Medearis v. City of Tahlequah ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 21, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ROBERT PARK MEDEARIS, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-7009
(D.C. No. 6:17-CV-00005-JH)
CITY OF TAHLEQUAH; MAYOR (E.D. Okla.)
JASON NICHOLS, in his official capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before McHUGH, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Robert Park Medearis, Jr., appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the City of Tahlequah (the City) on Medearis’s claim that the City
interfered with his right to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2654. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
For many years, the City employed Medearis as its City Attorney. On
September 8, 2015, however, he became incapacitated. He went to the emergency
room for falls and confusion and was admitted to the hospital, where he suffered
“from confusion, cognitive deficits, altered mental status, and impaired judgment.”
Aplt. App., Vol. I at 45. He was diagnosed with alcohol use disorder, and at some
point he developed a pulmonary embolism.
Medical staff were not optimistic about Medearis’s chances, advising his
then-wife, Sandy Medearis, to prepare for him to die. In mid-to-late September,
Ms. Medearis sought and obtained from an Oklahoma court an order of legal
guardianship over Medearis. However, Medearis’s health improved, and he was
transferred to a nursing home on or about October 9, 2015.
During this period, the City continued paying Medearis his salary and benefits.
Notably, however, the City didn’t believe Medearis was entitled to leave under the
FMLA and thus didn’t give any notice of FMLA rights either to Medearis or to
Ms. Medearis as his legal guardian. Through their communications with
Ms. Medearis, City officials understood that Medearis’s condition was dire, and they
remained concerned about the City’s legal representation. In mid-October, the
Mayor, Jason Nichols, signed a contract with a local attorney to act as Interim City
Attorney. But with Medearis’s long absence being the best-case scenario, the Mayor
communicated to Ms. Medearis near the end of October that the City needed to
replace Medearis as City Attorney. The Mayor believed that a resignation would be a
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softer and more respectful way to handle the transition. If Ms. Medearis as his
guardian would provide a letter of resignation on Medearis’s behalf, the Mayor
promised to fight for him to continue to receive payments and benefits for as long as
the City Council would agree to do so.
Ms. Medearis gave the Mayor an undated resignation letter. At a meeting on
November 2, 2015, the City Council voted to accept the resignation and make it
effective on January 31, 2016, thus continuing Medearis’s pay and benefits for three
additional months. The City Council further voted to make the Interim City Attorney
the City Attorney effective on February 1, 2016.
Medearis remained confined to the nursing home until January 4, 2016. When
he was discharged, his physician recommended he should not practice law until he
had been evaluated by a neuropsychologist. After examining Medearis on January
30, 2016, the neuropsychologist found he had suffered declines in cognitive abilities.
He stated that there was nothing to prohibit Medearis’s return to legal work, but he
recommended that Medearis return gradually and under the supervision of another
attorney until he demonstrated his cognitive skills were intact.
The legal guardianship remained in place until February 2, 2016, when the
state court lifted it upon a motion Ms. Medearis had filed at the end of January.
Neither Medearis nor Ms. Medearis ever contacted the City about Medearis resuming
his position as City Attorney until March 2016, when Medearis reached out to the
Mayor.
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In this litigation, Medearis sued both the City and Mayor Nichols in his
official capacity. He asserted FMLA claims of retaliation and interference and a
state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. During briefing on the
City’s summary-judgment motion, Medearis conceded his claims against Mayor
Nichols and his state-law claim, and he moved to dismiss his FMLA retaliation
claim. The district court granted dismissal of the FMLA retaliation claim and
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the FMLA interference
claim and the state-law claim. Medearis now appeals the judgment in favor of the
City on the FMLA interference claim.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “We review the district court’s summary
judgment decision de novo to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, viewing the record in the light most favorable to [Medearis].” Campbell v.
Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 478 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007).
The FMLA provides eligible employees who are suffering “a serious health
condition” that makes them “unable to perform the functions of [their] position” the
right to take up to twelve workweeks of leave in a twelve-month period. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(D). Such employees also are entitled, on return from FMLA leave, to
be reinstated to their position or an equivalent position. Id. § 2614(a)(1). The FMLA
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makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise
of or the attempt to exercise” any FMLA right. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
There are three elements to a FMLA interference claim: “(1) that [the
plaintiff] was entitled to FMLA leave, (2) that some adverse action by the employer
interfered with [his] right to take FMLA leave, and (3) that the employer’s action was
related to the exercise or attempted exercise of [his] FMLA rights.” Campbell,
478 F.3d at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted). Once a plaintiff has established
the first two elements, the burden shifts to the employer to satisfy the third element.
Id. The parties have stipulated for purposes of the summary-judgment motion that
Medearis was protected by the FMLA, but the district court ruled against Medearis
on both remaining elements.
“In order to satisfy the second element of an interference claim, the employee
must show that []he was prevented from taking the full 12 weeks[] of leave
guaranteed by the FMLA, denied reinstatement following leave, or denied initial
permission to take leave.” Id. The record is clear that the City extended Medearis
not only the full twelve weeks of leave mandated by the FMLA, but more—it paid
him and continued his benefits for approximately twenty-one weeks, from September
8, 2015, through January 31, 2016. The issue, then, is whether a reasonable jury
could find that the City denied him reinstatement following his leave. For
reinstatement, the relevant date is December 1, 2015, when Medearis’s
FMLA-guaranteed twelve weeks of leave ended.
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The district court held that Medearis had not shown any adverse action by the
City because Ms. Medearis, his legal guardian, had voluntarily and without coercion
submitted a resignation on behalf of Medearis. Once she submitted the resignation
letter, the district court held, the City was not required to make any effort to reinstate
Medearis to the position of City Attorney. On appeal, Medearis contends the district
court erred in concluding that the resignation was truly a knowing and voluntary act
by Ms. Medearis. But we need not decide whether the district court correctly
concluded that a reasonable jury could not find in favor of Medearis on the second, or
even the third, element. That’s because we agree with the district court that Medearis
has failed to show prejudice.1
As the district held, even if the City interfered with Medearis’s exercise of his
FMLA rights, he was not prejudiced because no reasonable factfinder could conclude
that he was capable of returning to work when his leave expired on December 1,
2015. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002) (stating
1
Regarding the third element, the district court held that even “[a]ssuming . . .
that the City’s act of soliciting the letter and accepting it before the end of the
twelve[-]week period amounted to adverse action,” the claim would still fail because
“[Medearis] has not met his burden with respect to the third, causation element of his
claim.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 553. But this was error because once the employee
establishes the first two elements, the burden shifts to the employer to establish the
third element. See Campbell, 478 F.3d at 1287. Medearis therefore had no burden at
this stage of the analysis—rather, the City had the burden to show no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether its solicitation of the resignation letter was related to
the exercise of Medearis’s FMLA rights. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed
above, even when the burden is properly placed on the City, Medearis’s FMLA
interference claim can’t survive the City’s summary-judgment motion.
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that “[the FMLA] provides no relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by the
violation”).
Medearis claims that he could have returned to work had he known his FMLA
leave expired on December 1, 2015. He asserts that by then there was no medical
reason to justify his being confined to a nursing home, and that the legal guardianship
proceeding was void for being procedurally infirm. In support, among other
evidence, he offered state-court filings from December 2015 attacking the
guardianship, as well as testimony from his family members that he was acting
normally at a family gathering at Thanksgiving.
As the district court concluded, however, regardless of Medearis’s actual
mental and physical condition,2 no reasonable jury could conclude that he would have
been able to return to work on December 1, 2015. He was confined to a nursing
home until January 4, 2016, and he was the subject of a state-court order of legal
guardianship until February 2, 2016. Even if the guardianship was improperly
obtained, as Medearis asserts, it remained valid until the state court vacated it. And
while the guardianship remained in effect, Medearis was deemed incapable of
conducting his own affairs. See Okla. Stat. tit. 30, § 1-112(A)(2) (providing that the
Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act applies to “[i]ncapacitated and
2
The district court expressed doubt, but didn’t decide, that Medearis’s
evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his mental and
physical condition as of December 1, 2015. Like the district court, we need not
evaluate Medearis’s actual competency. But we note that as late as January 30, 2016,
a neuropsychologist recommended that Medearis undertake only a gradual return to
work as an attorney, and that initially he be supervised by another attorney.
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partially incapacitated persons”); id. § 1-111(12) (defining “incapacitated person” as
an adult who is impaired by physical or mental illness or drug or alcohol dependency
“whose ability to receive and evaluate information effectively or to make and to
communicate responsible decisions is impaired to such an extent that said person:
(1) lacks the capacity to meet essential requirements for his physical health or safety,
or (2) is unable to manage his financial resources”). Under these circumstances, no
reasonable juror could conclude that as of December 1, 2015, Medearis could have
returned to work as the City Attorney.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
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