Williams v. United States ( 2016 )


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  • OR!GENAL
    In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 15-552C (Pro Se)
    (Filed: April l9, 2016 |Not for Publication)
    THOMAS E. WILLIAMS,   D
    APR 1 9 2016
    Plaintiff,
    U.S. COURT OF
    FEDERAL CLA|MS
    v.
    THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant.
    \/L/£§/\/\X\X\/\/L/§/
    Thomas E. Williams, Tuscon, AZ, Plaintiff, pro se.
    Steven M Mager, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    with whom were Steven l Gillingham, Assistant Director, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr. ,
    Director, and Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
    Department of Justice, and Leslie Ann Gerardo, Chief, Special Proceedings Division,
    U.S. Attomey’s Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    Kaplan, J.
    The plaintiff in this case, Thomas Williams, filed this pr_o g action on May 22,
    2015, seeking compensation for an unjust conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495 and
    2513. Compl. at l, ECF No. l. Currently before the Court is the govemment’s motion to
    dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule l2(b)(l) of the Rules of
    the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC).
    As described in greater detail below, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr.
    Williams’s complaint because the offense of which he claims he was unjustly convicted
    was not "an offense against the United States" as required to invoke this Court’s
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § l495(b). Therefore, the government’s motion to dismiss is
    GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.l
    1 Mr. Williams has also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. § ECF
    No. 2. 'l`hat motion is GRANTED for the limited purpose of dismissing the case for lack
    of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Williams was prosecuted for various offenses stemming from an incident that
    occurred in August 2012 in which Mr. Williams falsely represented himself as a District
    of Columbia employee, claimed authority to impound a vehicle belonging to a senior
    citizen, removed the victim’s car from her driveway with a tow truck, and disposed of it
    for scrap. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Def.’s Mot.) App. at 16~24, ECF No. 7. On September
    9, 2012, Mr. Williams was arrested and charged with first degree theft in connection with
    the incident. §§ at 5~6. Mr. Williams was released pending trial but then failed to appear
    before the D.C. Superior Court September 27, 2012, as ordered for a preliminary hearing.
    I_d. at 5-7. Nor did he appear at the continued hearing date in October. § i;:l; at 5.
    Accordingly, that court issued a bench warrant for Mr. Williams’s arrest, § at 8-10, and
    Mr. Williams was arrested on that warrant two months later, on December 4, 2012, § at
    25-26.
    On February 20, 2013, a local grand jury indicted Mr. Williams on charges of the
    carjacking of a senior citizen (D.C. Code §§ 22-2801 and 3601); robbery of a senior
    citizen (D.C. Code §§ 22-2801 and 3601); first-degree theft of a senior citizen (D.C.
    Code §§ 22-321 l .3212. and 3601); unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (D.C. Code
    § 22-3215); receiving stolen property (D.C. Code § 22-3232); false impersonation of a
    public official (D.C. Code § 22-1404); and a violation of the Bail Refor1n Act (D.C. Code
    § 23-1327). I;d. at ll-l4.
    On March 12, 20l3, following a jury trial before Superior Court, Mr. Williams
    was found guilty of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, second-degree theft of a senior
    citizen, impersonating a public official, and violation of the Bail Reforrn Act. __S_e_e  at
    27-28. On June 14, 2013 Judge Stuart Nash sentenced Mr. Williams to concurrent terms
    of imprisonment of 72 months for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and impersonating
    a public official and 540 days for second-degree theft of a senior citizen. I_d. Further, the
    court also imposed a consecutive tenn of 24 months for the violation of the Bail Refonn
    Act.
    On October 10, 2014 Mr. Williams filed a motion seeking to have his Bail
    Refor1n Act conviction vacated under the innocence Protection Act, D.C. Code §§ 22-
    4131-35, on grounds of actual innocence and because of alleged ineffective assistance of
    counsel. I_d. at 1. The government initially opposed Mr. William’s motion. I_d. However,
    after confinning that Mr. Williams had been confined at a psychiatric facility on the date
    and time of the scheduled court appearance that gave rise to the Bail Reform Act
    conviction, on April 2, 2015, the government withdrew its opposition and conceded that
    Mr. Williams was entitled to have his Bail Reform Act conviction vacated. _I_d._
    On May 12, 2015, Superior Court Judge Stuart Nash entered an order granting
    Mr. Williams’s innocence Protection Act claim, vacating his conviction, and dismissing
    the Bail Reforrn Act charge with prejudice. I;d. at 30-31. In his order, Judge Nash found
    that Mr. Williams had shown by clear and convincing evidence that he was actually
    innocent of the Bail Reform Act offense. _I_d.,_at 1, 30-31. Mr. Williams’s sentence was
    amended on May13, 20l5, nunc pr_o §L, to June 14, 2013.
    On May 29, 2015, Mr. Williams filed the present action. Citing 28 U.S.C..
    §§ 1495 and 2513, he claims entitlement to damages in the amount of $125,000.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Standards for Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1)
    ln deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court
    accepts as true all undisputed facts in the pleadings and draws all reasonable inferences in
    favor of the plaintiff. Trusted lntegration, Inc. v. United States, 
    659 F.3d 1159
    , 1163
    (Fed. Cir. 2011). The court may "inquire into jurisdictional facts" to determine whether it
    has jurisdiction. Rocovich v. United States, 
    933 F.2d 99l
    , 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991). lt is well
    established that complaints that are filed by pr_o g plaintiffs, as this one is, are held to
    "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner,
    
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972). Nonetheless, even pr_o g plaintiffs must persuade the Court
    that jurisdictional requirements have been met. Bemard v. United States, 
    59 Fed. Cl. 497
    , 499 (2004), §§ 98 Fed. App’x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
    II. Jurisdiction
    A. Statutoi_'y Provisions
    Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1495, "[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall
    have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim for damages by any person unjustly
    convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned." Section 2513 of the
    same title specifies that the damages awarded "shall not exceed . . . $50,000 for each 12-
    month period of incarceration." l;d. § 2513(e). lt also sets forth the elements that "any
    person suing under section 1495 . . . must allege and prove" to establish that he was
    unjustly convicted of a federal crime. I_230 Ct. Cl. 819
    , 820 (1982) (observing that requirements of
    section 2513 are jurisdictional "and therefore must be strictly construed")).
    But there is a more basic jurisdictional problem with Mr. Williams’s complaint
    because he was not convicted, unjustly or otherwise, of "an offense against the United
    States." § 28 U.S.C. § 1495 (conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims "to
    render judgment upon any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted of an
    offense against the United States and imprisoned"). Rather, Mr. Williams complains of
    an unjust conviction for violation of a local law, the D.C. Bail Reform Act, which is set
    forth in D.C. Code § 23-1327. Violations of the D.C. Code are not "offenses against the
    United States;" they are offenses against the local jurisdiction. § United States v. Mills,
    
    964 F.2d 1186
    , 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (violation of D.C. Code not a "federal
    criminal offense" within the meaning of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3172, even
    where code encompasses conduct made criminal by federal law), cert. denied, 
    506 U.S. 977
    (1992); §§ Key v. Doyle, 
    434 U.S. 59
    , 61 (1977) (holding that a law applicable only
    in the District of Columbia is not a "statute of the United States" for purposes of 28
    U.S.C. § 1257(a) which provides for review by appeal to the Supreme Court in cases
    "where is drawn in question the validity of a . . . statute of the United States and the
    decision is against its validity").
    Thus, unjust convictions predicated on the reversal of convictions for violation of
    the D.C. Code are not within the scope of the federal unjust conviction statute. Rather, for
    unjust convictions involving violations of the D.C. Code, a plaintiff s resort is to D.C.
    Code § 2-421, which provides that "[a]ny person unjustly convicted of and subsequently
    imprisoned for a criminal offense contained in the District of Columbia Official Code
    may present a claim for damages against the District of Columbia." And jurisdiction over
    such a claim would, of course, exist in the D.C. Superior Court, and not the Court of
    Federal Claims.
    CONCLUSION
    On the basis of the foregoing, the government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED
    and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment
    accordingly.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    51 /§/¢/~»
    ELAINE D. KAPLAN
    Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-552

Judges: Elaine D. Kaplan

Filed Date: 4/19/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021