Surrell v. Ca Water Service Co. ( 2008 )


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  •                    FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROSETTA SURRELL,                             No. 06-15400
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.
       CV-04-02143-FCD/
    CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE CO., a                   JFM
    corporation; YVONNE PILE-COX,
    OPINION
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Frank C. Damrell, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    December 5, 2007—San Francisco, California
    Filed March 11, 2008
    Before: Dorothy W. Nelson and Stephen Reinhardt,
    Circuit Judges, and Louis F. Oberdorfer,*
    Senior District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Oberdorfer
    *The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, Senior United States District
    Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
    2325
    2330        SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    COUNSEL
    Daniel L. Mitchell, Law Office of Daniel L. Mitchell, Ala-
    meda, California, for the appellant.
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE          2331
    Raymond F. Lynch, Amy L. Keyser, Hanson Bridgett Marcus
    Vlahos & Rudy, LLP, San Francisco, California, for the
    appellee.
    OPINION
    OBERDORFER, Senior District Judge:
    Rosetta Surrell brought numerous federal and state discrim-
    ination and retaliation claims against her employer, California
    Water Service Co. (“Cal Water”), and her former supervisor,
    Yvonne Pile-Cox (“Cox”). The district court granted sum-
    mary judgment to both Defendants. We affirm.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Cal Water is a wholly owned subsidiary of California
    Water Service Group, a privately owned company that pro-
    vides water service to businesses and consumers in communi-
    ties throughout California. Surrell, an African-American
    woman, began employment as a customer-service representa-
    tive in the company’s Stockton District in January 1997. Cox
    was the Office Manager and Surrell’s supervisor. Surrell’s job
    duties included answering phones, performing data entry, fil-
    ing records, and dispatching work orders. In 1998, Surrell bid
    on and received, based on her seniority at Cal Water, a
    higher-level customer-service position. At all times during her
    employment with Cal Water, she was a member of the Utility
    Workers Union of American AFL-CIO, which had a
    collective-bargaining agreement with Cal Water. Under this
    agreement, vacant or newly created positions were open for
    bid by current employees and filled based on seniority. But
    temporary jobs that would not last longer than 120 days were
    filled at management’s discretion, without regard to seniority.
    The agreement also provided that Cal Water could submit
    employees to drug testing if they appeared impaired.
    2332         SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    In April 2001, Surrell was in a car accident. Because of her
    injuries, she had difficulty lifting her hands above her head
    and could not do household chores. She was taking Vicodin
    at this time. Cal Water granted her a leave of absence. She
    had expected to return to work by July 1, 2001, but the pain
    persisted, and Cal Water granted her further medical leave
    through the rest of the year.
    In early 2002, when Surrell was still on medical leave, Cox
    announced that she was going to retire, creating an opening
    for the Office Manager position. This vacancy was posted
    within the company in February 2002, and several Cal Water
    employees applied. After the top two candidates declined to
    accept an offer for the position, Cal Water looked for outside
    applicants. Surrell requested and was allowed to be included
    in the process.
    On April 4, 2002, while her application for Office Manager
    was pending, Surrell returned to work. Her doctor had pro-
    vided a letter stating that she was able to do a full workload
    without restrictions, but she was still taking numerous pre-
    scription drugs as needed for her injuries.
    Also in April 2002, Surrell requested but was denied train-
    ing for the Head Cashier position, which was to be available
    for five days in June 2002 while the Head Cashier was on
    vacation. (The parties refer to this on-the-job training for
    another position as “cross-training.”) At the time of Surrell’s
    request, Cal Water had a substantially increased workload
    because it was changing to a new computer system and had
    just taken over a new billing operation. Accordingly, there
    was no formal cross-training program in place; employees
    would simply informally train with other employees if they
    had time after completing their job. In June 2002, Surrell
    learned that Cal Water was cross-training Denise Holt for the
    position. Cox testified that Cal Water chose to train Holt for
    the position because she had already informally learned a por-
    tion of that job on her own and therefore required less training
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE          2333
    than Surrell would have required. Holt, a younger, white co-
    worker with less seniority than Surrell, filled in at the Head
    Cashier position for this five-day period. In July 2002, the
    Union filed a grievance, stating that Surrell “was unfairly
    passed over for opportunities in crosstraining after repeatedly
    requesting to be crosstrained.” Excerpts of Record (“ER”) at
    196. The complaint was denied at the first stage of the griev-
    ance process, and it was not taken to arbitration.
    Also in July 2002, Cal Water chose not to promote Surrell
    to the Office Manager position. Instead, Cal Water hired
    Regina Coe, a younger, white, female applicant. Coe was a
    trained accountant with a B.S. in Business Administration and
    had five years of management and accounting experience.
    On August 22, 2002, supervisors, including Cox, observed
    Surrell at work and agreed that she appeared to be impaired
    and that her speech was slurred. Surrell had taken some of her
    prescription drugs, including Fiorinal, the night before, and
    admitted that her speech was slurred at work. Cal Water
    ordered her to submit to a drug test. The test showed the pres-
    ence of Surrell’s prescribed medication for her back injuries
    as well as the presence of cannabinoids (chemical compounds
    present in marijuana). Accordingly, under the collective-
    bargaining agreement, Cal Water offered Surrell two choices:
    either be discharged or enter a drug-rehabilitation program.
    Surrell chose to enter the rehabilitation program and returned
    to work in early October 2002.
    Tragically, Surrell’s son was murdered in December 2002.
    She took some time off and believed that she was ready to
    work again at the end of January 2003. During this period, she
    received some Demerol injections, was taking Valium each
    night to go to sleep, and was also taking Soma and Zanaflex.
    She returned to work on January 29, 2003. When co-
    workers asked her about her son, she started crying, shaking,
    and suffered a migraine headache. She had taken Valium the
    2334         SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    night before and then took a Vicodin at work. Observing Sur-
    rell in what appeared to them to be an impaired state, Surrell’s
    supervisors had Surrell drug tested again. The test returned
    positive for several substances. Surrell asserts that these sub-
    stances were associated with her prescribed medications. Cal
    Water then placed her on administrative leave with full salary
    for approximately the next 10 months.
    On July 9, 2003, Surrell filed a discrimination charge with
    the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing
    (the “State Employment Department”), alleging various dis-
    crimination claims against Cal Water. The State Employment
    Department provided her with a right-to-sue letter and advised
    her that she could obtain a federal right-to-sue letter from the
    Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
    On December 9, 2003, Surrell informed Cal Water that she
    was unable to return to work due to her medical condition.
    She concluded that she was too emotionally scarred at that
    time and would not have been able to function. Surrell
    remained employed but on an unpaid leave of absence during
    which she received health benefits.
    On July 6, 2004, Surrell filed suit in California state court
    against Cal Water and Cox, alleging numerous federal and
    state employment-discrimination claims based on race, sex,
    and age. On October 13, 2004, Defendants removed the suit
    to federal district court. On February 27, 2006, the district
    court granted summary judgment to Cal Water and Cox on all
    claims. Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., No. 04-2143, 
    2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7326
    (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2006). Cal Water
    and Cox later unsuccessfully moved for fees against Surrell.
    Surrell brought this appeal of the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment.
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE         2335
    II.   DISCUSSION
    A.     Standard of Review
    We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
    judgment. Lovell v. Chandler, 
    303 F.3d 1039
    , 1052 (9th Cir.
    2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    Conclusory statements without factual support are insufficient
    to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Nat’l Steel Corp.
    v. Golden Eagles Ins. Corp., 
    121 F.3d 496
    , 502 (9th Cir.
    1997). A district court’s exclusion of evidence at summary
    judgment will stand unless the court abused its discretion. 
    Id. B. Surrell’s
    Claims
    Surrell appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg-
    ment on her (1) discrimination, retaliation, and hostile-work-
    environment claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
    (2003); and (2) physical-disability discrimination claim under
    the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.
    1.    Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims
    [1] Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
    against an individual based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
    2(a)(1) (2003). Similarly, § 1981 prohibits discrimination in
    the “benefits, privileges, terms and conditions” of employ-
    ment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); Metoyer v. Chassman, 
    504 F.3d 919
    , 935 (9th Cir. 2007). When analyzing § 1981 claims, we
    apply “the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title
    VII disparate treatment case.” 
    Id. at 930
    (quoting Fonseca v.
    Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz. Inc., 
    384 F.3d 840
    , 850 (9th Cir.
    2004)). Title VII, however, “requires the plaintiff to exhaust
    administrative remedies, such as filing a claim with the EEOC
    . . . , before seeking a private action for damages, whereas
    § 1981 has no such requirement.” 
    Id. at 947
    n.11 (Bea, J., dis-
    2336         SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    senting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)). We discuss first the
    Title VII exhaustion question and then reach the merits of
    both Surrell’s Title VII and § 1981 claims.
    a.   Exhaustion of Title VII Claims
    A person seeking relief under Title VII must first file a
    charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlaw-
    ful employment practice, or, if, as here, the person initially
    instituted proceedings with the state or local administrative
    agency, within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment
    practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). If the EEOC does not
    bring suit based on the charge, the EEOC must “notify the
    person aggrieved” that she can file suit. 
    Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
    The notice is accomplished through a right-to-sue letter. Once
    a person receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter, she has 90 days
    to file suit. 
    Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
    [2] Although Surrell never filed a charge directly with the
    EEOC, her charge filed with the State Employment Depart-
    ment is deemed filed with the EEOC pursuant to a workshar-
    ing agreement between the two entities. See Green v. Los
    Angeles County Superintendent of Schools, 
    883 F.2d 1472
    ,
    1476 (9th Cir. 1989) (charge filed with the State Employment
    Department “is deemed to have been received by the EEOC
    on the same day . . . because under the worksharing agree-
    ment the [State Employment Department] was an agent of the
    EEOC for the purpose of receiving charges”).
    The State Employment Department also provided her with
    a state right-to-sue letter, which notes that “[i]f a federal
    notice of Right-To-Sue is wanted, the [EEOC] must be visited
    to file a complaint within 30 days of this [notice] or within
    300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is earli-
    er.” ER at 32. Surrell, however, never obtained a federal right-
    to-sue letter from the EEOC. Cal Water and Cox contend that
    this failure bars her claim. Surrell responds that obtaining the
    state right-to-sue letter suffices for her suit to proceed. This
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE             2337
    issue raises two questions: (1) whether the federal right-to-sue
    letter is an absolute jurisdictional prerequisite, or whether it
    is simply a general requirement for a Title VII claim that may
    be excused in particular cases; and (2) if simply a general
    requirement, whether that requirement should be excused
    here.
    [3] Failure to obtain a federal right-to-sue letter does not
    preclude federal jurisdiction. In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines,
    Inc., 
    455 U.S. 385
    , 393 (1982), the Supreme Court held that,
    although Title VII requires that plaintiffs timely exhaust
    administrative remedies, “filing a timely charge of discrimina-
    tion with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit
    in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limita-
    tions, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”
    The Supreme Court explained that Title VII’s timeliness pro-
    vision is entirely separate from Title VII’s jurisdictional pro-
    visions and “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in
    any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.” 
    Id. at 394.
    Because Title VII’s provisions requiring notice of the right to
    sue are similarly separate from the jurisdictional provisions,
    the right-to-sue requirement is similarly non-jurisdictional.
    See Temengil v. Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 
    881 F.2d 647
    , 654 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Pursuit of administrative remedies
    is a condition precedent to a Title VII claim. The requirement,
    however, is not jurisdictional.”) (citations omitted); Karim-
    Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 
    839 F.2d 621
    , 626 (9th
    Cir. 1988) (explaining that “Plaintiff must file a discrimina-
    tion charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
    mission and receive a right-to-sue letter from the
    Commission,” and that, under Zipes, “[f]ailure to observe
    these requirements renders a suit subject to dismissal in the
    absence of any equitable consideration to the contrary”)
    (emphasis added); see also Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs,
    
    180 F.3d 468
    , 474 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Every circuit before us
    that has faced the question has held that a plaintiff’s failure
    to obtain a notice-of-right-to-sue[ ]letter is not a jurisdictional
    2338          SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    bar, but only a precondition to bringing a Title VII action that
    can be waived by the parties or the court.”).
    [4] The general requirement of a federal right-to-sue letter
    remains, however. Courts typically look to the relative fault
    of the parties to determine whether the failure to obtain a
    right-to-sue letter should be excused. See, e.g., 
    Pietras, 180 F.3d at 474
    (allowing claim to proceed where EEOC errone-
    ously refused to send right-to-sue letter and plaintiff was dili-
    gent in seeking it). Such an inquiry could pose significant
    problems for Surrell, who was specifically notified by the
    State Employment Department that she needed to visit the
    EEOC to obtain a federal right-to-sue letter. See, e.g., Roman
    v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 
    85 Cal. App. 4th 316
    , 326 (Cal. App.
    2000) (barring Title VII claim because “the [state] right-to-
    sue notice specifically advised appellant that if he wanted a
    federal right-to-sue notice he had to file a complaint with the
    EEOC”). On the other hand, courts have also concluded that
    once a plaintiff is entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter (as
    Surrell was once the EEOC did not timely act on her properly
    filed charge), it makes no difference whether the plaintiff
    actually obtained it. See, e.g., Moore v. City of Charlotte, 
    754 F.3d 1100
    , 1104 n.1 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Entitlement to the let-
    ter, without actual receipt of it, is sufficient to support federal
    jurisdiction.”). Indeed, courts have reached that conclusion in
    this precise context where worksharing agreements exist
    between the federal and state agencies. See Burke v. Corner-
    stone, No. 07-889, 
    2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76662
    , at *5-6 (D.
    Conn. Oct. 12, 2007) (“[A]s the purposes of the exhaustion
    requirement—to provide notice to parties charged with viola-
    tions and to facilitate voluntary compliance should the investi-
    gating agency find merit in the complaint—have been served
    by the state proceeding, the Court does not view the omission
    of the actual right-to-sue letter as grounds for dismissal.”); but
    cf. Jones v. Grinnell Corp., 
    235 F.3d 972
    , 975 (5th Cir. 2001)
    (“federal-state cooperation does not extend to the exhaustion
    of administrative remedies”). This is a persuasive approach,
    which we now adopt. We hold that where, as here, a plaintiff
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE             2339
    is entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, a
    plaintiff may proceed absent such a letter, provided she has
    received a right-to-sue letter from the appropriate state
    agency. Thus, Surrell’s claims may proceed.
    b.   Merits of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims
    Typically, we apply the familiar McDonnell Douglas bur-
    den shifting framework for Title VII and § 1981 claims.
    
    Metoyer, 504 F.3d at 930
    (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
    v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    (1973)). A plaintiff may alternatively
    proceed by simply producing “direct or circumstantial evi-
    dence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely
    than not motivated the employer.” 
    Id. at 931.
    Here, the parties
    and the court below applied the McDonnell Douglas frame-
    work; we do so as well.
    [5] Under this framework, the plaintiff first must establish
    a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. 
    Id. at 931
    n.6. To do so through indirect evidence, the plaintiff must
    show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
    applied for a job for which she was qualified; (3) she was
    rejected; and (4) the position remained open and the employer
    sought other similarly-qualified employees. McDonnell Doug-
    las 
    Corp., 411 U.S. at 802
    .
    [6] If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
    then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondis-
    criminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory or retalia-
    tory conduct. 
    Metoyer, 504 F.3d at 931
    n.6. If the employer
    articulates a legitimate reason for its action, “the presumption
    of discrimination drops out of the picture, and the plaintiff
    may defeat summary judgment by satisfying the usual stan-
    dard or proof required . . . under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).” 
    Id. (quoting Cornwell
    v. Electra Central Credit Union, 
    439 F.3d 1018
    , 1028 (9th Cir. 2006)). The plaintiff may then offer evi-
    dence that “the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory rea-
    son is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Dominguez-Curry
    2340          SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 
    424 F.3d 1027
    , 1037 (9th Cir.
    2005).
    Surrell raises three types of claims under Title VII and 42
    U.S.C. § 1981: (1) discrimination (failure to promote and fail-
    ure to cross-train); (2) retaliation; and (3) hostile work envi-
    ronment. We discuss each in turn.
    (1)     Discrimination Claims
    (a)    Failure to promote
    [7] Surrell contends that Cal Water and Cox discriminated
    against her based on her race when they promoted Regina Coe
    to Office Manager. As an initial matter, Cox had no role in
    Surrell’s application for the promotion, so Cox is entitled to
    summary judgment on this claim. Even assuming that Surrell
    sets forth a prima facie case as to Cal Water, she fails to show
    that Cal Water’s articulated reason for promoting Coe—i.e.,
    that Coe was more qualified—was pretextual.
    Coe was a trained accountant and received a bachelor-of-
    science degree in business administration from California
    State University in 2000. She had five years of management
    and accounting experience, and she worked for approximately
    one year as a City Administrator. Coe also had experience
    with labor relations and demonstrated strong communication
    skills. She was ranked first by all interview panel members.
    Surrell stated that “[Coe] was not as well qualified as I was
    to manage the Stockton Office; I understood the policies and
    procedures; I knew what each job in that office required.” ER
    at 560. Surrell, however, lacked Coe’s management experi-
    ence, which was particularly suited to the Office Manager
    position. Surrell raises three unavailing points in response.
    First, Surrell argues that Cal Water and Cox provided evi-
    dence regarding the Office Manager selection decision only in
    their summary-judgment reply papers in the district court,
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE             2341
    improperly denying her the opportunity to respond. Surrell
    testified at deposition, however, that her discrimination claim
    was limited to the failure to cross-train for the Head Cashier
    position; the Office Manager claim did not surface until her
    opposition to Cal Water’s and Cox’s summary-judgment
    motion, leaving them to reply at that point. The district court
    nonetheless considered this claim—to Surrell’s benefit—“for
    the sake of completeness.” Surrell, 
    2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7326
    , at *5 n.3. She is responsible for her alleged inability to
    respond.
    Second, Surrell contends that the district court improperly
    excluded “her statistical analysis of Cal Water’s failure to
    promote minorities.” Surrell’s Br. at 24. The statistical analy-
    sis consists of two, unsigned pages of typed notes without any
    authentication as to author or content. Even Surrell’s counsel
    admitted that Surrell did not verify or authenticate it. Supple-
    mental Excerpts of Record (“SER”) at 80 (“[Y]ou’re right
    about the fact that other than gathering it, she did not verify
    it or authenticate it.”). Accordingly, the district court’s exclu-
    sion of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
    Finally, Surrell contends that the district court improperly
    ignored her testimony that she “had never seen any black peo-
    ple promoted to the office management positions since [she
    has] been in the Stockton Office.” Surrell’s Br. at 24; ER at
    559. We agree that the district court should have considered
    this statement, which was based on Surrell’s personal knowl-
    edge. Nonetheless, without more, this general statement is
    insufficient for a trier of fact to conclude that Cal Water’s
    articulated reason for hiring Coe instead of Surrell was pre-
    textual: Coe’s five years of management experience signifi-
    cantly distinguish her from Surrell as the most-qualified
    candidate for the management position.
    (b)   Failure to cross-train
    Surrell also contends that Cal Water and Cox discriminated
    against her by failing to cross-train her for the Head Cashier
    2342         SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    position. Surrell sets forth a prima facie case on this claim,
    stating that Cox refused to train her for the position and that
    Defendants cross-trained Denise Holt, a younger, white
    woman with less seniority.
    [8] Defendants have produced a non-discriminatory reason
    for not training Surrell. Cox testified that Cal Water chose to
    train Holt for the position because she had already done a por-
    tion of that job that she had learned on her own and therefore
    required less training than Surrell would have required. This
    was particularly relevant because Cal Water’s time for train-
    ing was limited because it was in the process of converting to
    a new computer system and taking over a new billing account.
    Surrell contends that “Cal Water offered no material evi-
    dence that it was engaged in the claimed conversion such that
    training could not be accomplished,” Surrell’s Br. at 27, and
    that Cox’s testimony regarding the conversion is inadmissible
    hearsay. But deposition testimony is ordinarily hearsay at
    trial, not in a summary-judgment motion. Orr v. Bank of Am.,
    
    285 F.3d 764
    , 779 n.27 (9th Cir. 2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
    (allowing deposition testimony in summary-judgment
    motion). Moreover, Surrell admitted that management told
    her that the increased office workload due to the conversion
    was the reason Cal Water did not cross train her, and she
    admitted that the conversion caused the increased workload.
    Surrell fails to provide sufficient evidence that this reason was
    pretextual. In any event, the collective-bargaining agreement
    explicitly states that “[t]emporary jobs that cannot be prede-
    termined to last longer than one hundred twenty (120) days
    will be filled at management’s discretion”—without regard to
    seniority. ER at 315. Knowing that it could have Holt fill in
    for this position at its discretion, management could fairly
    decide—because of concerns about limited time—to cross-
    train her instead of Surrell.
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE                 2343
    (2)    Retaliation Claim
    [9] Surrell contends that Cal Water and Cox retaliated
    against her by drug testing her after she filed her union griev-
    ance alleging that Cal Water’s failure to cross-train her for the
    Head Cashier position was discriminatory. Title VII makes it
    unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of [its]
    employees or applicants for employment . . . because [she]
    has opposed any practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Section
    1981 prohibits “racial discrimination in taking retaliatory
    action.” Manatt v. Bank of Am. N.A., 
    339 F.3d 792
    , 798 (9th
    Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).1 To establish a prima facie case
    of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove (1) she engaged in a pro-
    tected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
    action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
    two. Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and
    Power Dist., 
    272 F.3d 1136
    , 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001). Once
    established, the burden shifts to the defendant to set forth a
    legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions; at that point,
    the plaintiff must produce evidence to show that the stated
    reasons were a pretext for retaliation. 
    Id. [10] Even
    assuming that Surrell has established a prima
    facie case, Cal Water has presented a legitimate, non-
    retaliatory reason for conducting the drug tests: Surrell
    appeared to be an impaired state. In the first instance, on
    August 22, 2002, supervisors observed her and concurred that
    she appeared to be in such a state and that she was slurring
    her speech. Surrell admits that she was slurring her speech.
    The test results showed the presence of both prescription
    medications and illegal cannabinoids in her system. Following
    1
    The Supreme Court is currently considering whether retaliation claims
    lie under § 1981. See Humphries v. CBOCS West, 
    474 F.3d 387
    (7th Cir.
    2007) cert. granted, 
    2007 U.S. LEXIS 9079
    (U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 06-
    1431). Because Surrell’s (perhaps soon-to-be nonexistent) retaliation
    claim fails on the merits, Humphries’ preclusion of such a claim will not
    alter the result here.
    2344         SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE
    her return to work after completing the drug-treatment pro-
    gram, several supervisors again observed her to be impaired,
    and she again tested positive for a number of substances.
    [11] Surrell fails to raise a triable issue regarding whether
    Cal Water’s reasons for drug testing her were a pretext for
    retaliation. She contends that the district court failed to con-
    sider her statement that “it was clear to [her] that the tests
    were flawed” because she had “never smoked cigarettes[—
    ]least of all marijuana” and “never consumed alcohol in [her]
    lifetime.” ER at 563. Other than this unsubstantiated state-
    ment, however, Surrell presents no evidence contradicting the
    results of the drug tests. More importantly, even if the tests
    were flawed, Cal Water had ample basis to conduct the tests
    in the first place: Surrell does not dispute that she appeared
    impaired and was taking drugs. Accordingly, Surrell cannot
    establish that this legitimate basis for testing was actually a
    pretext to retaliate.
    (3)   Hostile-Work-Environment Claim
    Surrell also claims that Cal Water and Cox subjected her to
    a hostile work environment based on comments Cox made to
    her from 1998 to 2002. On at least one occasion, Cox con-
    fronted Surrell in front of a customer about failing to perform
    an aspect of her job. Cox also accused Surrell, in front of a
    customer and co-worker, of failing to pay attention to her job
    and, in turn, causing the company to lose money. Surrell
    asserts that this accusation was based on paperwork that did
    not belong to her. Also, on more than one occasion, Cox told
    Surrell that she was too slow with her work.
    [12] To establish a prima facie case for a hostile-work envi-
    ronment claim, Surrell must raise a triable issue of fact as to
    whether (1) the defendants subjected her to verbal or physical
    conduct based on her race; (2) the conduct was unwelcome;
    and (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
    SURRELL v. CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE            2345
    alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive
    working environment. 
    Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798
    .
    [13] Surrell cannot reach the first step: she presents no evi-
    dence that Cox’s comments were based on race. These com-
    ments were all performance related. Moreover, the alleged
    comments were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain
    a hostile-work-environment claim. To resolve such a claim,
    courts consider all the circumstances, including the frequency
    of the allegedly discriminatory conduct, its severity, and
    whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
    performance. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 
    229 F.3d 917
    , 923
    (9th Cir. 2000). The foregoing considered, Surrell’s hostile-
    work-environment claim fails.
    2. California-Fair-Employment-and-Housing-Act
    Claim
    [14] Finally, Surrell contends that the district court improp-
    erly granted summary judgment on her physical-disability dis-
    crimination claim under the California Fair Employment and
    Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12900-12996 (2002). Under
    that Act, an employer must reasonably accommodate disabled
    employees. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
    85 Cal. App. 4th 245
    , 257 (2000). Although Cal Water and Cox concede that
    the district court erroneously concluded that Surrell failed to
    exhaust administrative remedies under the Act, this error is
    immaterial because her claim lacks merit. Every time that
    Surrell claimed she was unable to work, Cal Water provided
    her with a leave of absence. Further, Surrell admits that she
    did not know of any accommodation that Cal Water could
    have provided for her claimed physical disability. Accord-
    ingly, this claim also fails.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment in favor of Cal Water and Cox.