Jimmy Parr v. State ( 2008 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-07-00207-CR
    JIMMY PARR,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    From the 54th District Court
    McLennan County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2003-667-C2
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant was convicted by a jury of the felony offense of robbery. He pled true
    to an enhancement paragraph and the jury assessed his punishment at confinement in
    the institutional division for a period of 17 years and assessed a $1,000 fine.     He
    appealed.
    Appellant and his co-defendant followed the victim from an ATM to her
    apartment. When she stepped out of her car, they approached her on foot. Appellant
    grabbed her purse, and when she refused to release it, he held a gun to the side of her
    neck and took the purse. The gun was later determined to be a BB gun. The sufficiency
    of the evidence is not challenged.
    Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, that his bond was improperly raised
    during trial, and second, that he was denied a complete Batson hearing at which he
    could cross-examine the prosecutor regarding his reasons for exercising peremptory
    strikes against two African–American venire members. We overrule the first issue and
    abate the appeal for the trial court to complete the Batson hearing.
    During the trial, the court became concerned about the sufficiency of the
    appellant’s bond.    After a hearing at which a witness testified that appellant had
    threatened him and his family, the court raised appellant’s bond from $10,000 to
    $75,000, and he was placed into custody for the remainder of the trial. Appellant
    contends that this action constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. While the
    amount of bond set by a trial court can be appealed prior to trial, once a defendant is
    convicted, any complaint about that bond becomes moot. Martinez v. State, 
    826 S.W.2d 620
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Appellant’s issue here is similarly moot and is accordingly
    overruled.
    In his second issue, appellant complains that he was not given an opportunity to
    cross-examine the prosecutor after he offered his race–neutral reasons for striking two
    African–American venire members.
    After both sides had turned in their lists of peremptory strikes, but before the
    jury was seated and sworn, appellant objected to the state’s striking of two African–
    American jurors, Nos. 31 and 28. The court then asked for the state’s response. The
    Parr v. State                                                                      Page 2
    prosecutor then offered as reasons for striking No. 31 that her husband had a criminal
    history and that her answer to one specific question indicated that she had been
    involved in “situations” in the past. As for No. 28, the state said they struck him
    because he had not revealed a prior DWI conviction. After each explanation, the trial
    court stated that the Batson challenge was denied. Appellant’s attorney then requested
    a hearing on the “third phase of the Batson trial,” which, under questioning from the
    judge, he explained as cross-examining the prosecutor. The judge denied that request
    and proceeded with the trial.
    The exclusion of a venire-member based on race violates the Equal Protection
    Clause. Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 1712
    , 
    90 L. Ed. 2d 69
    (1986). Once a
    Batson challenge is made, there is a three-step procedure that the trial court employs to
    determine the validity of the challenge. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie
    showing of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor. Second, once the prima facie
    case is made, the prosecutor must come forward with a race-neutral reason for the
    peremptory challenge. Finally, once the prosecutor offers such an explanation, the
    defendant must rebut the explanation by showing that it is a mere pretext for an
    improperly motivated action.
    An integral part of the Batson procedure is the right to cross-examine the
    prosecutor once he has stated his racially neutral reason for challenging the jury.
    Salazar v. State, 
    795 S.W.2d 187
    , 192-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).       The Salazar court
    explained:
    Parr v. State                                                                       Page 3
    Cross-examination is necessary in a Batson hearing because once the State
    has met its burden of coming forward with neutral explanations for its
    peremptory strikes, the burden to show purposeful discrimination shifts
    back to the defendant to impeach or refute the neutral explanation or
    show that it is merely a pretext.
    
    Id. at 192
    (citations omitted).
    In the instant case, the trial court made an implicit finding that a prima facie case
    had been made when he requested the State to respond and then heard their two race–
    neutral explanations.     After each of those explanations, he denied the challenge.
    Appellant’s trial attorney then requested a hearing on the “third phase of the Batson
    trial.” After clarifying that the defense attorney wanted to cross-examine the prosecutor
    on the stand, the trial court refused to allow it. This action violated the holding of
    Salazar.
    The proper remedy for a violation of the procedures for a Batson hearing is to
    abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to conduct a further hearing.
    Guzman v. State, 
    85 S.W.3d 242
    , 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Consequently, we abate the
    appeal and remand the case to the trial court to conduct a further Batson hearing which,
    at a minimum, will provide the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine the
    prosecutor.
    The appeal is abated.
    KEN ANDERSON
    District Judge
    Parr v. State                                                                          Page 4
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Vance, and
    Judge Anderson1
    (Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
    Abated
    Opinion delivered and filed November 5, 2008
    Do not publish
    [CR25]
    1 Ken Anderson, Judge of the 277th District Court of Williamson County, sitting by assignment of the
    Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to section 74.003(h) of the Government Code.
    Parr v. State                                                                                Page 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-07-00207-CR

Filed Date: 11/5/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2015