    decision.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    3      According to the complaint, Roger died at the accident scene and
    Iran died at the hospital.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 20-0048

Filed Date: 2/16/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/16/2021