Lara S. v. Dcs ( 2020 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    LARA S., Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, O.S., O.S., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 20-0220
    FILED 12-3-2020
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD21161
    JS20335
    The Honorable Robert Ian Brooks, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    John L. Popilek, Scottsdale
    Counsel for Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Sandra L. Nahigian
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    LARA S. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
    T H U M M A, Judge:
    ¶1           Lara S. (Mother) challenges the superior court’s order
    terminating her parental rights to her biological twin children. Because
    Mother has shown no error, the order is affirmed.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Mother is 31 years old. She began using methamphetamines
    when she was 12. Other than when she has been incarcerated, Mother has
    not been sober for more than a year or two since then. Mother had three
    children before the twins. Her first child was born substance–exposed in
    late 2011, and the Department of Child Services (DCS) took custody of the
    child. Mother refused to participate in services, including for substance
    abuse, and her parental rights were terminated in late 2012. Mother’s
    second child, V.F., was born substance–exposed in late 2018, and DCS took
    custody of the child. Again, Mother refused to participate in services and
    her parental rights to V.F. were terminated in early 2020, based on
    substance abuse, abandonment, six months’ time-in-care and length of
    felony prison sentence. Mother’s third child lives with his father in South
    Carolina; Mother’s parental rights to that child have not been terminated.
    ¶3            In July 2019, Mother was arrested for absconding from
    probation (for a possession of heroin offense) and a new offense of unlawful
    flight from law enforcement. By that time, Mother had been on probation
    for more than eight years. She had participated in many outpatient
    substance abuse treatment programs, but continued to abuse drugs,
    showing “a lack of commitment to living a drug-free lifestyle.” While in
    custody for the probation violation, Mother completed several counseling
    and substance-abuse treatment programs. Within a month of being
    released, however, Mother returned to using methamphetamine. In
    September 2019, Mother was sentenced to two years in prison, with an early
    release date in October 2020 and a maximum end date in April 2021.
    2
    LARA S. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶4             When initially incarcerated, Mother tested positive for opiates
    and apparently first learned she was pregnant with the twins, who were
    born in December 2019. DCS took custody of the twins soon after they were
    born and filed both a dependency petition and a petition to terminate her
    parental rights to the twins. DCS alleged two grounds for terminating
    parental rights: substance abuse and prior termination for the same cause
    within two years. DCS also alleged that termination would be in the best
    interests of the twins.
    ¶5             At a one-day termination adjudication in July 2020, Mother
    testified she had been using drugs up until she was incarcerated in July 2019
    and admitted she would have continued to use drugs if she had not been
    arrested, meaning her children would likely have been born substance-
    exposed. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the twins on the
    grounds alleged and because termination would be in the twins’ best
    interests. This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal pursuant
    to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes
    (A.R.S.) sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) and 12-2101(A) and Arizona Rules
    of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103–104 (2020).1
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6             As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must
    find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground set
    out in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a preponderance
    of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. See Kent
    K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
    Sec., 
    196 Ariz. 246
    , 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court “is in the best
    position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of
    witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm an order
    terminating parental rights as long as it is supported by reasonable
    evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    223 Ariz. 86
    , 93 ¶ 18 (App.
    2009) (citation omitted).
    1Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited
    refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
    3
    LARA S. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    I.   Mother Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Finding
    Terminating Her Parental Rights to the Twins Was the “Same
    Cause” as the Prior Termination.
    ¶7            The parent-child relationship may be terminated when a
    parent had her “parental rights to another child terminated within the
    preceding two years for the same cause and is currently unable to discharge
    parental responsibilities due to the same cause.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(10); see
    also Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 48–49 ¶¶ 11–13
    (App. 2004). The “same cause” requirement refers to the same underlying
    factual cause that led to the prior termination. See Mary Lou 
    C., 207 Ariz. at 48
    ¶ 11.
    ¶8           The court terminated Mother’s parental rights to V.F. on
    various grounds, including chronic substance abuse. The court found
    Mother had a history of chronic substance abuse, beginning at age 12 and
    continuing until the trial. The court also found DCS made reasonable efforts
    to provide Mother with appropriate services (including substance–abuse
    treatment) but that Mother refused to participate. Given these findings, the
    court found Mother’s substance abuse would remain an issue in the future.
    ¶9            DCS alleged that the cause for terminating Mother’s parental
    rights to both V.F. and the twins included chronic substance abuse. In
    terminating Mother’s parental rights to the twins, the court held that “[t]he
    cause of this termination [is] virtually indistinguishable from [V.F.’s]
    termination. Mother remains incarcerated, has not demonstrated that she
    can maintain sobriety outside of a controlled environment, and has
    maintained almost no contact with” DCS. Mother argues the fact that she is
    now addressing mental health issues underlying her substance abuse
    differentiates the present circumstances from those that led to the
    termination of her parental rights to V.F. However, the record supports the
    court’s determination that Mother’s chronic drug abuse would continue,
    finding “the path to parenting could be a period of years given her history
    of substance abuse.” Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in
    finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother is currently unable
    to parent the twins because of the same cause that led to the termination of
    her parental rights to V.F.2
    2 Given this conclusion, this court need not address Mother’s arguments
    regarding the other statutory ground found by the superior court. See
    Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    196 Ariz. 246
    , 251 ¶ 27 (2000).
    4
    LARA S. v. DCS, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    II.    Mother Has Not Shown the Court Erred in Finding Termination
    Was in the Twins’ Best Interests.
    ¶10            The best interests determination “focuses primarily upon the
    interest of the child, as distinct from those of the parent.” Kent 
    K., 210 Ariz. at 287
    ¶ 37. “[A] determination of the child’s best interest[s] must include a
    finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed
    by the continuation of the relationship.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-
    500274, 
    167 Ariz. 1
    , 5 (1990) (citing cases). A best interests finding may be
    based on “the immediate availability of an adoptive placement.” Audra T.
    v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    194 Ariz. 376
    , 377 ¶ 5 (App. 1998). Maintaining
    sibling relationships also supports a best interests finding. See
    id. at 378 ¶ 6. ¶11
               Here, the twins and V.F. currently are in a familial placement
    that is looking to adopt the twins. Although Mother has made some
    progress in addressing her mental health issues, the court found that
    delaying permanency for an extended (and perhaps indefinite) period was
    not in the twins’ best interests. See In re. Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-
    501568, 
    177 Ariz. 571
    , 577 (App. 1994). Accordingly, Mother has not shown
    the court erred in finding that DCS proved termination was in the twins’
    best interests.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12            The superior court’s order terminating Mother’s parental
    rights to the twins is affirmed.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 20-0220

Filed Date: 12/3/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/3/2020