Five Points Hotel Partnership v. Joe Pinsonneault , 697 F. App'x 549 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 19 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FIVE POINTS HOTEL PARTNERSHIP, an               No.    14-15970
    Arizona partnership and PARAGON
    HOTEL CORPORATION, a Delaware                   D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00548-JAT
    corporation,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    JOE PINSONNEAULT, individually, and
    on behalf of the marital community of Joe
    Pinsonneault and Jane Doe Pinsonneault,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 15, 2017**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Five Points Hotel Partnership and Paragon Hotel Corporation (collectively,
    Five Points) appeals the district court’s adverse summary judgment. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    On April 26, 2010, following a bench trial, the Pinal County, Arizona,
    Superior Court entered a $500,000 judgment in favor of Five Points and against
    Casa Grande Resort Living, LLC (Casa) for breach of contract and breach of the
    duty of good faith and fair dealing. Five Points was unable to recover its judgment
    from Casa, which had been dissolved in 2006.
    Five Points then brought a second action in Arizona federal district court
    against Joe Pinsonneault, the sole member and manager of Casa. The complaint
    contained a single “claim”—that Pinsonneault is the alter ego of Casa. It also
    sought a jury trial, punitive damages, and compensatory damages in an amount
    roughly equivalent to that awarded in the prior state judgment after adjusting for
    interest.
    The district court granted summary judgment for Pinsonneault. It held that
    Five Points failed to state a valid claim after “predict[ing]” that the Arizona
    Supreme Court would follow the majority view that alter ego is a theory of liability
    and not an independent “claim.” See Lewis v. Tel. Emps. Credit Union, 
    87 F.3d 1537
    , 1545 (9th Cir. 1996).
    Reviewing de novo, see 
    id.,
     we agree. We are persuaded by “decisions from
    2
    other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements,” 
    id.
     (citation omitted),
    which specify that alter ego is a procedural mechanism to enforce an underlying
    claim and not an independent cause of action, see, e.g., Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc.
    v. Lowry, 
    284 P.3d 630
    , 634 n.1 (Utah 2012) (“Alter ego theory is not an
    independent claim for relief; rather, it is a theory of liability.” (citation omitted));
    William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
    § 41.10 (Sept. 2016 update) (“A claim based on the alter ego theory is not in itself
    a claim for substantive relief, but rather is procedural.”).
    Five Points argues that this conclusion conflicts with Phoenix Van Buren
    Partners, LLC v. Moulding & Millwork, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-01943-NVW, 
    2012 WL 1190842
     (D. Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012), where a plaintiff was awarded summary
    judgment based solely on “success on its alter ego claim.” 
    Id. at *11
    . We
    disagree. The plaintiff in Van Buren did not bring an independent alter ego action.
    Instead, it filed an action in the Arizona Superior Court seeking enforcement of a
    prior judgment by that same court. See Notice of Removal, Van Buren, 
    2012 WL 1190842
     (ECF No. 1). And although Five Points claims that it also seeks
    enforcement of a prior judgment, this assertion is belied by the fact that Five Points
    filed its action in the federal district court and not in the Arizona state court that
    adjudicated its claims. See Labertew v. Langemeier, 
    846 F.3d 1028
    , 1033 (9th Cir.
    2017) (“[J]udgments are not executed upon in courts that did not issue them.”).
    3
    Contrary to Five Point’s critique, we do not suggest that a party is required
    to raise an unsupported alter ego theory in an underlying action “or lose [reliance
    on that theory] forever.” However, a party is required to raise an alter ego theory
    by “the appropriate procedure.” See Piaquadio v. Am. Legal Funding LLC, No.
    2:15-cv-00579-GMS, 
    2016 WL 393638
    , at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2016). Because
    Five Points did not file an action with the Arizona trial court seeking to enforce its
    judgment, see 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1551
    (A), and instead filed an action in federal
    court raising alter ego as a freestanding claim, the district court properly granted
    summary judgment.
    Costs shall be taxed against Five Points. See Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(2).
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-15970

Citation Numbers: 697 F. App'x 549

Filed Date: 9/19/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023