Jeffrey Mitchell v. Mary Richard ( 2018 )


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  •                          NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted December 7, 2018*
    Decided December 14, 2018
    Before
    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
    No. 16-4150
    JEFFERY MITCHELL,                                   Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                           Court for the Central District of Illinois.
    v.                                           No. 16-1042
    MARY RICHARD, et al.,                               Michael M. Mihm,
    Defendants-Appellees.                           Judge.
    ORDER
    Jeffery Mitchell, an Illinois prisoner, acting pro se, makes a constitutional case out
    of his unfortunate breakup with his girlfriend. Mitchell alleges that officers at Pontiac
    Correctional Center told Mitchell’s cellmate, Andrés Reyes, to pack up Mitchell’s
    belongings from his property storage boxes for his transfer to another prison facility.
    Unsupervised, Reyes pilfered Mitchell’s personal property, including private
    correspondence and photographs of Mitchell’s girlfriend, Genina Johnson. With the
    *We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appellate
    brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument
    would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    No. 16-4150                                                                         Page 2
    intelligence gained from his plunder, Reyes wrote to Johnson, complimenting the
    photographs of her and impugning Mitchell’s character to persuade her to desert
    Mitchell. Eventually, she did.
    Mitchell sued the officers under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     for violations of his rights to
    privacy under the Fourth Amendment and due process and equal protection under the
    Fourteenth Amendment, as well as violations of state law. Consistent with the screening
    procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the defendants were not served with process in the
    district court and are not participating in this appeal. However, for the purposes of
    these proceedings the allegations in Mitchell’s complaint are treated as true. Echols v.
    Craig, 
    855 F.3d 807
    , 809 (7th Cir. 2017).
    On June 15, 2016, upon screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
    the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and assessed a
    strike, see id. § 1915(g). The district judge determined that Mitchell had no reasonable
    expectation of privacy in his cell and that the officers’ negligent loss of his personal
    property did not violate the Constitution. Further, the court concluded, Mitchell could
    not bring a federal constitutional claim for alleged violations of Illinois prison
    regulations. Judgment was entered in accordance therewith on June 16, 2016.
    On July 16, 2016, Mitchell moved under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the
    judgment. Consistent with the original determination in the merits screening, the
    district court denied Mitchell’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.
    We review the dismissal of Mitchell’s complaint de novo, see McGowan v. Hulick,
    
    612 F.3d 636
    , 640 (7th Cir. 2010), and the denial of his post-judgment motion for abuse
    of discretion, see Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, 
    782 F.3d 911
    , 914 (7th Cir. 2015).
    Because Mitchell fails to assert a federal claim, we affirm.
    In his appeal, Mitchell initially raises the argument “never decided by the federal
    judiciary,” that prisoners have a right to privacy in their personal effects “in relation to
    other inmates.” He argues that the correctional officers violated this right by directing
    his cellmate to pack his belongings, unsupervised, which led to the theft of his
    possessions. As an initial matter, Mitchell’s assertion that the express right to privacy
    conferred by Article I § 6 of the Illinois Constitution is enforceable under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , because it is similar to the right of privacy under the United States Constitution
    as interpreted by the courts, is incorrect. Mitchell cannot enforce a provision of the
    No. 16-4150                                                                          Page 3
    Illinois Constitution by suing under section 1983, which vindicates violations of federal
    law by state actors.
    As for his federal constitutional claim, Mitchell invokes Fourth Amendment
    principles, not an implied right to privacy. Mitchell recognizes the settled precedent
    that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, prisoners have no reasonable expectation
    of privacy in their personal effects. Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
    , 526 (1984). But he
    says that this principle applies only against prison officials, not “in relation to other
    inmates”; in other words, his cellmate could violate his right to privacy although the
    officers could not. This is wrong because, with few exceptions, the Constitution protects
    citizens from government action, not the actions of private individuals. DeShaney
    v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 
    489 U.S. 189
    , 195 (1989). And, even if we assumed
    that Reyes, acting in cahoots with the correctional officers, were a “state actor,”
    see Wilson v. Warren County, 
    830 F.3d 464
    , 468 (7th Cir. 2016), then Mitchell runs right
    back up against the proposition he concedes: he has no reasonable expectation of
    privacy under the Fourth Amendment “as to prison security officers.”
    Next, Mitchell contends that the theft of his personal belongings violated his
    procedural due-process and equal-protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
    This confusing due-process claim appears premised on the notion that Illinois statutes
    and prison regulations created an enforceable “liberty interest” with mandatory
    language that reserves only to the inmate the ability to pack his own items. Mitchell
    argues that the officers violated this right, without notice or any procedural safeguards.
    But a state actor’s violations of state law do not form the basis of a federal constitutional
    claim. Garcia v. Kankakee Cty. Hous. Auth., 
    279 F.3d 532
    , 535 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover,
    Mitchell does not allege that the officers intended to deprive him of his belongings; he
    argues that they were negligent in letting Reyes pack them unsupervised. The Due
    Process Clause does not apply to the negligent acts of prison officials that cause
    unintended property loss. Daniels v. Williams, 
    474 U.S. 327
    , 328 (1986). As for the equal
    protection claim, Mitchell does not develop an argument that the officers singled him
    out for discriminatory treatment. See Home Care Providers, Inc. v. Hemmelgarn, 
    861 F.3d 615
    , 625 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that undeveloped appellate arguments are waived).
    Finally, although he generally challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
    to alter or amend the judgment, Mitchell does not argue that he established a manifest
    error of law or presented newly discovered evidence warranting relief. See FED. R. CIV.
    P. 59(e); Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
    759 F.3d 645
    , 652–53 (7th Cir. 2014). He
    rests on the same arguments made in opposition to the dismissal.
    No. 16-4150                                                                  Page 4
    We have considered Mitchell’s remaining arguments, but none merits further
    discussion. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.