Roger D. Campbell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 21 2018, 10:58 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Roger D. Campbell, December 21, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1473
v. Appeal from the White Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert B. Mrzlack,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
91D01-1705-F4-69
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1473 | December 21, 2018 Page 1 of 6
[1] Roger Campbell appeals his convictions for three counts of Child Molesting, 1
one as a Level 1 felony and two as Level 4 felonies, arguing that the evidence is
insufficient. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts
[2] J.G., who was five to six years old at the time of the incidents, lived in
Monticello with her grandmother. J.G.’s mother also lived at the residence,
along with many other family members. Campbell’s house was nearby in the
same neighborhood. Her grandmother’s home was not always a stable place
for J.G., and Campbell acted as a family support. J.G. would go over to
Campbell’s house three to four times a week, ask for food, and spend time with
Campbell and his wife.
[3] In October 2016, J.G. was removed from her mother’s care and from her
grandmother’s home because of suspected drug use and lack of proper
supervision. J.G. was placed in foster care. About a month after being placed
with her foster family, J.G. disclosed that Campbell had touched her
inappropriately, leading to a forensic interview. J.G. was later placed with a
second foster family and divulged further details, leading to a second forensic
interview.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3.
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[4] On May 2, 2017, the State charged Campbell with two counts of Level 4 felony
child molesting, later adding one count of Level 1 felony child molesting.
Campbell’s jury trial began on April 17, 2018. J.G. testified at the trial,
explaining that Campbell had touched her “girl part up there” and had done so
on multiple occasions. Tr. Vol. II p. 71-72. He told J.G. to touch his “boy
part” with her hands and mouth; J.G. explained that she complied “[b]ecause
he told me to. And he said if I do it, he’ll let me go home.” Id. at 74.
Campbell touched J.G.’s vagina with his hands and mouth and put his fingers
in her anus. Id. at 74, 80-81. At least once, Campbell called J.G. a “bad word”
that started with a “b” and told her that he loved her. Id. at 74-75. Campbell
once attempted to insert his penis into J.G.’s anus but did not penetrate her. He
told her not to tell anyone about these sexual incidents and threatened her if she
told anyone. J.G. later told her grandfather that she did not want to go back to
Campbell’s house, but still went over there on occasion because her
grandmother asked her to do so.
[5] The jury found Campbell guilty as charged. At Campbell’s May 25, 2018,
sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence for the Level 1
felony conviction and concurrent six-year sentences for each of the two Level 4
felony convictions, to be served consecutively to the thirty-year sentence, for an
aggregate term of thirty-six years imprisonment. Campbell now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] Campbell’s sole argument on appeal is that the evidence does not support his
conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the conviction and will neither assess witness credibility
nor reweigh the evidence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We
will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.[7] To convict Campbell of Level 1 felony child molesting, the State was required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Campbell, who was over the age of
twenty-one, knowingly or intentionally performed or submitted to sexual
intercourse or other sexual conduct with J.G., who was under the age of
fourteen. I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a). To convict Campbell of Level 4 felony child
molesting, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Campbell performed or submitted to any fondling or touching of or by J.G.,
who was under the age of fourteen, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual
desires of either J.G. or himself. I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).
[8] Campbell does not raise an argument regarding any of the statutory elements.
Instead, he argues that his conviction is based on incredibly dubious evidence.
The rule of incredible dubiosity allows the court to impinge upon a jury’s
responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d
749, 754 (Ind. 2015). This rule applies only when a sole witness provides
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testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion.
Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015). Its application is very rare,
and the “‘testimony must be so convoluted and/or contrary to human
experience that no reasonable person could believe it.’” Moore, 27 N.E.3d at
756 (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)).
[9] J.G.’s testimony was neither inherently contradictory nor equivocal, nor was
there any evidence that she was coerced to testify. And unfortunately, her
testimony was not contrary to human experience.
[10] The gravamen of Campbell’s argument is his claim that J.G.’s version of events
changed significantly between her two forensic interviews. Initially, we note
that her version of events did not change significantly; instead, she merely
divulged more details and information the second time. This is an eminently
reasonable course for a sexual assault survivor to take—especially when the
survivor is a young child.
[11] Moreover, J.G.’s forensic interviews were not introduced into evidence at trial.
Instead, the young girl testified, and her testimony—which is the focus of the
incredible dubiosity rule—was unequivocal. See Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d
406, 409 (Ind. 2002) (explaining that a successful claim of incredible dubiosity
must show contradictions inherent in the testimony itself rather than
inconsistencies between testimony and other external sources). Campbell’s
attorney cross-examined J.G., raising the issue of her consistency and
questioning her level of certainty regarding her allegations. It was for the jury
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to evaluate J.G.’s credibility, and we may not and will not second-guess the
jurors’ determination that she was believable.
[12] We do not find J.G.’s testimony to be incredibly dubious. Therefore, the
evidence is sufficient to support Campbell’s convictions. See Bailey v. State, 979
N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (holding that a conviction may be sustained on
only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness
is the victim).
[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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