Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1982 )


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  •                                  The Attorney                       General of Texas
    July   5.   1982
    MARK WHITE
    Attorney General
    Mr. Maurice S. Pipkin                                       Opinion     No.      MU-483
    Supreme Court Building
    Executive   Director
    P. 0. BOX 12546
    Austin. TX. 78711. 2546
    State Commission on Judicial    Conduct                     Re:  Authority     of county judge
    5121475~2501                   P. 0. Box 12265. Capitol   Station                          to receive    fees   for temporary
    Telex 9101674.1367             Austin.   Texas      78711                                  commitment hearings
    Telecopier  51214759266
    Dear Mr. Pipkin:
    1607 Main Sl.. Suite 1400
    Dallas. TX. 75201-4709              You ask whether:
    214l742.8944
    a county     judge   of one county     may enter    into   a
    contract     with   another   county  to be compensated
    4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160
    El Paso. TX. 79905.2793                       personally     from public   funds for holding    hearings
    9151533.3464                                  on temporary      commitments to an institution      of the
    Texas    Department     of  Mental   Health    and Mental
    Retardation.
    1220 Dallas Ave.. Suite 202
    Houslon. TX. 770026986
    7 131650.0666                       Article       5547-31,     V.T.C.S.,        provides     in part    as follows:
    A       SWO73l      Application                 for     Temporary
    806 Broadway. Suite312                        Hospitalization      of a proposed             patient  may be filed
    Lubbock.   TX.   79401.3479
    with the county       court of the              county  in which the
    .8Wl747~5230
    proposed     patient   resides    or         in which the patient
    is   found    or in which        the          proposed    patient    is
    4309 N. Tenlh. Suite B                        hospitalized      by court order.              (Emphasis added).    -
    McAllen. TX. 78501-1665
    512l662-4547
    Article       5547-33.     V.T.C.S..        provides     in part    that:
    200 Main Plaza. Suite 400                         When                   Application        for         Temporary
    San Antonio. TX. 78205-2787                   Hospitalizat:tn          is filed,     the county      judge     shall
    312,225.4191                                  set    a date        for   a hearing       to  be     held      within
    fourteen        (14)      days     of    the   filing        of     the
    An Equal OppOrtunityI                         Application.
    Attirmative Aclion Employer
    Article       5547-41.     V.T.C.S.,        provides     in part    that:
    A sworn Petition        for the indefinite     commitment
    of a person to a mental hospital          may be filed    with
    the    county    court    of   the‘ county-    in which     the
    proposed    patient    is hospitalized,      the county   from
    which he is temporarily          committed.    or the county
    in   which    he    resides     or  is   found.      (Emphasis
    added).
    D. 1704
    Mr. Maurice        S.   Pipkln   - Page 2     (bfw-483)
    Article      5547-43.     V.T.C.S.,    reads      as follows:
    When a Petition     and the required   Certificate      of
    Medical      Examination    for   Mental    Illness      I see
    V.T.C.S.    art. 5547-421 are filed,     the county judge
    shall    set a date for a hearing      to be held within
    thirty    (30) days of the filing    of the Petition....
    The briefs          and correspondence          submitted     to this office        indicate
    that the relevant             facts   are as follows.          The judge      in question      is the
    constitutional             county     judge     of     a county       within      which     a Texas
    Department         of Mental Health and Mental Retardation                    [hereinafter       MHMR]
    facility         is     located.        This     facility      serves      several      neighboring
    counties.          In 1979, this county judge informed                 these counties       that his
    workload      was such that he could “no longer                    hold temporary        commitment
    hearings       for [counties         other    than his own].”           By this,     he apparently
    meant       that       he     would     no    longer       conduct      subsequent       commitment
    proceedings          involving      patients      who are originally            committed     to ‘the
    MMR facility             from other      counties.        Shortly    thereafter,       however,      he
    agreed with other             counties     to hold commitment hearings             involving      such
    patients       where the committing             county agreed        to pay him a prescribed
    fee     for     holding       them.      The agreement         attempted       CO designate        him
    “special      judge.”
    We are     informed      that      the    applications       which     triggered     the
    comirment     hearings     in question       were filed      in the county in which the
    judge regularly      serves,    I.e.6     the county in which the NRMR facility               is
    located;    not in the counries           from which the patients           were committed.
    Thus,    the fee agreements         were obviously         predicated     upon the judge’s
    conclusion    that he is under no legal             obligation      to conduct      cowmitmenr
    proceedings     involving     patients        committed      from other      counties,     even
    when an application           is     filed      in  his     county,     but     that    he may
    voluntarily     agree    to do so for a fee.                As we shall        explain,    this
    conclusion    was erroneous.
    Under articles       5547-31    and 5547-41.       a commitment application          may
    be filed     in the county in which the proposed               patient     is hospitalized.
    When such      application       is   filed,’     the county      judge     is   required     to
    schedule     a hearing.      V.T.C.S.     arts.    5547-33,    5547-43.       Thus, when the
    applications      for     the    continued       commitment      of    patients      who were
    hospitalized     in the HRMR facility            located    in the judge’s        county were
    filed    in that county,        the judge assumed a duty to hold a commitment
    hearing,     as his     county    was the one “in which the proposed                   patient
    [was] hospitalized.”           V.T.C.S.     arts.     5547-31,   5547-41.       He could    not
    refuse     to perform     this    duty as county         judge   and insist       that    he be
    compensated      therefor       as “special         judge.”     -See    Nueces      County    v.
    Currington,     
    162 S.W.2d 687
    (Tex.          1942).
    Ue are aware of no constitutional       or statutory                    provision    which
    would authorize      this county judge, acting   as county                  judge or “special
    judge,”    to   receive    compensation  for   conducting                    these     commitment
    p.   1705
    Mr.   Maurice     S. Pipkin     - Page 3       (MU-483)
    hearings.      As noted,     the duty to conduct         these hearings      was imposed
    upon the judge by the foregoing             statutes.      Consequently.     we conclude
    that he is not legally          authorized     to charge these      fees.     See Nueces
    County v. 
    Currington. supra
    (unless      a fee is provided        by G    for an
    official    service   required     to be performed     and the amount thereof       fixed
    by lav,     none can lawfully        be charged     therefor);     McCalla v. City of
    Rockdale,     
    246 S.W. 654
    (Tex. 1922).           Even if he could lawfully        charge
    such a fee.     moreover,    he would be obliged,         under article     XVI. section
    61 of the Texas Constitution           and article     3912k, V.T.C.S.,      to turn the
    fee    over   to the county       treasury.      Wichita     County v. Robinson,       
    276 S.W.2d 509
    (Tex.      1954);    Binford v. Robinson,        
    244 S.W. 807
    (TeX. 1922);
    McLennan County v. Boggess,           
    137 S.W. 346
    (Tex. 1911).
    Under the        facts     before   us,   therefore,    we answer   your   question   in
    the negative.
    SUMMARY
    Under the facts     before  us, a county     judge    of
    one county    could   not enter   into a contract      with
    another   county    to be compensated    personally     for
    holding  a hearing which he is statutorily        required
    to hold in his capacity      as county judge.
    MARK        WHITE
    Attorney   General of   Texas
    JOHN W. FAINTER, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney             General
    RICHARD E. GRAY III
    Executive Assistant           Attorney    General
    Prepared    by Jon Bible
    Assistant    Attorney  General
    APPROVED:
    OPINION COMMITTEE
    Susan L. Garrison,            Chairman
    Jon Bible
    Walter Davis
    Rick Gilpin
    Patricia   Hinojosa
    Jim Moellinger
    Bruce Youngblood
    p.   1706
    

Document Info

Docket Number: MW-483

Judges: Mark White

Filed Date: 7/2/1982

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017