Kansas H., Daniel Z. v. Dcs ( 2022 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    KANSAS H., DANIEL Z., Appellants,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, I.Z., A.Z., K.Z., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 21-0222
    FILED 2-3-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD529107
    The Honorable David King Udall, Judge (Retired)
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
    By Robert D. Rosanelli
    Counsel for Appellant Kansas H.
    H. Clark Jones, Attorney at Law, Mesa
    By H. Clark Jones
    Counsel for Appellant Daniel Z.
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Emily M. Stokes
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale
    By John L. Popilek
    Counsel for Appellee I.Z.
    KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the court, in which
    Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
    W I L L I A M S, Judge:
    ¶1            Kansas H. (“Mother”) and Daniel Z. (“Father”) appeal the
    superior court’s order terminating their parental rights to I.Z., A.Z., and
    K.Z. (the “children”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In 2015, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) received a
    report that Mother and Father, who lived in California, had sent the
    children to stay with an aunt in Arizona without providing her the
    necessary paperwork to obtain medical treatment for them. The reporter
    also alleged Mother and Father were homeless, using drugs, and engaging
    in acts of domestic violence.
    ¶3            When interviewed by DCS, both parents admitted they had
    untreated mental-health disorders and regularly used marijuana. Mother
    disclosed a history of methamphetamine use as well as a history of suicidal
    ideations and attempts. The children witnessed at least two suicide
    attempts, when Mother “jump[ed] out of a moving car going 70 mph” and
    “jump[ed] off a bridge.” Father disclosed he had previously been arrested
    for a domestic-violence incident involving Mother and that he was
    “wanted” in Arizona for violating probation on a firearm-related offense.
    Mother described Father as having “anger issues.”
    ¶4            DCS filed a dependency petition alleging substance abuse,
    domestic violence, mental-health issues, and neglect. In early 2016, the
    superior court, exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction, adjudicated
    the children dependent, set a case plan of family reunification, and ordered
    DCS provide both parents with a psychological evaluation, substance abuse
    treatment, and counseling with a domestic violence component.
    ¶5           DCS attempted to place the children with Mother and/or
    Father in California under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
    Children (“ICPC”). The ICPC application was denied due to unresolved
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    KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al
    Decision of the Court
    criminal matters involving both parents. The children have resided with a
    placement in Arizona since 2015.
    ¶6            In the summer of 2016, Mother and Father completed
    psychological evaluations with Dr. Mansfield-Blair. Dr. Mansfield-Blair
    diagnosed Mother with several mental disorders and recommended she
    participate in Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (“DBT”). During Father’s
    evaluation with Dr. Mansfield-Blair, he blamed his extended family for
    DCS’s involvement, claiming they “made up” the allegations against him.
    Dr. Mansfield-Blair diagnosed Father with several mental disorders and
    recommended that both parents participate in counseling, ongoing drug
    testing, and complete a second psychological evaluation after maintaining
    sobriety for at least one year.
    ¶7           DCS referred both parents to a therapist in California, but
    they never began services, claiming the office was too far away despite
    DCS’s willingness to provide transportation. Mother and Father also
    claimed their schedule conflicted with the therapist’s schedule. The
    therapist reported to DCS that this claim was not accurate. DCS then
    attempted to assign Mother and Father to another therapist, but the
    assignment was delayed due to the indecision of the parents as to whether
    services should begin in California or Arizona.
    ¶8             Throughout the dependency, DCS provided the parents with
    supervised visitation. In the spring of 2018, DCS referred the family for
    therapeutic visitation after one child expressed discomfort during visits
    with the parents. All three children ultimately refused to attend visits citing
    their parents’ inability to change, and their happiness with their placement.
    The children’s case manager encouraged the children to change their minds
    but was unsuccessful.
    ¶9            In the fall of 2018, Mother was in a car accident and stopped
    participating in services. Mother consistently reported to DCS that she was
    physically incapable of participating in services, but in 2019 Mother was
    charged with manufacturing a controlled substance and a 2020 police
    report indicates Mother attended a party where she danced and drank
    excessively.
    ¶10           To his credit, Father completed additional psychological
    evaluations as well as individual counseling. Nevertheless, he continued to
    deny any responsibility for DCS’s involvement and instead blamed others.
    ¶11          In the summer of 2020, DCS referred Father and the children
    for a bonding assessment with Dr. Bryce Bennett. Dr. Bennett concluded
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    KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al
    Decision of the Court
    further services would be unlikely to “alter [the children’s] willingness to
    engage in reunification” and that reunification would not be in the
    children’s best interests. Dr. Bennett also noted Father’s tone towards the
    children was so aggressive that he nearly ended the assessment early and
    opined that Father could be even more aggressive around the children
    when unobserved.
    ¶12           In 2021, after the children had been in care for nearly six years,
    the superior court changed the case plan from family reunification to
    severance and adoption. DCS then moved to terminate Mother and Father’s
    parental rights.
    ¶13           Following a termination trial, the superior court terminated
    parental rights based upon fifteen-months in an out-of-home placement, see
    A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), and found termination to be in the children’s best
    interests.
    ¶14          Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
    under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A),
    12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile
    Court 103(A).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶15            Parental rights are fundamental, but not absolute. Dominique
    M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    240 Ariz. 96
    , 97, ¶ 7 (App. 2016). A court may
    terminate a parent’s right in the care, custody, and management of their
    children “if it finds clear and convincing evidence of one of the statutory
    grounds for severance, and also finds by a preponderance of the evidence
    that severance is in the best interests of the children.” 
    Id. at 97-98, ¶ 7
    .
    ¶16            We review a termination order for abuse of discretion,
    accepting the court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, Mary Lou C.
    v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004), and view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling, Manuel
    M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    218 Ariz. 205
    , 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008). Because the
    superior court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the
    parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” we
    will affirm an order terminating parental rights if reasonable evidence
    supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    223 Ariz. 86
    , 93, ¶ 18
    (App. 2009) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 
    209 Ariz. 332
    , 334,
    ¶ 4 (App. 2004)).
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    KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al
    Decision of the Court
    ¶17          Fifteen months in an out-of-home placement is one statutory
    ground authorizing termination. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The superior court
    may terminate a parent-child relationship under that ground if DCS has
    made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services and:
    The child has been in an out-of-home placement for a
    cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer pursuant
    to court order or voluntary placement pursuant to [A.R.S.]
    § 8-806, the parent has been unable to remedy the
    circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home
    placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent
    will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental
    care and control in the near future.
    Id.
    ¶18            Mother only challenges whether DCS made diligent
    reunification efforts. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (as a prerequisite to
    termination under the out-of-home placement ground, DCS must make “a
    diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services”). Mother does
    not challenge the superior court’s statutory findings, or that termination of
    the parent-child relationship was in the children’s best interests. Christina
    G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    227 Ariz. 231
    , 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (App. 2011)
    (recognizing the failure to develop an argument on appeal usually results
    in abandonment and waiver of the issue).
    ¶19          Mother claims DCS’s efforts were insufficient because,
    although DCS offered counseling, DCS did not refer her for DBT even
    though that service was recommended by Dr. Mansfield-Blair. The record
    shows, however, DCS referred Mother to a mental-health provider who
    could have enrolled her in DBT, but Mother chose not to engage, despite
    DCS’s willingness to provide transportation. DCS was then unable to refer
    Mother to another therapist due to Mother’s indecision as to whether
    services should begin in California or Arizona.
    ¶20            Mother also claims, based upon Dr. Mansfield-Blair’s
    recommendations, DCS should have provided her an additional
    psychological assessment. However, in 2018, prior to Mother’s accident,
    DCS referred Mother for an additional psychological evaluation, but
    Mother did not participate. Lastly, Mother contends that following her
    accident, DCS should have consulted with its unit psychologist to
    determine appropriate services. Mother, however, was unwilling to
    participate in services following her accident. Because the requirement that
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    KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al
    Decision of the Court
    DCS provide reunification efforts “does not oblige the State to undertake
    rehabilitative measures that are futile,” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
    Sec., 
    193 Ariz. 185
    , 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999), the superior court did not err in
    finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother appropriate
    reunification services.
    ¶21           Father also challenges whether DCS made diligent
    reunification efforts. Father claims DCS’s efforts were insufficient because,
    although DCS offered numerous services, DCS failed to provide counseling
    services designed to help the children overcome their reluctance to reunify
    with him, failed to provide family counseling, and failed to ensure the
    children participated in therapeutic visits.
    ¶22           The record, however, demonstrates DCS offered services
    designed to help the children overcome their reluctance to reunify
    including referring the family for therapeutic visitation, which included a
    family counseling component, and individual therapy in which the
    children worked on overcoming the “current issues” in the case. DCS also
    referred Father and the children for a bonding assessment to determine
    whether additional services could assist in reunification. Dr. Bennett
    concluded that further services would be unlikely to “alter [the children’s]
    willingness to engage in reunification.” On this record, the superior court
    did not err in finding DCS made a diligent effort to provide Father
    appropriate reunification services.
    ¶23           Father also challenges the superior court’s findings that
    Father has been unable to remedy the circumstances causing the children
    to be in an out-of-home placement and that there is a substantial likelihood
    that Father will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental
    care and control in the near future.
    ¶24           The superior court found Father failed to remedy the
    circumstances causing the children to be in an out-of-home placement
    because Father failed to resolve his anger problem and refused to accept
    responsibility for the trauma and neglect the children suffered in his care.
    Though Father sees it differently, reasonable evidence supports the court’s
    findings. See Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 93, ¶ 18. Despite completing an
    anger-management class, Father was continually aggressive towards and
    around the children. Further, during the approximately six years that the
    children were in care, Father refused to accept responsibility for the trauma
    and neglect the children suffered. The superior court did not err in finding
    Father had not remedied the circumstances causing the children to be in an
    out-of-home placement and that there was a substantial likelihood Father
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    KANSAS H., DANIEL Z. v. DCS et al
    Decision of the Court
    would be unable to exercise proper and effective care and control in the
    near future.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶25          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
    order terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights to I.Z., A.Z., and K.Z.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 21-0222

Filed Date: 2/3/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2022