In Re: Mh 2022-006353 ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    IN RE: MH2022-006353
    No. 1 CA-MH 22-0092
    FILED 5-9-2023
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. MH2022-006353
    The Honorable Nicolas B. Hoskins, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Joseph Branco
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Robert S. Shipman
    Counsel for Appellant
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
    B A I L E Y, Judge:
    ¶1           Patient appeals the superior court’s order requiring him to
    involuntarily undergo a combination of inpatient and outpatient mental
    IN RE: MH 2022-006353
    Decision of the Court
    health treatment, arguing the court failed to strictly follow the applicable
    statutes. For the reasons below, we affirm the order for inpatient treatment
    but vacate the order for outpatient treatment.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
    order. In re MH2011-000914, 
    229 Ariz. 312
    , 314, ¶ 8 (App. 2012).
    ¶3            Patient has a history of mental illness; he was previously
    diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and involuntarily hospitalized for
    treatment. In April 2021, he was arrested on murder charges and is now
    awaiting trial in the Lower Buckeye Jail. While in jail he received forced
    injections of antipsychotic medication under a prior court order. In the
    months before that order expired, jail behavioral health technicians
    observed the Patient often responded to internal stimuli, expressed
    delusional thoughts, spread feces in his cell, and was hostile toward jail
    staff. He was placed on suicide watch and considered unable to function in
    the general population of the jail. He refused oral medication and told
    technicians that when his court-ordered treatment expired, he would refuse
    all medication.
    ¶4           In August 2022, a psychiatrist petitioned for a court-ordered
    evaluation of Patient, and the superior court issued a detention order for
    evaluation and notice. Patient was transported to a medical center,
    Valleywise, where he was examined by two psychiatrists, Dr.
    Hadziahmetovic and Dr. Sood. After the evaluations, Patient was then
    transported back to the Lower Buckeye Jail. Both doctors reported that
    Patient suffers from schizoaffective disorder, signs of psychosis, and
    refuses needed medications.
    ¶5            Dr. Hadziahmetovic then petitioned for court-ordered
    treatment of Patient. The petition included both his and Dr. Sood’s signed
    affidavits reporting their findings that Patient is “persistently and acutely
    disabled” because of a mental disorder, would not accept voluntary
    treatment, and required court-ordered treatment.
    ¶6           Patient moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that he could
    not be treated at an inpatient facility and an appropriate outpatient
    treatment plan could not issue because he would remain in jail throughout
    2
    IN RE: MH 2022-006353
    Decision of the Court
    the court order.1 The superior court denied the motion, finding Patient’s
    claims that he would remain in jail during the duration of the court order
    speculative.
    ¶7            In September 2022, the superior court held a hearing on the
    petition. The parties stipulated that Patient was brought to Valleywise “for
    purposes of the evaluation, he was no[t] admitted on an inpatient basis at
    that time,” and he would remain in jail because Valleywise did “not intend
    to admit him” due to security concerns. The parties stipulated to the
    admission of the affidavits of Dr. Hadziahmetovic and Dr. Sood and over
    Patient’s objection, based on his motion to dismiss, the court admitted an
    outpatient treatment plan. Three Lower Buckeye Jail behavioral health
    technicians testified for the State as to their observations of Patient’s
    behavior and symptoms. The medical director of the proposed outpatient
    treatment provider for Patient, La Frontera, testified for Patient. He
    explained that providers from La Frontera would not go to the jail to
    administer treatment to Patient under the outpatient treatment plan.
    ¶8            The superior court found that the State had established by
    clear and convincing evidence that “Patient is suffering from a mental
    disorder, and as a result, is persistently or acutely disabled, in need of
    treatment and is either unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment.”
    The court ordered Patient to undergo combined inpatient and outpatient
    treatment, finding this was the appropriate level of treatment.
    ¶9           Patient timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona
    Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 36-546.01.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶10            We review de novo the interpretation and application of
    statutes. In re M.H. 2007-001236, 
    220 Ariz. 160
    , 165, ¶ 15 (App. 2008). “Our
    task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and
    unambiguous.” BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 
    244 Ariz. 17
    , 19,
    ¶ 9 (2018). Because involuntary mental health treatment implicates
    1  Patient also argued that the court needed to comply with Sell v. United
    States, 
    539 U.S. 166
    , 180-81 (2003), before it could order forced medication
    and he requested that if the court ordered outpatient treatment, it issue an
    injunction preventing any jail provider from administering treatment. The
    court rejected these arguments and Patient does not re-urge them on
    appeal, meaning he has abandoned and waived them. See State v. Carver,
    
    160 Ariz. 167
    , 175 (1989).
    3
    IN RE: MH 2022-006353
    Decision of the Court
    significant liberty interests, “the statutory requirements must be strictly
    construed and followed.” In re MH2012-002480, 
    232 Ariz. 421
    , 422, ¶ 5
    (App. 2013) (citation omitted). If the statutory requirements are not strictly
    followed, we must vacate the treatment order. See In re Maxwell, 
    146 Ariz. 27
    , 30 (App. 1985).
    I.     Inpatient Treatment Order
    ¶11           Patient argues the superior court’s order that he involuntarily
    undergo inpatient treatment must be vacated because the court failed to
    strictly comply with A.R.S. § 36-540. The State argues that Patient has not
    sufficiently developed his argument and has thus waived it. But Patient
    specifically argued that because he would not be treated in one of the
    allowed inpatient facilities under A.R.S. § 36-540(A)(3), the court did not
    strictly comply with the statute. He has sufficiently developed the
    argument.
    ¶12             Under A.R.S. § 36-540(A), if the court finds “the proposed
    patient, as a result of a mental disorder . . . has a persistent or acute disability
    . . . and is in need of treatment, and is either unwilling or able to accept
    voluntary treatment, the court shall order the patient to undergo” either
    inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment or a combination of the two. If
    the patient is to undergo inpatient treatment, it must be, as applicable here,
    in “a mental health treatment agency,” or a private hospital if the hospital
    agrees. A.R.S. § 36-540(A)(3). A “mental health treatment agency” is “the
    state hospital or a health care agency that is licensed by the department” of
    health services. A.R.S. § 36-501(28).
    ¶13           At the hearing the parties stipulated, and the superior court
    accepted, that at the time the court ordered treatment, Patient would not be
    admitted to Valleywise, an appropriate mental health treatment agency
    under A.R.S. § 36-540(A)(3), but would remain at the Lower Buckeye Jail.
    Patient claims that therefore “no evidence” demonstrated he would receive
    inpatient treatment at an approved mental health treatment agency, and the
    court improperly relied on “speculation” of future admission to an
    appropriate facility when ordering Patient to undergo inpatient treatment.
    ¶14           True, at the time the court ordered inpatient treatment,
    patient was to remain in the Lower Buckeye Jail, which is not a “mental
    health treatment agency” under A.R.S. § 36-540(A)(3). But the superior
    court did not order Patient to receive inpatient treatment in jail. It ordered
    Patient to be treated “in a local mental health treatment agency.” Though
    Valleywise would not admit Patient at the time of the court order based on
    4
    IN RE: MH 2022-006353
    Decision of the Court
    security concerns, Valleywise may accept Patient if circumstances change,
    or he could be admitted at a different facility.
    ¶15           Patient’s lack of immediate placement at the time of the
    hearing did not prevent the court from ordering inpatient treatment
    because upon finding a patient has a persistent or acute disability because
    of a mental disorder, needs treatment, and will not voluntarily accept
    treatment, the court must order some level of treatment. See A.R.S. § 36-
    540(A) (“[T]he court shall order the patient to undergo one of the following
    . . . .” (emphasis added)). Here, the court made the requisite findings to
    order inpatient treatment, and Patient does not dispute these findings and
    they are supported by the record. The court thus strictly followed A.R.S.
    § 36-540(A) and properly ordered inpatient treatment.
    II.    Outpatient Treatment Order
    ¶16           Patient also argues the superior court’s order that he
    involuntarily undergo outpatient treatment must be vacated because the
    outpatient treatment plan lacked the information required by A.R.S. § 36-
    540.01(B).
    ¶17            The State claims Patient waived this argument because he
    failed to raise it in superior court. In his motion to dismiss, Patient argued
    the court could not order outpatient treatment due to the “lack of an
    appropriate outpatient treatment plan.” Citing A.R.S. § 36-540.01(B), he
    argued the plan was “not rooted in [] reality” because the provider, La
    Frontera, would not treat Patient in the community and he would instead
    be treated by jail providers. Though Patient did not specifically argue that
    the outpatient treatment plan lacked the information required by A.R.S.
    § 36-540.01(B), he sufficiently challenged the plan’s validity under the
    statute putting the issue before the superior court and avoiding waiver.
    ¶18           Section 36-540.01(B) requires an outpatient treatment order to
    include a written treatment plan “prepared by staff familiar with the
    patient’s case history and approved by the medical director” that includes:
    (1) A statement of the patient’s requirements, if any, for
    supervision, medication and assistance in obtaining basic
    needs such as employment, food, clothing or shelter.
    (2) The address of the residence where the patient is to live
    and the name of the person in charge of the residence, if
    any.
    5
    IN RE: MH 2022-006353
    Decision of the Court
    (3) The name and address of any person, agency or
    organization assigned to supervise an outpatient
    treatment plan or care for the patient, and the extent of
    authority of the person, agency or organization in carrying
    out the terms of the plan.
    (4) The conditions for continued outpatient treatment, which
    may require periodic reporting, continuation of
    medication and submission to testing, and may restrict
    travel, consumption of spirituous liquor and drugs,
    associations with others and incurrence of debts and
    obligations or such other reasonable conditions as the
    medical director may specify.
    (5) Any other provisions that the medical director or the court
    believes are necessary to protect the well-being of the
    patient and the public.
    ¶19           The outpatient treatment plan provided by La Frontera
    included the “conditions for continued outpatient treatment,” listing five
    conditions that Patient needed to follow. See A.R.S. § 36-540.01(B)(4). But
    the plan failed to meet any other requirement of A.R.S. § 36-540.01(B).
    ¶20           First, the plan failed to include a statement of Patient’s
    requirements for medication. See A.R.S. § 36-540.01(B)(1). The phrase “if
    any” does not render this requirement an “optional consideration[] for staff
    and the medical director” as the State argues. The statute requires the plan
    to include the patient’s medication requirements if he has any. A statement
    need not be included only if the patient does not have medication
    requirements. Here, Patient has medication requirements. Over the past
    year, courts ordered he receive injections of antipsychotic medications.
    And the petitions for court-ordered evaluation and treatment indicated that
    he had a continued need for these medications. The plan was therefore
    required to include a statement of these needs. Though the plan included
    a statement that “[m]edications included in the ADHS SMI formulary”
    were a service available to Patient, it did not address Patient’s medication
    requirements.
    ¶21            Second, the plan failed to include the address where Patient
    would live. See A.R.S. § 36-540.01(B)(2). The plan stated Patient was
    recommended for “Independent Living-TBD.” This fails to sufficiently
    state Patient’s address. It is true that if Patient is released from jail into the
    community, Patient would not have a known address to list. And as the
    6
    IN RE: MH 2022-006353
    Decision of the Court
    State correctly points out, the statute requires the plan to list the patient’s
    address only if the patient has one. Where a patient does not have an
    address because of a lack of housing, the plan need not include an address.
    But here, Patient is housed in the Lower Buckeye Jail and the jail’s address
    was listed as Patient’s address in the petition for evaluation in this case. At
    the time the plan was entered, Patient was living in jail for the foreseeable
    future. The jail address was thus the “address where the patient is to live”
    and the outpatient treatment plan had to include it. See A.R.S. § 36-
    540.01(B)(2).
    ¶22           Third, the plan failed to include the name and address of all
    persons, agencies or organizations assigned to care for Patient. See A.R.S.
    § 36-540.01(B)(3). Though the plan listed La Frontera as the “person,
    agency, or organization” assigned to implement the ordered treatment, La
    Frontera’s letter of intent to treat Patient expressly contemplated that
    Patient would be cared for by the Lower Buckeye Jail providers, stating La
    Frontera would “collaborate with the jail prescribers” to share “essential
    clinical information” and be “routinely involved” with the “jail providers
    of care.” Thus, jail providers were to care for Patient, but the plan did not
    include the names and addresses of such providers.
    ¶23            Because the outpatient treatment plan did not contain
    statutorily required information, it did not strictly comply with A.R.S. § 36-
    540.01(B), and the outpatient treatment order must be vacated. See Maxwell,
    146 Ariz. at 30.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶24           We vacate the outpatient treatment portion of the superior
    court’s order for failure to strictly comply with A.R.S. § 36-540.01(B) but
    affirm the inpatient treatment order.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-MH 22-0092

Filed Date: 5/9/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/9/2023