Anderson v. Winslow ( 2023 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    CHARLES ANDERSON, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF WINSLOW, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 22-0518
    FILED 5-9-2023
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
    No. S0900CV202100305
    The Honorable Melinda K. Hardy, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    APPEARANCES
    Charles Anderson, Winslow
    Plaintiff/Appellant
    Doyle Hernandez Millan, Phoenix
    By William H. Doyle, Brandon D. Millan, Nathan R. Andrews
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
    Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.
    ANDERSON v. WINSLOW
    Decision of the Court
    G A S S, Vice Chief Judge:
    ¶1         Anderson appeals the superior court’s grant of the City of
    Winslow’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            On July 16, 2020, Anderson felt knee pain after he fell on a city
    sidewalk in Winslow, Arizona. A month later, Anderson sought treatment
    at a hospital emergency department for knee pain and returned home the
    same day. At the end of August, he saw his primary care physician who
    suspected a torn ligament and disc in his knee. Following that appointment,
    Anderson underwent an x-ray exam and magnetic resonance imaging
    which showed a diminutive tear in his meniscus. His doctor scheduled
    surgery in February 2021.
    ¶3            On January 11, 2021 (179 days after his fall) Anderson filed a
    notice of claim (NOC) with Winslow. The NOC said: “Claimant will settle
    for $250,000.00 in addition to reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’
    fees.” Anderson also described the location of his fall and said he
    “hyperextended his right knee and sustain[ed] serious injuries to his
    person.” He included medical information about his trip to the emergency
    department, visit with his doctor, imaging, and upcoming surgery. His
    portion of the attached bills totaled about $1,600. Anderson included no
    information about his ability to work, pain and suffering, or any other
    information about his costs.
    ¶4            When Winslow did not respond, Anderson filed a complaint
    in propria persona on July 14, 2021. Winslow moved for judgment on the
    pleadings alleging Anderson’s NOC did not comply with A.R.S. § 12-
    821.01, thus barring his claim. Anderson responded he specifically asked
    for $250,000 to settle. The superior court found Anderson failed to state a
    “specific amount for which the claim can be settled” because he included
    the language: “in addition to reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’ fees”
    and did not include facts supporting the requested amount. For these
    reasons, the superior court granted Winslow’s motion for judgment on the
    pleadings and barred Anderson’s claim.
    ¶5            This court has jurisdiction over Anderson’s timely appeal
    under article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-
    120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1.
    2
    ANDERSON v. WINSLOW
    Decision of the Court
    ANALYSIS
    ¶6             To begin, Winslow argues Anderson waived all his
    arguments on appeal because he appropriated unrelated arguments taken
    from a brief in another case. Winslow is correct—Anderson appears to have
    copied most of his argument from the opening brief in Donovan v. Yavapai
    County Community College District, 
    244 Ariz. 608
     (App. 2018). Anderson,
    thus, made arguments unrelated to his case which he did not raise to the
    superior court.
    ¶7           Anderson, however, validly appeals the superior court’s
    grant of Winslow’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because
    Anderson’s other arguments are unrelated to this case and he did not
    present them to the superior court, we find Anderson waived them on
    appeal. See Contreras Farms Ltd. LLC v. City of Phoenix, 
    247 Ariz. 485
    , 489
    ¶ 13 (App. 2019). We address his compliance with A.R.S. § 12-821.01 below.
    ¶8              “A motion for judgment on the pleadings . . . tests the
    sufficiency of the complaint, and a defendant is entitled to judgment if the
    complaint fails to state a claim for relief.” Mobile Cmty. Council for Progress,
    Inc. v. Brock, 
    211 Ariz. 196
    , 198 ¶ 5 (App. 2005) (cleaned up). In reviewing a
    grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court accepts the
    complaint’s allegations as true and reviews the superior court’s legal
    conclusions de novo. See Muscat by Berman v. Creative Innervisions LLC, 
    244 Ariz. 194
    , 197 ¶ 7 (App. 2017).
    ¶9              Anderson argues his NOC stated he would accept $250,000 to
    settle. Winslow contends Anderson did not accurately portray his NOC
    because he did not include the “actual language” of the NOC: “Claimant
    will settle for $250,000.00 in addition to reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’
    fees.” (Emphasis added.) Winslow also contends the italicized language
    above made it “impossible” to determine the specific amount for which
    Anderson would settle his claim.
    ¶10           To pursue legal action against a public entity in Arizona, an
    individual must file a valid NOC within 180 days of the cause of action. See
    A.R.S. § 12-821.01. A valid claim must “contain a specific amount for which
    the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” A.R.S. § 12-
    821.01.A. “This language unmistakably instructs claimants to include a
    particular and certain amount of money that, if agreed to by the
    government entity, will settle the claim.” Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No.
    97 v. Houser, 
    214 Ariz. 293
    , 296 ¶ 9 (2007). Qualifying language like
    3
    ANDERSON v. WINSLOW
    Decision of the Court
    “approximately,” “or more,” and “no less” make it “impossible to ascertain
    a precise amount.” 
    Id.
     at 296 ¶ 10.
    ¶11           A claimant complies with the sum certain requirement if the
    claimant makes an offer. Yollin v. City of Glendale, 
    219 Ariz. 24
    , 31 ¶ 19 (App.
    2008). “An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain,
    so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that
    bargain is invited and will conclude it.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Restatement (Second)
    of Contracts § 24 (1981)).
    ¶12            Anderson’s NOC included a minimum sum that would
    increase with “reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’ fees.” He included
    no documents showing what the future costs would be but did include his
    future scheduled knee surgery. Nothing in the NOC provided a maximum,
    or precise, amount for which Anderson would settle. Anderson’s NOC,
    thus, effectively requested $250,000 or more and did not satisfy the sum
    certain requirement. See Deer Valley, 
    214 Ariz. at
    296 ¶ 9; see also Yahweh v.
    City of Phoenix, 
    243 Ariz. 21
    , 23 ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (finding a series of
    ambiguous statements of the amount plaintiff intended to demand in
    litigation not a sum certain); Jones v. Cochise Cnty., 
    218 Ariz. 372
    , 375 ¶ 8
    (App. 2008) (finding the amount an attorney would recommend for
    settlement not a sum certain). Because Anderson’s NOC was not an offer,
    the superior court did not err in granting Winslow’s motion for judgment
    on the pleadings.
    ¶13           Lastly, Winslow asks this court to sanction Anderson for the
    “cumulative effect” of his copying arguments from an unrelated case and
    noncompliance with ARCAP 13 because it “transmuted his appeal from
    meritless to frivolous.” This court may impose sanctions on a party “if it
    determines that an appeal or a motion is frivolous.” ARCAP 25. And this
    court holds self-represented parties to the same standard as attorneys. See
    Flynn v. Campbell, 
    243 Ariz. 76
    , 83 ¶ 24 (2017). Though ignorance does not
    excuse a self-represented litigant from complying with procedural rules, it
    may show a litigant made a mistake, rather than a “deliberate strategic
    decision.” See 
    id.
     at 84 ¶ 25. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to
    impose a sanction against Anderson, finding his actions were not deliberate
    attempts to evade court procedures.
    ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
    ¶14           Because Anderson is not the prevailing party, we deny his
    request for costs. See A.R.S. § 12-341.
    4
    ANDERSON v. WINSLOW
    Decision of the Court
    ¶15           As the prevailing party, Winslow seeks attorney fees and
    costs under ARCAP 21 and 25. As to ARCAP 21, we deny Winslow’s
    request for attorney fees because it provides no substantive basis for it. See
    Smyser v. City of Peoria, 
    215 Ariz. 428
    , 442 ¶ 50 (App. 2007). Under ARCAP
    25, this court may, as a sanction, award attorney fees and costs, if
    “appropriate in the circumstances of the case, and to discourage similar
    conduct in the future.” As discussed above, we exercise our discretion not
    to sanction Anderson. As the prevailing party, Winslow may recover its
    costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16           We affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 22-0518

Filed Date: 5/9/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/9/2023