Com. v. Everetts, T. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A26025-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    TARA R. EVERETTS                       :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 330 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 29, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-03-SA-0000066-2017
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                     FILED DECEMBER 24, 2018
    Tara R. Everetts (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following her conviction of harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1), on
    summary appeal. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the facts of record as follows:
    The Commonwealth’s sole witness was the alleged victim in the
    case, Patricia Everetts, who is [Appellant’s] mother-in-law.1
    [Appellant] and her husband are in the process of obtaining a
    divorce. They have two children. Ms. Everetts testified that on
    June 11, 2017, [Appellant] arrived unannounced [at Ms. Everetts’]
    home. At the time, Mr. Everetts was sitting outside in the gazebo
    adjacent to the home. Ms. Everetts testified that [Appellant]
    approached Mr. Everetts and was yelling. When Ms. Everetts
    exited the house, [Appellant] attacked her, pulling her hair,
    grabbing her neck, and clinching her fist to hit her. Mr. Everetts
    then intervened, telling [Appellant] that she had “better not” hit
    Ms. Everetts. [Appellant] ceased and quickly left the scene.
    1 The [c]ourt will refer to Patricia Everetts and her
    husband [as] “Ms. Everetts” and “Mr. Everetts,”
    J-A26025-18
    respectively. [Appellant] and her husband both will
    be referred to as such.
    [Appellant] testified on her own behalf, recounting the same
    basic facts. She testified conversely, however, that when Ms.
    Everetts came out of the house, she threw a portable telephone
    receiver at [Appellant] and then attacked her. [Appellant] claimed
    that her actions in grabbing Ms. Everetts were in self-defense.
    She further testified that Mr. Everetts approached her during the
    skirmish and was preparing to punch her, when Ms. Everetts
    intervened and stopped him. Thus, the material difference in the
    two stories was each witness’ contrary accusation that the other
    was the aggressor.
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/18, at 1–2.
    The police charged Appellant with harassment on July 10, 2017.         A
    magisterial district justice found Appellant guilty on August 21, 2017, and
    imposed sentence. Appellant filed a summary appeal on September 20, 2017.
    The trial court conducted a bench trial on January 29, 2018. During the trial,
    defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Ms. Everetts about a potential
    motive for fabricating the harassment allegation. Specifically, defense counsel
    tried to question Ms. Everetts about whether a conviction would jeopardize
    Appellant’s job as an x-ray technician.    N.T., 1/29/18, at 14.    When the
    Commonwealth objected to the questioning as irrelevant, defense counsel
    informed the trial court that someone had sent an anonymous letter to
    Appellant’s employer in September of 2017, along with a copy of the district
    court docket. 
    Id. at 15
    and Exhibit A. Defense counsel explained to the trial
    court that he intended to show that Mr. Everetts had sent the letter and docket
    sheet to endanger Appellant’s employment. 
    Id. The trial
    court sustained the
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    J-A26025-18
    Commonwealth’s objection and prohibited any defense questions about the
    letter and docket sheet; it also prohibited defense questions to Appellant about
    other actions taken by Ms. Everetts and Appellant’s husband, proffered in an
    attempt to discredit Ms. Everetts. 
    Id. at 15
    , 27–30, 32–33.
    Following the bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty and
    sentenced her to pay a fine of $150, together with costs and fees. Order of
    Court, 1/29/18. This appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied
    with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant presents the following question for our consideration:
    I.    Did the lower court commit reversible error when it
    sustained the Commonwealth’s objections to the relevance
    of defense counsel’s questioning into the accuser’s
    knowledge of attempts to use the summary conviction to
    endanger [Appellant’s] employment?
    II.   Did the lower court commit reversible error when it
    sustained the Commonwealth’s objections to the relevance
    of defense counsel’s questioning concerning the efforts of
    both the accuser’s son, who was [Appellant’s] estranged
    husband, and the accuser to initiate frivolous legal claims
    against [Appellant] to obtain the upper hand in a
    contentious divorce?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).
    Both of Appellant’s issues challenge the trial court’s refusal to admit
    testimonial evidence.    Questions concerning the admission of evidence are
    within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal
    absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 
    960 A.2d 59
    (Pa. 2008).     Where a defendant’s guilt or innocence depends on the
    -3-
    J-A26025-18
    credibility of a Commonwealth witness, the defense “must be afforded the
    opportunity to demonstrate through cross-examination that the witness is
    biased.”   Commonwealth v. Hyland, 
    875 A.2d 1175
    , 1186 (Pa. Super.
    2005). Even if the decision to exclude evidence was an abuse of discretion, a
    defendant must further demonstrate that it was not merely harmless error.
    Commonwealth v. Fears, 
    836 A.2d 52
    , 69 n.18 (Pa. 2003).
    Upon review of the certified record, we conclude the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in precluding the proffered questioning. We reach this
    conclusion based on the trial court’s sound reasoning, which we adopt as our
    own:
    [Appellant] argues in her first assertion of error that the
    [c]ourt abused its discretion in precluding cross-examination
    questioning of Ms. Everetts regarding attempts by Ms. Everetts
    and her family to notify [Appellant’s] employer of the harassment
    citation. The [c]ourt sustained the Commonwealth’s objection,
    finding the evidence to be irrelevant because 1) the allegation
    made by defense counsel was that someone had sent a letter to
    [Appellant’s] employer advising it of the citation; counsel asserted
    that he believed it was Mr. Everetts (not Ms. Everetts, the witness)
    who sent the letter; 2) the alleged communication occurred after
    the [harassment] citation was filed and therefore did not
    materially relate to the circumstances leading up to the incident
    or Ms. Everetts’ credibility in recounting what happened; and 3)
    the [c]ourt already was aware of the strained relationships that
    existed among the several family members because of [the]
    divorce. The introduction of extrinsic evidence by defense counsel
    in an attempt to suggest that someone in the family had
    communicated the incident to [Appellant’s] employer would have
    resulted in a trial within a trial which, given the meagre [sic]
    probative value of the evidence, would have [gone] beyond the
    reasonable scope of cross-examination. See Transc., at 14:10–
    15:23. The [c]ourt discerns no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
    * * *
    -4-
    J-A26025-18
    [Appellant’s] second assertion of error . . . relate[s] to the
    [c]ourt’s preclusion of testimony from [Appellant] regarding other
    post-incident conduct by Ms. Everetts or other members of her
    family, including the PFA order and [Appellant’s] husband’s
    apparent attempt to file some type of action against [Appellant]
    in magisterial district court on the day in question. See Transc.,
    at 28:14–30:15; 32:12–33:5. The [c]ourt found all of these
    matters to be irrelevant to the issues of whether [Appellant]
    committed a harassment and whether Ms. Everetts was a credible
    witness. Again, the [c]ourt was well aware of the relationship
    between [Appellant] and her husband’s family and any motive
    that Ms. Everetts would have had to fabricate or color her
    testimony. The family interactions after June 11, 2017, the PFA,
    and [Appellant’s] husband’s trip to the magisterial district court all
    were extrinsic facts that, even if established, would not have
    elucidated the issue of Ms. Everetts’ credibility to the [c]ourt. For
    those reasons, the [c]ourt sustained the Commonwealth’s
    objections.
    Finally, even if any or all of the [c]ourt’s evidentiary rulings
    were in error, such errors were harmless and resulted in no
    prejudice to [Appellant].
    Harmless error exists where: (1) the error did not
    prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de
    minimus; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was
    merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which
    was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted
    evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and
    uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming
    and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
    insignificant by comparison that the error could not
    have contributed to the verdict.
    Commonwealth v. Fears, 
    836 A.2d 52
    , 69 n. 18 (Pa. 2003).
    [Appellant] was convicted after [a] non-jury trial.         As the
    factfinder, the [c]ourt was aware of and considered the
    relationship between [Appellant] and the members of her
    husband’s family and determined that Ms. Everetts’ testimony was
    more credible and sufficient to prove the charge beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See Transc., at 45:13–47:1. Even had the
    additional facts been proven[,] that Ms. Everetts sent the charging
    documents to [Appellant’s] employer and filed a PFA petition
    against Appellant, those facts alone would not have changed the
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    J-A26025-18
    [c]ourt’s credibility determinations; nor would have the
    circumstances surrounding [Appellant’s] husband’s activities at
    the magisterial district [c]ourt. Thus, to the extent that the
    [c]ourt’s rulings resulted in legal error, they were harmless and
    non-prejudicial.
    Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/18, at 5–7.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/24/2018
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 330 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 12/24/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021