Arlene Atherton v. Hastings-on-Hudson Police Depa ( 2019 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted July 30, 2019 *
    Decided July 30, 2019
    Before
    ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
    DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
    No. 18-2985
    ARLENE R. ATHERTON,                            Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                       Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
    Eastern Division.
    v.                                       No. 18-cv-02321
    ST. VINCENT HOSPITAL, et al.,                  Andrea R. Wood,
    Defendants-Appellees.                    Judge.
    ORDER
    Arlene Atherton has filed four complaints in the Northern District of Illinois,
    suing nine New York entities and residents for their roles in her allegedly unlawful
    commitment to New York psychiatric hospitals. The case before us—the last to be
    adjudicated in the district court—was dismissed at screening based on res judicata and
    improper venue. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e). We affirm the judgment on both grounds.
    * The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not
    participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument
    because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
    argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    No. 18-2985                                                                             Page 2
    In her complaint, Atherton states that the district court previously dismissed a
    nearly identical suit. Both suits allege that the defendants wrongly arrested her and
    discriminated against her based on her disabilities, and that her commitment violated
    her free exercise of religion, due-process rights, and liberty. The district court dismissed
    the earlier suit because Atherton had failed to obey an order that she either file a proper
    application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the filing fee.
    Atherton asserts that her current suit is her attempt to reopen the earlier one, but
    filing a new suit is not the proper way to ask a court to reopen a dismissed case. After
    the district court dismissed the first suit, Atherton had several options, none of which
    she pursued: She did not appeal the dismissal, see FED. R. APP. P. 3, move the district
    court to modify the dismissal, see FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), or ask that court to grant relief
    from the dismissal, see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Because the first case is closed, the judgment
    there can, and as we are about to explain does, bar this suit.
    Atherton challenges whether res judicata bars this case, but we agree with the
    district court that it does. Although res judicata is an affirmative defense, dismissal at
    screening is proper when it is clear “from the face of the complaint” that res judicata
    bars the claims. Walker v. Thompson, 
    288 F.3d 1005
    , 1009 (7th Cir. 2002). A district court
    may dismiss a suit based on res judicata if the plaintiff’s earlier suit raised identical
    claims against the same parties (or their privies) and reached a final judgment on the
    merits. See Barr v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Ill. Univ., 
    796 F.3d 837
    , 840 (7th Cir. 2015). That is all
    evident from Atherton’s complaint. She sues seven of the defendants whom she
    previously sued and labels this suit a “reopen[ing] of a previous complaint.” Moreover,
    the earlier dismissal was on the merits. Under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure, when, as here, the district court dismisses a suit for plaintiff’s failure to
    comply with a court order, the dismissal “operates as an adjudication on the merits.”
    See Tartt v. Nw. Cmty. Hosp., 
    453 F.3d 817
    , 822 (7th Cir. 2006). (Although Rule 41 refers to
    dismissals prompted by a defendant’s motion, the Rule also applies when a court sua
    sponte dismisses the suit for violations of court orders. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,
    
    370 U.S. 626
    , 630 (1963).)
    Atherton responds that res judicata does not block the claims against the two
    defendants whom she did not previously sue—Westchester County Government and
    the New York State Office of Mental Health. She adds that she should be allowed to
    proceed on those claims in the Northern District of Illinois because venue is proper. She
    may be correct about res judicata, but she is wrong about venue. To show that venue is
    No. 18-2985                                                                        Page 3
    proper, Atherton argues that the district court had federal-question jurisdiction over her
    claims against the two new defendants. But a federal question establishes subject-matter
    jurisdiction; it has no bearing on whether the plaintiff brought the suit in the proper
    court from a geographic standpoint. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1390
    (a).
    As with res judicata, improper venue is an affirmative defense that district courts
    ordinarily should not consider at screening. See Auto. Mechs. Local 701 Welfare & Pension
    Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 
    502 F.3d 740
    , 746 (7th Cir. 2007). But the
    complaint establishes that venue in Illinois is improper, so the district court acted
    properly when it addressed the defense. Atherton specifies in her complaint that the
    defendants are New York government entities, and all relevant events—including
    Atherton’s psychiatric commitment—took place in that state. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1391
    (b).
    The district court thus permissibly dismissed these two defendants for improper venue,
    and it rightly described their dismissal as without prejudice. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1406
    ; In re
    IFC Credit Corp., 
    663 F.3d 315
    , 320 (7th Cir. 2011).
    AFFIRMED