Sarah Speck v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 22 2017, 7:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Sarah Speck, February 22, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1609-CR-2195
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G06-1601-F5-3318
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] At approximately 7:00 a.m., Alpine Group employee Robert Jennings arrived
at work to find the door ajar and the office ransacked. Jennings noticed that a
laptop had been moved from its normal location and placed near a door and a
number of medical supplies had been placed in a cardboard box. Jennings
became startled when he found Appellant-Defendant Sarah Speck sitting in a
chair in the office. Speck did not have permission to enter the office. Speck
was later found in possession of a lighter that had been stored in a desk drawer
in the office.
[2] Speck was subsequently charged with Level 5 felony burglary and Class A
misdemeanor attempted theft. She was found guilty as charged following a
bench trial. The trial court subsequently merged the attempted theft conviction
with the burglary conviction and sentenced Speck to 1095 days with 1073 days
suspended. The trial court also placed Speck on probation for 730 days and
ordered her to complete eighty hours of community service.
[3] On appeal, Speck challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her
burglary conviction. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
challenged conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] In January of 2016, Alpine Group was a commercial entity consisting of three
different businesses: a scrap business for semi-trailers and equipment, a trucking
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company, and a land management company. Alpine Group had two locations
in Marion County, one of which was located within the vast OmniSource
compound located on South Holt Road. The OmniSource compound was
surrounded by a ten-foot chain-link/barbed wire fence and secured by two
gates. The OmniSource compound was surrounded by commercial property
and the National Guard Armory. The nearest residential area was Mars Hill,
which was located about one and one-half miles away.
[5] The Alpine Group trailer was located approximately one-quarter mile within
the OmniSource compound and was also surrounded by a fence. The trailer
had two doors—one on each end—with the main employee entrance opening
to a lunch room/common area. The other end of the trailer held a business
office.
[6] At the close of business on January 24, 2016, Alpine Group employee Jennings
locked the door to the trailer and left the premises. When he left, all was well
within the trailer and all items were in their normal locations.
[7] At some point during the late night hours of January 24, 2016 or early morning
hours of January 25, 2016, Speck squeezed between the two main gates of the
OmniSource compound and approached the Alpine Group trailer. Although
she observed no people or vehicles within the complex, Speck knocked on the
trailer door. After receiving no answer, and knowing that she did not have
permission to enter, Speck opened the door and entered the trailer.
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[8] When Jennings returned at approximately 7:00 a.m. on January 25, 2016, he
observed that the trailer door was slightly ajar. When he entered the trailer, he
further observed that the trailer’s business office had been ransacked.
Specifically, Jennings observed that file and desk drawers had been opened, a
closet door had been opened, a tool box had been disturbed, items had been
scattered on the floor, a computer monitor had been overturned, a laptop
computer had been removed from a shelf in the office and placed on a chair by
the door, and medical supplies from a wall cabinet had been removed from the
cabinet and placed in a small cardboard box.
[9] Upon turning on a light, Jennings was startled to find Speck sitting in a chair in
the corner of the trailer. Speck, who had a pair of coveralls over her body,
stated “Hi, I’m Sarah.” Tr. p. 10. Jennings quickly left the trailer and called
the police. Speck then exited the trailer and walked north onto the OmniSource
property, which had no nearby exit.
[10] A short time later, members of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department detained Speck. At this time, Speck was found in possession of a
lighter that belonged to Jennings and had been stored in a desk drawer in the
office.
[11] When confronted by Alpine Group National Operations Director Russell Law,
Speck claimed that she did not know that the area was a secured facility.
Speck, however, alluded to the fact that she had gone into something that was
locked. Upon examining the trailer door, Law came to the belief that
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something had been used on the door jam to open it. About a week later, an
Alpine Group employee found a knife, which he claimed did not belong to him,
in the pocket of the coveralls which Speck had used to cover herself.
[12] On January 26, 2016, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (“the State”)
charged Speck with Level 5 felony burglary and Class A misdemeanor
attempted theft. The case proceeded to a bench trial. Speck testified during
trial, claiming that on the night in question, she had had an argument with a
friend after which she left his Mars Hill residence on foot. Speck claimed that
she walked through the neighborhood until she saw the OmniSource
compound. She then squeezed between the two gates and approached the
Alpine Group trailer. Speck, who was under the influence of Xanax, claimed
to be “looking for people.” Tr. p. 60. Speck claimed that when no one
answered her knock on the trailer door, Speck entered, covered herself with a
pair of coveralls and fell asleep. Speck denied touching or moving anything
inside the trailer, claimed that the lighter found on her person belonged to her,
and denied having a knife. The trial court found Speck guilty as charged.
[13] During a September 1, 2016 sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the
attempted theft conviction into the Level 5 felony burglary conviction and
sentenced Speck to 1095 days with 1073 days suspended. The trial court also
placed Speck on probation for 730 days and ordered her to complete eighty
hours of community service. This appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
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[14] Speck contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for
Level 5 felony burglary.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be
reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in
original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess
the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind.
2002).
[15] In charging Speck, the State alleged that “[o]n or about January 25, 2016,
[Speck] did break and enter the building or structure of Alpine Group, to-wit:
trailer; with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein, to-wit: theft[.]”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 21. Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 provides that
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“[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person,
with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 5
felony.” Thus, in order to prove that Speck committed the charged Level 5
felony, the State was required to prove that Speck broke and entered the
building or structure of another with the intent to commit theft therein.
[16] In challenging her conviction, Speck argues that the evidence is insufficient to
prove that she had the requisite mens rea, i.e., that she intended to commit a
felony or theft once inside the Alpine Group’s trailer. “Intent, being a mental
state, can only be established by considering the behavior of the relevant actor,
the surrounding circumstances, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom.” Richardson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(citing Davis v. State, 791 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied).
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that in order to sufficiently prove a
burglary charge, “the State must prove a specific fact that provides a solid basis
to support a reasonable inference that the defendant had the specific intent to
commit a felony.” Freshwater v. State, 853 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ind. 2006). With
respect to proof of intent to commit a felony or theft, however, the Indiana
Supreme Court has acknowledged that “‘[b]urglars rarely announce their
intentions at the moment of entry,’ [Gilliam v. State, 508 N.E.2d 1270, 1271
(Ind. 1987)], and indeed many times there is no one around to hear them even
if they were to do so.” Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 229. “Hence, a burglar’s intent to
commit a specific felony at the time of the breaking and entering ‘may be
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inferred from the circumstances.’” Id. at 229-30 (quoting Gilliam, 508 N.E.2d at
1271).
[17] The evidence to prove intent “need not be insurmountable, but only provide a
solid basis to support a reasonable inference that the defendant intended to
commit the underlying [theft or] felony charged.” Gilliam, 508 N.E.2d at 1271.
“In other words, the evidence must support each inference—felonious intent
and breaking and entering—independently, and neither inference should rely on
the other for support.” Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 230. “This is not to say, however,
that the same piece of evidence cannot support both inferences.” Id.
[18] In Baker, the Indiana Supreme Court determined that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain Baker’s burglary conviction, finding as follows:
there was evidence that the defendant had been in the church
kitchen and opened several cupboards and drawers while there.
This evidence, standing alone, permits a reasonable inference of
the defendant’s felonious intent at the time of entry. Looking
through the kitchen cupboards and drawers was not a necessary
step in the act of breaking and entering the church. It was an
additional act, separate and distinct from the breaking and
entering, in which the defendant chose to engage. The opening
of cabinets and drawers by an intruder suggests, among other
things, that the person opening them was looking for something
to take. From this, the jury reasonably could have concluded
that the defendant broke and entered the church with an intent to
commit theft. That there was no evidence that the defendant had
rummaged through the drawers or cabinets, as the defendant
argues, is of no consequence. The act of opening the drawers
and cabinets alone was enough to support an inference of intent
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to commit theft. Evidence of rummaging would simply bolster
the already reasonable inference of intent.
Id. at 231.
[19] In the instant matter, the evidence indicates that Jennings had locked the trailer
when he left at the end of the business day on January 24, 2016, and that when
he left, all was well within the trailer and all items were in their normal
location. When Jennings returned at approximately 7:00 a.m. on January 25,
2016, he found Speck sitting inside the trailer and that the trailer’s business
office had been ransacked. Specifically, Jennings observed that file and desk
drawers had been opened, a closet door had been opened, a tool box had been
disturbed, items had been scattered on the floor, a computer monitor had been
overturned, a laptop computer had been removed from a shelf in the office and
placed on a chair by the door, and medical supplies from a wall cabinet had
been removed from the cabinet and placed in a small cardboard box.
[20] The evidence indicates that Speck moved the laptop computer and placed the
medical supplies in a small cardboard box. The location of the laptop computer
and the placement of medical supplies into a box suggests that the items had
been prepared for easy removal. The Indiana Supreme Court has long held that
evidence of intent to commit theft may be established by a showing that a
defendant touched, disturbed, or even approached valuable property. Cash v.
State, 557 N.E.2d 1023, 1024 (Ind. 1990). Further, ransacking the trailer was
not a necessary step in the act of breaking and entering the trailer, but rather
was an additional act in which Speck chose to engage. Further, as the Indiana
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Supreme Court has determined, “[t]he opening of cabinets and drawers by an
intruder suggests, among other things, that the person opening them was
looking for something to take.” Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 231.
[21] In addition, after Speck was detained, she was found in possession of a lighter
that belonged to Jennings and had been in the drawer of Jennings’s desk. The
fact that Speck left the trailer with Jennings’s property found therein also
supports the reasonable inference that she intend to commit theft when she
broke and entered the trailer. See McBride v. State, 597 N.E.2d 992, 994 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992) (providing that possession of stolen property will support an
inference of intent to commit theft at the time of a breaking and entering).
Although Speck claimed at trial that she owned that lighter, the trial court,
acting as the trier-of-fact, was in the best position to judge Speck’s credibility
given the seemingly unlikely fact that both she and Jennings would own the
exact same lighter and that someone else had removed Jennings’s lighter from
his desk prior to Speck’s entry into the trailer. See Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d
814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (providing that the fact-finder is best positioned to judge
the credibility of witnesses and is therefore free to credit or discredit testimony
and to weigh conflicting evidence).
[22] Speck admittedly broke into and entered the Alpine Group’s trailer without
permission. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to create a
reasonable inference that Speck intended to commit theft once inside the trailer.
Speck’s claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for
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this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768
N.E.2d at 435.
[23] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.
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