State v. Williams ( 2023 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    THEODORE BRADY WILLIAMS, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 22-0136
    FILED 5-4-2023
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
    No. S8015CR202100412
    The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Jr., Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Andrew Reilly
    Counsel for Appellee
    Jill L. Evans Attorney at Law, Flagstaff
    By Jill L. Evans
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Acting Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the
    Court, in which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.
    M O R S E, Judge:
    ¶1            Theodore Brady Williams appeals his convictions and
    sentences for one count of aggravated assault, a class 3 felony, and one
    count of disorderly conduct, a class 6 felony. We affirm in part and vacate
    in part.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2             In April 2021, two families were camping near Kingman,
    Arizona. In the late afternoon, four of the families' young boys rode their
    all-terrain vehicles ("ATVs") down a trail toward a nearby wash. Williams
    had set up camp near the wash, about 60-75 feet from the ATV trail.
    ¶3            Williams took issue with the boys riding near his campsite
    and yelled to try to get their attention. The boys could not hear Williams
    initially because of their padded helmets and the noise from their ATVs.
    Williams proceeded to retrieve a handgun from his truck and fire two shots
    near where the boys were riding. The gunshots scared the boys and caused
    them to leave the area near Williams's campsite and return to their parents.
    ¶4            The boys' parents went to Williams's campsite to speak with
    him about the incident. When they arrived, Williams pulled out a gun and
    threatened to shoot. Williams told the parents that he "shot at" the boys and
    later confirmed to police that he had "fired two shots to get their attention."
    Williams claimed the boys were burning out, doing doughnuts, and
    creating a "whirlwind of dirt," but the police found no evidence of this
    behavior and found no ATV tracks within 60 feet of Williams's campsite.
    ¶5           The State charged Williams with aggravated assault and
    disorderly conduct involving a weapon. A jury convicted Williams of both
    charges. The superior court suspended imposition of Williams's sentence
    and placed him on three years' supervised probation.
    2
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    Decision of the Court
    ¶6            Williams timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
    Arizona Constitution article VI, section 9 and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
    13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Sufficiency of the Evidence.
    ¶7           Williams challenges the sufficiency of the                 evidence
    supporting his conviction for aggravated assault.
    ¶8             We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. State v.
    West, 
    226 Ariz. 559
    , 562, ¶ 15 (2011). We view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to affirming the verdict, and "will reverse only if there is a
    complete absence of substantial evidence to support the conviction." State
    v. Ramsey, 
    211 Ariz. 529
    , 542, ¶ 40 (App. 2005) (citation omitted).
    "Substantial evidence is that which reasonable persons could accept as
    sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
    Davolt, 
    207 Ariz. 191
    , 212, ¶ 87 (2004). We will consider both direct and
    circumstantial evidence, West, 
    226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16
    , but we will not reweigh
    conflicting evidence or reassess witness credibility on appeal, State v.
    Buccheri-Bianca, 
    233 Ariz. 324
    , 334, ¶ 38 (App. 2013).
    ¶9              To support Williams's conviction, the State had to prove he
    "[i]ntentionally plac[ed] another person in reasonable apprehension of
    imminent physical injury" using "a deadly weapon or dangerous
    instrument." A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2), -1204(A)(2). Williams argues that the
    State failed to provide evidence of either his intent to place the boys in fear
    of imminent injury or that the boys feared imminent injury.
    ¶10            As to Williams's intent, because a defendant's mental state
    "will rarely be provable by direct evidence," a jury may "infer it from his
    behaviors and other circumstances surrounding the event." State v. Noriega,
    
    187 Ariz. 282
    , 286 (App. 1996); see also State v. Routhier, 
    137 Ariz. 90
    , 99 (1983)
    ("Criminal intent, being a state of mind, is shown by circumstantial
    evidence."). Viewed in its entirety, the evidence is sufficient to allow a
    reasonable factfinder to find that Williams intended to place the victims in
    reasonable apprehension of physical injury. See State v. VanWinkle, 
    230 Ariz. 387
    , 392, ¶ 16 (2012).
    ¶11          At least one victim recalled that Williams shouted at the
    group to get off his property before pointing his gun and firing the first
    shot. The jury heard Williams testify that he fired the first shot at a tree in
    the "opposite" direction from the children and fired a second shot to let
    3
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    Decision of the Court
    them know not to return. But an officer testified that the tree at which
    Williams claimed to shoot was only 20 feet away from the children. When
    asked where Williams pointed the gun when he fired the shot, a boy
    testified that it "kind of looked, like, at us, but, like, I can't really say." And
    the jury also heard that officers could not locate evidence to support
    Williams's claim that he was "return[ing] fire" in response to being pelted
    by rocks from the ATV tires. The parents testified that when confronted,
    Williams admitted he "shot at" the boys. And Williams later told police he
    had "fired two shots to get their attention." Williams also testified to firing
    the first shot to get them to stop riding near his camp and the second to
    make sure they did not come back.
    ¶12            We "view the evidence in the light most favorable to
    sustaining the conviction" and resolve all reasonable inferences against the
    defendant. State v. Lee, 
    189 Ariz. 590
    , 603 (1997). The jury "was not required
    to accept [Williams's] testimony and could consider his false denials as
    evidence of guilt." State v. Crain, 
    250 Ariz. 387
    , 400, ¶ 53 (App. 2021); see also
    United States v. Davis, 
    909 F.3d 9
    , 19 (1st Cir. 2018) ("It is a 'well-settled
    principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence — often strong
    evidence — of guilt.'" (quoting Al-Adahi v. Obama, 
    613 F.3d 1102
    , 1107 (D.C.
    Cir. 2010)). In this context, we must accept the reasonable inference that
    Williams brandished and fired the gun "to place the victims in reasonable
    apprehension of imminent physical injury. The use of a gun as a method of
    control is, after all, based on its potential to inflict harm." State v. Tschilar,
    
    200 Ariz. 427
    , 437, ¶ 41 (App. 2001).
    ¶13             As to whether the boys were afraid of imminent physical
    injury, two of the boys testified that they were "scared" after Williams fired
    the gun and the third testified that it gave him "a big adrenaline rush" and
    that he could tell the younger two boys "were really scared."1 Two boys
    also testified that the reason they went right back to their parents' camp was
    because they were scared. The jury also heard from a parent that all the
    boys "were scared" when they returned to camp, and the oldest boy, who
    saw Williams point the handgun, "looked like he was going to cry." Again,
    we must accept the jury's reasonable inference from this evidence that the
    two gunshots placed another person in reasonable apprehension of
    imminent physical injury. See Lee, 
    189 Ariz. at 603
    ; Tschilar, 200 Ariz. at 437,
    ¶ 41.
    1During oral argument, Williams's counsel acknowledged that sufficient
    evidence as to any individual victim would be adequate to affirm the
    conviction.
    4
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    Decision of the Court
    ¶14           Because the testimony presented at trial provides substantial
    evidence of each element of the charged offense, we affirm Williams's
    conviction for aggravated assault.
    II.    Double Jeopardy.
    ¶15           Williams claims his convictions for both disorderly conduct
    and aggravated assault violated his double jeopardy protections. Double
    jeopardy claims are a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review
    de novo. State v. Powers, 
    200 Ariz. 123
    , 125, ¶ 5 (App. 2001).
    ¶16            "The Double Jeopardy Clauses in both the United States and
    Arizona Constitutions protect a defendant 'against a second prosecution for
    the same offense after acquittal' and 'against a second prosecution for the
    same offense after conviction.'" State v. Carter, 
    249 Ariz. 312
    , 315, ¶ 7 (2020)
    (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 
    467 U.S. 493
    , 498 (1984)). And lesser-included
    offenses are considered the same as the greater for purposes of double
    jeopardy analysis. State v. Ortega, 
    220 Ariz. 320
    , 324, ¶ 9 (App. 2008).
    Offenses are "lesser included" if they share some, but not all, of the elements
    of a greater crime such that one cannot commit the greater offense without
    also committing the lesser crime. Carter, 249 Ariz. at 316, ¶ 10 (citing State
    v. Wall, 
    212 Ariz. 1
    , 3, ¶ 14 (2006)); State v. Celaya, 
    135 Ariz. 248
    , 251 (1983).
    ¶17            Our supreme court has repeatedly stated that disorderly
    conduct by recklessly displaying a firearm is a lesser-included offense of
    aggravated assault as charged in this case. State v. Miranda, 
    200 Ariz. 67
    , 68,
    ¶ 3 (2001); State v. Angle, 
    149 Ariz. 478
    , 479 (1986). The State argues that this
    line of cases has been impliedly overruled by Carter, 249 Ariz. at 315-16.
    But we are not free to disregard our supreme court's explicit rulings in
    Miranda and Angle, and it would be error to try to anticipate whether Carter
    will lead our supreme court to depart from those cases:
    The lower courts are bound by our decisions, and this Court
    alone is responsible for modifying that precedent. State v.
    Smyers, 
    207 Ariz. 314
    , 318, ¶ 15 n. 4 (2004); see also McKay v.
    Indus. Comm'n, 
    103 Ariz. 191
    , 193 (1968) ("Whether prior
    decisions of the highest court in a state are to be disaffirmed
    is a question for the court which makes the decisions. Any
    other rule would lead to chaos in our judicial system."). Trial
    courts are required to follow the decisions of a higher court,
    and the superior court here failed to abide by that
    fundamental principle. We therefore caution lower courts
    5
    STATE v. WILLIAMS
    Decision of the Court
    not to depart from binding precedent anticipating that we
    will overrule existing case law.
    Sell v. Gama, 
    231 Ariz. 323
    , 330, ¶ 31 (2013) (emphasis added) (parallel
    citations omitted).
    ¶18           "[B]ecause one cannot place a person in reasonable
    apprehension of imminent physical danger without in fact also disturbing
    her peace, all elements of disorderly conduct by reckless display of a
    firearm are in fact elements of aggravated assault." Miranda, 
    200 Ariz. at 68, ¶ 3
    . Thus, Williams's convictions for both aggravated assault and
    disorderly conduct arising from the same event violate the Double Jeopardy
    Clause, and we must vacate his conviction for disorderly conduct. Ortega,
    220 Ariz. at 328, ¶ 25.2
    CONCLUSION
    ¶19           For the above-stated reasons, we affirm Williams's conviction
    for aggravated assault and vacate his conviction for the lesser included
    offense of disorderly conduct.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    2The State also argues that the reasoning in our decision in State v. Erivez,
    
    236 Ariz. 472
    , 476, ¶ 18 (App. 2015) is "irreconcilable" with Miranda and
    Angle. We fail to see any merit in the State's argument. In Erivez, we
    explicitly cited Miranda and Angle in affirming that both "disorderly
    conduct and assault are lesser-included offenses of" aggravated assault as
    charged in this case, but that neither disorderly conduct nor misdemeanor
    assault "is a lesser-included offense of the other." Id. at 475-76, ¶¶ 15, 17.
    We noted that assault cannot be a lesser-included offense of disorderly
    conduct because one can disturb the peace and quiet of a victim without
    placing them in apprehension of physical injury. Id. at ¶ 18. Erivez's
    reasoning is consistent, not irreconcilable, with Miranda's statement that
    placing a victim in reasonable apprehension of physical injury necessarily
    disturbs the victim's peace. Miranda, 
    200 Ariz. at 68, ¶ 3
    .
    6