Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Vaughn ( 2007 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA            
    FE RAILWAY COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                           No. 05-16755
    CHARLES VAUGHN, Chairman of the
    Hualapai Indian Tribe, a federally            D.C. No.
    CV-04-02227-EHC
    recognized Indian Tribe; WANDA
    OPINION
    EASTER, Finance Director of the
    Hualapai Indian Tribe, a federally
    recognized Indian Tribe,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Earl H. Carroll, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    October 16, 2007—San Francisco, California
    Filed December 7, 2007
    Before: Arthur L. Alarcón, David R. Thompson, and
    Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Tallman
    16105
    16108        BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN
    COUNSEL
    Susan M. Williams (argued), Sarah S. Works, Williams &
    Works, P.A., Corrales, New Mexico, for the appellants.
    BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN              16109
    Charles G. Cole (argued), Alice E. Loughran, Amber B.
    Blaha, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, D.C.; Paul J.
    Mooney, Jim L. Wright, Fennemore Craig, P.C., Phoenix,
    Arizona, for the appellee.
    OPINION
    TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
    The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company
    (BNSF) brought suit against two officials of the Hualapai
    Indian Tribe, Charles Vaughn and Wanda Easter (the tribal
    officials), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
    their efforts to enforce or collect the Hualapai Tribe’s posses-
    sory interest tax against BNSF for use of the railroad’s right-
    of-way through the reservation. The tribal officials filed a
    motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. The tribal
    officials bring this appeal.
    We address the novel jurisdictional question whether, under
    Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    (1949), denial of a tribal sovereign immunity claim is appeal-
    able on an interlocutory basis as a collateral order. We hold
    that it is and proceed to review the district court’s ruling on
    the merits. We affirm the district court’s ruling that tribal sov-
    ereign immunity does not bar suit against Easter, who is alleg-
    edly responsible for enforcing the tax at issue in this suit, but
    reverse with regard to Vaughn, the Tribe’s Chairman, who
    has no alleged enforcement responsibilities to actually collect
    the tax. The tribal officials also appeal the district court’s
    denial of their exhaustion of tribal remedies claim. However,
    they do not assert an adequate basis to permit us to exercise
    jurisdiction over that claim now, and we dismiss the remain-
    der of this interlocutory appeal.
    16110            BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN
    I
    Viewed in the light most favorable to BNSF, as required on
    a motion to dismiss, see Hydrick v. Hunter, 
    500 F.3d 978
    , 985
    (9th Cir. 2007), the record reveals the following facts. BNSF1
    operates its railroad on a congressionally granted right-of-way
    through Arizona that crosses the Hualapai Indian Reservation.
    BNSF owns title to the right-of-way, free of all claims by the
    Tribe.
    In 1989, the Hualapai Tribal Council enacted a tax by ordi-
    nance which imposes a 7% tax on the value of certain “pos-
    sessory interests” within the Reservation. At oral argument,
    counsel for the Tribe asserted the tax was intended to be in the
    nature of a use tax to reimburse the Tribe for the cost of
    attending railway accidents or blockages since the mainline
    hosts upward of eighty trains daily that pass at one point
    through the heart of the tribal administrative center. In 1991,
    BNSF brought suit challenging the Tribe’s authority to apply
    the tax to the railroad’s right-of-way. The parties settled and
    BNSF agreed to pay a lump sum to the Tribe in lieu of any
    taxes, interest, and penalties that might otherwise have been
    assessed against it during tax years 1990 through 2001.
    On July 24, 2002, after the settlement agreement had
    expired, Wanda Easter, the Tribe’s finance director, sent tax
    registration forms to BNSF. BNSF notified the Tribe that it
    disputed the Tribe’s jurisdiction to tax BNSF’s operation of
    the right-of-way. The parties attempted to resolve their dis-
    agreement, but were unsuccessful.
    BNSF subsequently filed a complaint in the United States
    District Court for the District of Arizona seeking declaratory
    and injunctive relief against the Tribe’s efforts to enforce or
    collect the tax. The tribal officials responded with a motion to
    dismiss, claiming that: 1) the suit is barred by tribal sovereign
    1
    References to BNSF include BNSF and its predecessors in interest.
    BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN               16111
    immunity, 2) BNSF failed to exhaust tribal remedies, and 3)
    the tax does not violate federal law. The district court denied
    the motion, holding that: 1) tribal sovereign immunity did not
    bar BNSF’s claims against the tribal officials, 2) BNSF was
    not required to exhaust tribal remedies because the tribal court
    “plainly” lacked jurisdiction, and 3) BNSF’s allegation that
    the tax is unenforceable against it was sufficient to state a
    claim for relief. The tribal officials appealed.
    II
    A
    [1] Our jurisdiction is circumscribed by 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    ,
    which provides: “The courts of appeals . . . shall have juris-
    diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
    of the United States . . . .” A district court’s denial of a motion
    to dismiss is not a final decision within the meaning of 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent.
    Dist. of Cal., 
    130 F.3d 1342
    , 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1997). None-
    theless, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the
    final judgment rule for that “small class [of orders] which
    finally determine claims of right separable from, and collat-
    eral to, rights asserted in the action.” Cohen, 
    337 U.S. at 546
    .
    [2] We have not previously decided whether a district
    court’s order denying a motion to dismiss on tribal sovereign
    immunity grounds is a collateral order which may be
    reviewed on an interlocutory basis. The Tribe persuasively
    argues that by analogy to qualified immunity appeals under
    civil rights claims, the rule should be the same when an
    adverse decision is rendered denying tribal sovereign immu-
    nity as a complete defense to proceeding with the litigation.
    See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
     (1985). We agree.
    [3] As commonly expressed, the collateral order doctrine
    established in Cohen permits interlocutory review of an order
    that “conclusively determine[s] the disputed question,
    16112           BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN
    resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the
    merits of the action, and [is] effectively unreviewable on
    appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Live-
    say, 
    437 U.S. 463
    , 468 (1978). All three factors are met in this
    case.
    [4] The district court’s order “conclusively determine[d]
    the disputed question,” that is, whether the tribal officials are
    immune from suit, because “there will be nothing in the sub-
    sequent course of the proceedings in the district court that can
    alter the court’s conclusion that the defendant[s are] not
    immune.” See Mitchell, 
    472 U.S. at 527
    .
    [5] The district court’s order is also “effectively unreview-
    able on appeal from a final judgment.” See Coopers & Lyb-
    rand, 
    437 U.S. at 468
    . Tribal sovereign immunity is rooted in
    federal common law and “is a necessary corollary to Indian
    sovereignty and self-governance.” Three Affiliated Tribes of
    the Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 
    476 U.S. 877
    ,
    890 (1986). Indian tribes, and tribal officials acting within the
    scope of their authority, are immune from lawsuits or court
    process in the absence of congressional abrogation or tribal
    waiver. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 751
    , 754 (1998); United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 
    806 F.2d 853
    , 861 (9th Cir. 1986). As with absolute, qualified, and
    Eleventh Amendment immunity, tribal sovereign immunity
    “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liabil-
    ity; and . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously per-
    mitted to go to trial.” See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
    Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 
    506 U.S. 139
    , 143-44 (1993) (quoting
    Mitchell, 
    472 U.S. at 526
    ); Osage Tribal Council v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Labor, 
    187 F.3d 1174
    , 1179-80 (10th Cir. 1999);
    Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
    Fla., 
    63 F.3d 1030
    , 1050 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Tribal sovereign
    immunity would be rendered meaningless if a suit against a
    tribe asserting its immunity were allowed to proceed to
    trial.”).
    BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN              16113
    [6] Finally, the district court’s order “resolve[d] an impor-
    tant issue completely separate from the merits of the action.”
    See Coopers & Lybrand, 
    437 U.S. at 468
    . Courts have gener-
    ally found that claims of immunity are separate from the mer-
    its of the underlying action. See, e.g., Mitchell, 
    472 U.S. at 527-28
    ; P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 
    506 U.S. at 145
    ; Com-
    pania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the
    Cent. Dist. of Cal., 
    859 F.2d 1354
    , 1358 (9th Cir. 1988);
    Osage Tribal Council, 
    187 F.3d at 1180
     (holding that whether
    the Safe Drinking Water Act abrogated the tribe’s immunity
    is “distinct from the underlying merits” of whether the tribe
    violated the plaintiff’s whistle blower rights under the Act).
    Likewise, the issue in this case, whether the tribal officials are
    subject to suit under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, is sepa-
    rate from the underlying merits of BNSF’s claim that the tax
    ordinance cannot be enforced against its right-of-way through
    the Reservation. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
    of Md., 
    535 U.S. 635
    , 645-46 (2002) (holding that “the
    inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex Parte Young does not
    include an analysis of the merits of the claim”).
    BNSF argues that interlocutory review is inappropriate
    because the district court did not resolve an “important issue”
    completely separate from the merits of the action, but rather
    applied settled precedent to determine that, under the doctrine
    of Ex Parte Young, the tribal officials are not immune from
    suit. BNSF cites Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 731
     (1982),
    and In re Kemble, 
    776 F.2d 802
     (9th Cir. 1985), for the propo-
    sition that an issue is important only if it involves a “serious
    and unsettled” question of law. The “serious and unsettled”
    language BNSF cites does not define when an issue is impor-
    tant under this Cohen factor. Rather, it is a completely sepa-
    rate consideration, which is not normally cited as one of the
    elements of the collateral order doctrine. See 15A Charles
    Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3911
    (2007).
    [7] There is simply no requirement that the argument on
    appeal be novel. See Schwartzman v. Valenzuela, 
    846 F.2d 16114
              BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN
    1209, 1210 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Supreme Court has autho-
    rized limited appellate review of a denial at the pretrial stage
    of a defense of immunity. State government defendants appar-
    ently now deem it mandatory to bring these appeals from any
    adverse ruling, no matter how clearly correct the trial court’s
    decision.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). We think the
    issue of tribal official immunity is analogous. The fact that the
    district court applied settled law to determine whether immu-
    nity barred BNSF’s suit does not prevent interlocutory
    review.
    [8] BNSF also contends that the tribal officials, by raising
    factual issues regarding ripeness and standing, have created
    an “evidence sufficiency” claim, which is not appealable.
    BNSF is correct that denial of an immunity claim is appeal-
    able on an interlocutory basis only to the extent that it turns
    on an issue of law. Johnson v. Jones, 
    515 U.S. 304
    , 313
    (1995). However, the district court’s order denying the tribal
    officials’ motion to dismiss on the basis of tribal immunity
    did not involve a determination that genuine issues of material
    fact existed for trial, as was the case in Johnson. See id.;
    Armendariz v. Penman, 
    75 F.3d 1311
    , 1316-17 (9th Cir.
    1996). Rather, the district court held that under Ninth Circuit
    precedent BNSF’s suit could proceed because “suits against
    tribal officers for prospective relief are not barred by sover-
    eign immunity.”
    [9] This is not the type of evidence sufficiency claim that
    falls outside the collateral order doctrine. Verizon Md., Inc.,
    
    535 U.S. at 645
     (“In determining whether the doctrine of Ex
    Parte Young avoids [a sovereign immunity] bar to suit, a
    court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into
    whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of fed-
    eral law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospec-
    tive.’ ” (citation omitted) (second alteration in the original));
    Mitchell, 
    472 U.S. at 528
     (“An appellate court reviewing the
    denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider
    the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even
    BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN              16115
    determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations actually state a
    claim.”).
    [10] We join the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding
    that denial of a claim of tribal sovereign immunity is immedi-
    ately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. We there-
    fore turn to whether the district court properly determined that
    BNSF’s suit was not barred by tribal sovereign immunity.
    B
    Issues of tribal sovereign immunity are reviewed de novo.
    Linneen v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 
    276 F.3d 489
    , 492 (9th
    Cir. 2002). Absent congressional abrogation or explicit
    waiver, sovereign immunity bars suit against an Indian tribe
    in federal court. Kiowa Tribe of Okla., 
    523 U.S. at 754
    . This
    immunity protects tribal officials acting within the scope of
    their valid authority. Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
    
    779 F.2d 476
    , 479-80 (9th Cir. 1985).
    [11] Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, immunity does
    not extend to officials acting pursuant to an allegedly uncon-
    stitutional statute. 
    209 U.S. 123
    , 155-56 (1908) (holding that
    Eleventh Amendment immunity was not a bar to suit against
    the state’s Attorney General to enjoin him from enforcing a
    law that the plaintiffs alleged violated the Due Process Clause
    of the Fourteenth Amendment). This doctrine has been
    extended to tribal officials sued in their official capacity such
    that “tribal sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for pro-
    spective relief against tribal officers allegedly acting in viola-
    tion of federal law.” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet
    Tribe, 
    924 F.2d 899
    , 901 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other
    grounds by Big Horn County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams, 
    219 F.3d 944
    , 953 (9th Cir. 2000).
    [12] In determining whether Ex Parte Young is applicable
    to overcome the tribal officials’ claim of immunity, the rele-
    vant inquiry is only whether BNSF has alleged an ongoing
    16116             BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN
    violation of federal law and seeks prospective relief. See Veri-
    zon Md., Inc., 
    535 U.S. at 645-46
    . Clearly it has done so.
    BNSF’s complaint states that “Defendants have acted, have
    threatened to act, or may act under the purported authority of
    the Tribe, to the injury of BNSF and in violation of federal
    law and in excess of federal limitations placed on the power
    of the Defendants” by seeking to enforce an unauthorized tax
    against BNSF that the Tribe lacks the jurisdiction to impose.
    Compl. ¶ 5. BNSF seeks a declaration that the tax is invalid
    as applied to its right-of-way and a permanent injunction pro-
    hibiting the tribal officials from enforcing the tax against it.
    Compl. ¶ 1. This is clearly the type of suit that is permissible
    under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.
    The tribal officials contend that Ex Parte Young does not
    apply because the officials “have taken no actions in violation
    of federal law and BNSF failed to prove that tribal officials
    intend to take such action.” First, as noted above, BNSF is not
    required to “prove” anything; it is sufficient that the railroad
    has alleged a violation of federal law. Also, the requirement
    that the violation of federal law be “ongoing” does not require
    BNSF to show that the tribal officials have enforced the chal-
    lenged statute. See Wilbur v. Locke, 
    423 F.3d 1101
    , 1104-05,
    1111 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
    immunity did not bar suit against state officials where “the
    complaint alleged that the challenged statutes authorize the
    state to enter into agreements which violate federal law”
    (emphasis added)); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 
    307 F.3d 835
    , 846-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendants’ argu-
    ment that “the Ex Parte Young exception ‘require[s] a genuine
    threat of enforcement by a state official before a federal court’
    can hear a party’s claims”).2
    2
    Like the defendants in National Audubon Society, the tribal officials
    here improperly seek to engraft Article III standing and prudential ripeness
    considerations onto the Ex Parte Young analysis. Because these arguments
    were not properly raised on appeal or before the district court, we do not
    address them here.
    BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN                      16117
    [13] Although enforcement need not be imminent, the
    named officials must have “the requisite enforcement connec-
    tion to” the challenged law for the Ex Parte Young exception
    to apply. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 
    307 F.3d at 847
    . We
    recognize the long history of efforts by the Tribe to impose
    and collect taxes on the railroad that resulted in a previous
    settlement. Easter is allegedly responsible for administering
    and collecting the challenged tax, and has already transmitted
    tax registration forms to BNSF, the first step in seeking to
    impose and collect more taxes. Because BNSF has alleged
    that Easter has “direct authority over and principal responsi-
    bility for enforcing” the tax, the Ex Parte Young exception
    applies and tribal immunity does not bar suit against her. See
    
    id. at 847
    . Charles Vaughn, the Tribal Chairman, is responsi-
    ble for exercising executive authority over the Tribe. BNSF
    has not alleged that Vaughn is in any way responsible for
    enforcing the tax. Therefore the Ex Parte Young exception
    does not apply to Vaughn and suit against him is barred by
    tribal sovereign immunity. See 
    id.
    [14] We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the
    motion to dismiss with regard to Easter. We reverse with
    regard to the court’s ruling against Vaughn; his motion to dis-
    miss should have been granted.
    III
    The exception to the final judgment rule for collateral
    orders does not give a court jurisdiction over every claim or
    defense addressed by the district court’s order. Instead, we
    must be able to exercise jurisdiction over each issue indepen-
    dently. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 
    514 U.S. 35
    ,
    49 (1995). The tribal officials argue that we should exercise
    pendent appellate jurisdiction to review whether the district
    court properly denied their motion to dismiss for failure to
    exhaust tribal remedies.3
    3
    We do not determine whether exhaustion of tribal remedies is a collat-
    eral order subject to interlocutory review under Cohen. The tribal officials
    16118              BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN
    [15] A court may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction
    over rulings that do not independently qualify for interlocu-
    tory review only if the rulings are inextricably intertwined
    with, or necessary to ensure meaningful review of, decisions
    that are properly before the court on interlocutory appeal.
    Swint, 
    514 U.S. at 51
    ; Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 
    379 F.3d 654
    , 668 (9th Cir. 2004). These requirements are nar-
    rowly construed, setting “a very high bar” for the exercise of
    pendent appellate jurisdiction. Poulos, 
    379 F.3d at 669
    . That
    bar is not met here.
    First, the tribal officials’ sovereign immunity and exhaus-
    tion of tribal remedies claims are not inextricably intertwined.
    A court may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction only if it
    “must decide the pendent issue in order to review the claims
    properly raised on interlocutory appeal” or if “resolution of
    the issue properly raised on interlocutory appeal necessarily
    resolves the pendent issue.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted).
    Issues are not inextricably intertwined if different legal stan-
    dards apply to each issue. 
    Id.
     The tribal sovereign immunity
    claim turns on whether BNSF has alleged a continuing viola-
    tion of federal law and seeks prospective relief. The exhaus-
    tion of tribal remedies claim requires the court to analyze
    whether there is a colorable claim of tribal court jurisdiction.
    These issues “turn on wholly different factors,” and therefore
    are not inextricably intertwined. See, e.g., 
    id. at 670
     (primary
    jurisdiction and class certification issues not inextricably
    intertwined); Meredith v. Oregon, 
    321 F.3d 807
    , 815 (9th Cir.
    waived this argument by raising it for the first time in their reply brief. See
    Singh v. Ashcroft, 
    361 F.3d 1152
    , 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). The tribal offi-
    cials also discussed for the first time in their reply brief pendent appellate
    jurisdiction as a basis for jurisdiction over the exhaustion of tribal reme-
    dies claim. However, pendent appellate jurisdiction was discussed by
    BNSF in its answering brief, so that issue has been joined and we may
    consider it. See In re Riverside-Linden Inv. Co., 
    945 F.2d 320
    , 324 (9th
    Cir. 1991) (“We have discretion to review an issue not raised by appellant,
    however, when it is raised in the appellee’s brief.”).
    BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN                       16119
    2003) (Younger abstention and preliminary injunction not
    inextricably intertwined); Stewart v. Oklahoma, 
    292 F.3d 1257
    , 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) (Eleventh Amendment immunity
    and exhaustion of administrative remedies not inextricably
    intertwined).
    [16] Likewise, exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction
    where the pendent claim shares only a “tangential relationship
    to the decision properly before [the court] on interlocutory
    appeal,” is not “necessary to ensure meaningful review” of
    that decision. Poulos, 
    379 F.3d at 669
    . In Meredith v. Oregon,
    the court found that review of the pendent Younger abstention
    decision was necessary to provide meaningful review of the
    preliminary injunction decision because “if the district court
    is required to abstain under Younger and dismiss the suit, then
    it has no authority to rule on a party’s motion for a prelimi-
    nary injunction.” 321 F.3d at 816. Similar considerations are
    not present in this case. Determination of whether the tribal
    court has jurisdiction, and thus exhaustion is required, is not
    necessary to provide meaningful review of the tribal officials’
    claim that they are completely immune from suit in federal
    court. Because this is not one of the rare instances in which
    pendent appellate jurisdiction is appropriate, the remaining
    claims on appeal are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.4
    IV
    Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction
    over the denial of the tribal officials’ motion to dismiss on
    4
    The district court’s holding that exhaustion of tribal remedies was not
    required was based on its finding that the tribal officials could not make
    a colorable claim of tribal court jurisdiction. The tribal officials argue that
    the district court erred in so finding. Because we do not have interlocutory
    jurisdiction over the issue of exhaustion of tribal remedies at this stage of
    the case, we do not yet have jurisdiction to review the district court’s find-
    ing regarding the scope of the tribal court’s jurisdiction and we do not
    decide now whether this finding was correct. That issue may be consid-
    ered if necessary on appeal from any final judgment below.
    16120          BURLINGTON NORTHERN v. VAUGHN
    tribal sovereign immunity grounds. Reviewing the claim on
    the merits, the Ex Parte Young exception applies to Easter,
    who is allegedly responsible for enforcing the challenged tax,
    and tribal sovereign immunity is not a bar to suit against her.
    We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the motion
    to dismiss as to Easter. The exception does not apply, how-
    ever, to the suit against Chairman Vaughn because BNSF has
    not alleged that he is connected to enforcement of the tax, and
    we reverse that part of the district court’s order. Finally, we
    elect not to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the
    exhaustion of tribal remedies claim as it is not inextricably
    intertwined with, or necessary to ensure meaningful review on
    interlocutory appeal, of the tribal sovereign immunity claim.
    The remainder of the appeal is therefore dismissed. Each
    party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; DISMISSED in
    part.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-16755

Filed Date: 12/7/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2015

Authorities (29)

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Charles K. Stewart v. State of Oklahoma, and James Saffle, ... , 292 F.3d 1257 ( 2002 )

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ross-b-linneen-husband-kim-ann-linneen-wife-v-gila-river-indian , 276 F.3d 489 ( 2002 )

Hardeep Singh v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General , 361 F.3d 1152 ( 2004 )

tamiami-partners-ltd-by-and-through-its-general-partner-tamiami , 63 F.3d 1030 ( 1995 )

marvin-wilbur-jr-trustee-of-the-salish-trust-dba-trading-post-at-march , 423 F.3d 1101 ( 2005 )

In Re Riverside-Linden Investment Co., Debtor. Ralph O. ... , 945 F.2d 320 ( 1991 )

96-cal-daily-op-serv-839-96-daily-journal-dar-1369-tomas-armendariz , 75 F.3d 1311 ( 1996 )

United States v. Robert James Poole , 806 F.2d 853 ( 1986 )

big-horn-county-electric-cooperative-inc-v-denis-adams-tax-commissioner , 219 F.3d 944 ( 2000 )

national-audubon-society-inc-golden-gate-audubon-society-inc-marin , 307 F.3d 835 ( 2002 )

compania-mexicana-de-aviacion-sa-a-corporation-doing-business-as , 859 F.2d 1354 ( 1988 )

In Re Donn Kemble, Debtor. Packerland Packing Co., Inc., a ... , 776 F.2d 802 ( 1985 )

Ex Parte Young , 28 S. Ct. 441 ( 1908 )

burlington-northern-railroad-company-v-the-blackfeet-tribe-of-the , 924 F.2d 899 ( 1991 )

william-h-poulos-brenda-mcelmore-larry-schreier-on-behalf-of-themselves , 379 F.3d 654 ( 2004 )

97-cal-daily-op-serv-9042-97-daily-journal-dar-14617-credit-suisse , 130 F.3d 1342 ( 1997 )

baker-b-hardin-jr-a-single-man-v-white-mountain-apache-tribe-the , 779 F.2d 476 ( 1985 )

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay , 98 S. Ct. 2454 ( 1978 )

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