State of Iowa v. Samella Simone Bailey ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1927
Filed December 19, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMELLA SIMONE BAILEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Andrea J. Dryer
(motion to dismiss) and David P. Odekirk (trial and sentencing), Judges.
The defendant appeals her conviction of delivering or possessing with the
intent to deliver a simulated controlled substance as a second offender.
AFFIRMED.
Eric W. Manning of Manning Law Office, PLLC, Urbandale, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary C. Miller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
An undercover law enforcement agent contacted Samella Simone Bailey
about purchasing two ounces of crack cocaine. Bailey agreed to sell the agent
crack cocaine for a specified price. The two met at a predetermined location, and
Bailey handed the agent a bag of suspected crack cocaine. The substance was
field tested and turned out not to be crack cocaine.
The State charged Bailey with delivery or possession with intent to deliver
a simulated controlled substance (more than forty grams of simulated cocaine
base) as a second offender. See Iowa Code §124.401(1)(a)(3) (2017).1 The crime
was a class “B” felony. Bailey moved to dismiss the charge on the ground the
statute required an actual rather than simulated controlled substance and she
should have been charged under section 124.401(1)(a)(8), which was a class “C”
felony.2 The district court denied the motion. Bailey waived her right to a jury trial,
and the district court found her guilty on the minutes of testimony. The court
sentenced Bailey to a prison term not exceeding twenty-five years, with a one-third
mandatory minimum. On appeal, Bailey contends (1) the district court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss and (2) the sentence was illegal.
I. Motion to Dismiss
Bailey argues the structure of chapter 124 together with its plain language
required dismissal of the trial information. In her view, the chapter “generally
defines the criminal activity,” then “define[s] the punishments for varying
1
The charge appears in an amended trial information.
2
Effective July 1, 2017, section 124.401(1)(c)(8) was redesignated as section
124.401(1)(c)(9). See 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 145, § 4–10, 24–27. The previously-numbered
sections are applicable to Bailey’s conviction, because her offense predated the changes.
3
aggravating circumstances,” and finally, “defines the penalty for a violation of the
chapter without aggravating circumstances.” She asserts all the penalty provisions
except one require “an actual controlled substance.” She contends the single
exception is section 124.401(1)(c)(8), which carries a penalty assigned “without
regard to . . . the existence of an actual controlled substance.”
Bailey’s argument is appealing at first blush. See Iowa Code §124.401. But
it ignores key language in the provision under which she was charged:
1. Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or
deliver, a controlled substance, a counterfeit substance, a simulated
controlled substance, or an imitation controlled substance . . . .
a. Violation of this subsection, with respect to the following
controlled substances, counterfeit substances, simulated controlled
substances, or imitation controlled substances, is a class “B” felony,
....
....
(3) More than fifty grams of a mixture or substance
described in subparagraph (2) which contains cocaine base.
See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(a)(3) (emphasis added).3 Because the introductory
paragraph refers to a “simulated controlled subtance” as well as a “controlled
substance,” delivery or possession of simulated “cocaine base” would fall within
the ambit of section 124.401(a)(3). The district court did not err in reaching this
conclusion. See State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Iowa 2017) (reviewing
questions of statutory interpretation for errors of law).
Nor did the court err in rejecting Bailey’s assertion that “the minutes as
submitted [did] not amount to probable cause to support a criminal charge under
Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(a)(3).” See State v. Rimmer, 877 N.W.2d 652, 660
3
Effective May 12, 2017, section 124.401(1)(a)(3) substituted “two hundred” for “fifty.”
See Acts 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 122, § 7.
4
(Iowa 2016) (“We accept the facts alleged by the State in the trial information and
attached minutes as true.”). The facts as disclosed in the minutes of testimony
satisfied the statutory definition of “simulated controlled substance”:
[A] substance which is not a controlled substance but which is
expressly represented to be a controlled substance, or a substance
which is not a controlled substance but which is impliedly
represented to be a controlled substance and which because of its
nature, packaging, or appearance would lead a reasonable person
to believe it to be a controlled substance.
Iowa Code § 124.101(28)4; cf. State v. Henderson, 478 N.W.2d 626, 627–28 (Iowa
1991) (rejecting vagueness challenges to the definition). Bailey expressly
represented to the undercover agent that she would be selling her crack cocaine.
Testing revealed the substance she sold was not crack cocaine. Based on these
facts, the State could charge Bailey under section 124.401(1)(a)(3). We affirm the
district court’s denial of the dismissal motion.
II. Sentencing
Bailey raises various challenges to her sentence. First, she contends the
court should “reconsider the primacy of [State v. Criswell, 242 N.W.2d 259, 260
(Iowa 1976)] and overturn precedent.” In Criswell, the court addressed “whether
the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences upon convictions, of two
separate offenses, obtained in a single prosecution, charged in a single
information, and arising from the same criminal transaction.” 242 N.W.2d at 260–
61. Bailey appears to equate her enhancement for a prior conviction with “a
separate offense . . . obtained in a single prosecution.” Id. at 260. Our courts have
4
The definition of “simulated controlled substance” is now redesignated as section
124.101(29). See 2017 Iowa Acts 2017 ch. 145, § 2.
5
treated them differently. See State v. Gordon, 732 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 2007)
(“[H]abitual-offender status is not a separate offense; it is simply a sentencing
enhancement.” (citation omitted)); State v. Hardin, No. 00-1400, 2002 WL 663557,
at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (“When a person is charged with an habitual
offense, they are not being charged with a separate offense. Rather, the habitual
offender statute only provides for enhanced punishment of the current offense.”
(citation omitted)); cf. State v. Butler, 706 N.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Iowa 2005) (addressing
requirement of notice to defendant of enhanced charges). More fundamentally,
we are not at liberty to overrule Iowa Supreme Court precedent, even if the
precedent applies to the facts of the case. See State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64
(Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
Next, Bailey argues “[t]he District Court had the ability to find Ms. Bailey
guilty of a lesser included offense, but failed to do so.” She bases her contention
on the fact she “was never found to have possessed any actual illegal substances.”
But, as discussed, the statute criminalizes possession or delivery of a “simulated
controlled substance” to the same extent as an actual controlled substance.
Finally, Bailey argues her sentence amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment under the United States Constitution. She cites the “25-year sentence
with a minimum of one third to be served for a single act of selling a simulated
substance with no traces of an illegal substance.” Again, Bailey bases her
challenge on her sale of fake rather than real cocaine.
To reiterate, Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(a)(3) sets forth the same
penalty for sale of simulated and real cocaine base. The question we must decide
is whether the sentence under section 124.401(1)(a)(3) amounts to cruel and
6
unusual punishment as applied to Bailey. See State v. Wickes, 910 N.W.2d 554,
572 (Iowa 2018). The threshold inquiry is “whether the sentence being reviewed
is ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the underlying crime.” Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 290–91 (1983)). Under similar circumstances, the Iowa Court of Appeals
found defendants’ sentences did not violate this principle. See State v. Daniels,
No. 14-1442, 2016 WL 5408279, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2016) (finding no
high risk of gross disproportionality because “[c]ocaine trafficking is exactly what
Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(a)(3) (2013) was designed to prevent, and the
statute is precise in its application” and “[t]he cited section enhances the sentence
based on large quantities precisely defined”); State v. Daniels, No. 14-1480, 2015
WL 9450636, at *11 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015) (finding no gross
disproportionality in a defendant’s sentence where his “conduct [fell] squarely
within the elements of possession of a controlled substance, to wit: more than 50
grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute”); State v. Newell, No. 13-1436,
2015 WL 566654, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015) (finding a sentence under
section 124.401(1)(a)(3) did not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality).
The same is true here.
Bailey’s sale of $3400 worth of a substance she represented to be crack
cocaine fell squarely within the parameters of the narrowly defined statute. On our
de novo review, we conclude the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to her
offense. Accordingly, the sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment.
We affirm Bailey’s conviction, judgment, and sentence.
AFFIRMED.