Jackson v. State , 497 S.W.3d 685 ( 2016 )


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  •                                          Cite as 
    2016 Ark. 294
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
    No.   CR-03-1127
    ANARIAN CHAD JACKSON                                  Opinion Delivered July   21, 2016
    APPELLANT PRO SE FOURTH PETITION TO REINVEST
    JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL COURT TO
    V.                                             CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT OF
    ERROR CORAM NOBIS
    [PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    STATE OF ARKANSAS                              NO. 60CR-01-4006]
    APPELLEE PETITION DISMISSED.
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioner Anarian Chad Jackson was found guilty, after a jury trial, of second-degree
    murder, for which he was sentenced to eighty years’ imprisonment. Jackson’s conviction
    and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Jackson v. State, CR-03-1127 (Ark. App. Dec. 1,
    2004) (unpublished) (original docket no. CACR 03-1127). On May 10, 2016, Jackson filed
    this, his fourth petition requesting this court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to
    consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. 1
    The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there
    existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial
    court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward
    before rendition of the judgment. Newman v. State, 
    2009 Ark. 539
    , 
    354 S.W.3d 61
    . The
    1
    For clerical purposes, the motion was assigned the same docket number as the direct
    appeal.
    Cite as 
    2016 Ark. 294
    petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the
    record. Roberts v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 56
    , 
    425 S.W.3d 771
    .
    The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to
    address errors of the most fundamental nature. 
    Id. A writ
    of error coram nobis is available
    to address certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of
    trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a
    third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Howard
    v. State, 
    2012 Ark. 177
    , 
    403 S.W.3d 38
    .
    The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary because the trial court
    can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on
    appeal only after we grant permission. Newman, 
    2009 Ark. 539
    , 
    354 S.W.3d 61
    . A writ of
    error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. State v. Larimore, 
    341 Ark. 397
    , 
    17 S.W.3d 87
    (2000). Coram-nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the
    judgment of conviction is valid. Westerman v. State, 
    2015 Ark. 69
    , at 4, 
    456 S.W.3d 374
    ,
    376.
    Jackson seeks leave to proceed in the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis,
    claiming that there is newly discovered evidence that the prosecution wrongfully withheld
    evidence about a deal that was made between the prosecution and the State’s witness,
    Ammar Mahdi, in exchange for Mahdi’s testimony at Jackson’s trial. Jackson contends he
    was unaware at the time of trial that Mahdi’s statements that he received no “help from the
    State in his sentencing proceeding was demonstrably untrue and the State knew it was
    untrue.” He further contends that he received this information in an affidavit from Mahdi
    2
    Cite as 
    2016 Ark. 294
    “less than twelve months before he filed [t]his petition.” Notwithstanding his contention
    to the contrary, Jackson also states that on the day of trial his defense counsel was made
    aware of a transcript from Mahdi’s sentencing proceeding that had not previously been
    provided to his counsel.
    Jackson has raised this claim in three previous petitions requesting this court to
    reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. 2
    In Jackson v. State, CR 03–1127 (Ark. Dec. 11, 2008) (unpublished per curiam) (original
    docket no. CACR 03-1127), Jackson alleged, as he does now, that evidence was withheld
    by the prosecutor regarding Mahdi’s sentencing, which violated his right to due process as
    guaranteed by Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963). This court noted that Jackson failed
    to demonstrate due diligence in seeking error coram nobis relief because he was aware of
    the facts concerning Mahdi at his trial. 3 This court concluded that the court of appeals
    decision on direct appeal noted that Jackson was in possession of a copy of the transcript
    from Mr. Mahdi's sentencing hearing during the trial and that Jackson was aware of the
    2
    Jackson sought the same relief, coram-nobis relief, because he claimed he was unable
    to adequately impeach Mahdi’s and another witness’s testimony at trial because evidence
    was withheld regarding Mahdi’s sentencing and a deal made in exchange for Mahdi’s
    testimony. Jackson’s third petition seeking coram-nobis relief was denied by syllabus entry
    on April 21, 2011.
    3
    While there is no specific time limit for seeking a writ of error coram nobis, due
    diligence is required in making an application for relief and in the absence of a valid excuse
    for delay, the petition will be denied. Echols v. State, 
    360 Ark. 332
    , 
    201 S.W.3d 890
    (2005).
    Due diligence requires satisfaction of certain conditions, as follows: (1) that the defendant
    be unaware of the fact at the time of trial; (2) that the defendant could not have, in the
    exercise of due diligence, presented the fact at trial; (3) that upon discovering the fact, the
    defendant did not delay bringing the petition. 
    Id. 3 Cite
    as 
    2016 Ark. 294
    alleged fundamental error of fact at that time and had an opportunity to seek correction of
    the error more than five years previously. 4 In Jackson v. State, 
    2009 Ark. 572
    , at 1–2 (per
    curiam), this court again addressed the same claim regarding assertions that the prosecution
    withheld evidence concerning information about deals made with two witnesses, including
    Mahdi. This court held that Jackson’s “successive application for coram nobis relief in this
    court [wa]s an abuse of the writ. [Jackson] alleges few, if any new facts, and he does not
    allege any fact sufficient to distinguish his latest claims. The issues are the same.” Jackson,
    
    2009 Ark. 572
    , at 2.
    In this present petition, Jackson again fails to allege any fact sufficient to distinguish
    his claim from his three prior attempts to seek coram nobis relief. Although he submits a
    2013 affidavit signed by Mahdi as “new evidence,” Jackson still offers only conclusory
    statements maintaining that information was withheld and fails to state any facts in support
    of his contention that the State did withhold evidence concerning the existence of an alleged
    agreement with the witness, Mahdi. Clearly, contrary to Jackson’s claim that he was
    unaware of any agreement made with, or leniency given to, Mahdi in exchange for Mahdi’s
    testimony against Jackson, Jackson was aware of Mahdi’s sentencing at the time of his trial.
    4
    In his direct appeal, Jackson argued that the trial court erred when it refused to allow
    him to put on an impeachment witness, the prosecutor, whose testimony would have
    contradicted Mahdi’s testimony that he received no help from the State in his sentencing.
    Jackson, CR-03-1127, slip op. at 4–5. The court of appeals found that the trial court offered
    Jackson the opportunity to recall Mahdi for a second cross-examination, which was refused,
    and that Jackson was in possession of a copy of the transcript from Mahdi’s sentencing
    hearing and chose only to proffer the transcript in lieu of offering the transcript into
    evidence, which resulted in the matter not going before the jury. 
    Id. 4 Cite
    as 
    2016 Ark. 294
    As noted in the previous opinions, the writ is appropriate only when an issue was not
    addressed or could not have been addressed at trial because it was somehow hidden or
    unknown. Jackson, 
    2009 Ark. 572
    , at 6 (citing Larimore v. State, 
    327 Ark. 271
    , 
    938 S.W.2d 818
    (1997)).
    After examining the claims raised in this fourth petition, we conclude that Jackson’s
    successive application for coram-nobis relief in this court is an abuse of the writ in that he
    alleges no fact sufficient to distinguish his claims in the instant petition from the claims raised
    in his previous petitions. Jackson did not establish in his three prior petitions that there was
    any basis for the writ, and his reassertion of largely the same claims in the fourth petition is
    a misuse of the remedy. See Smith v. State, 
    2015 Ark. 188
    , 
    461 S.W.3d 345
    (per curiam).
    Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. See Rodgers v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 294
    , at 3–4 (per
    curiam) (“[A] court has the discretion to determine whether the renewal of a petitioner’s
    application for the writ, when there are additional facts presented in support of the same
    grounds, will be permitted.”). Due process does not require this court to entertain an
    unlimited number of petitions to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition
    for writ of error coram nobis in a particular case. Swanigan v. State, 
    2016 Ark. 109
    (per
    curiam).
    Petition dismissed.
    5