Jefferson Cnty. Election Comm'n v. Hollingsworth , 445 S.W.3d 504 ( 2014 )

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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CV-14-391
JEFFERSON COUNTY ELECTION Opinion Delivered OCTOBER 23, 2014
COMMISSION; TED DAVIS; STU APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
SOFFER; CYNTHIA SIMS; WILL FOX; COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
PATRICIA JOHNSON [NO. CV-2014-133-5]
APPELLANTS
HONORABLE TED CAPEHEART,
V. JUDGE
DEBORAH “DEBE” HOLLINGSWORTH APPEAL DISMISSED.
APPELLEE
DONALD L. CORBIN, Associate Justice
This is an appeal from an order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court granting
Appellee Deborah “Debe” Hollingsworth’s request for a petition for writ of mandamus.1
Appellants are the Jefferson County Election Commission (Commission); Ted Davis,
individually and in his official capacity as chairman of the Jefferson County Election
Commission; Stu Stoffer and Cynthia Sims, in their official capacities as Jefferson County
Election Commissioners; Will Fox, in his official capacity with the Jefferson County Election
Commission; and Patricia Johnson, in her official capacity as Jefferson County Clerk
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Although the circuit court’s order is styled as “Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition,”
this court has explained that “[a] writ of prohibition may only be directed to a court or
adjudicative committee that is proceeding wholly without jurisdiction; it cannot be directed,
as a writ of mandamus can, to a ministerial officer.” State v. Craighead Cnty. Bd. of Election
Comm’rs, 300 Ark. 405, 411, 779 S.W.2d 169, 172 (1989).
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(collectively “Appellants”).2 For reversal, they argue that the circuit court erred in (1)
denying their motion to dismiss Appellee’s complaint because the complaint failed to state a
cause of action for which relief could be granted; (2) denying their motion to dismiss because
the complaint failed to state facts upon which relief could be granted; and (3) its construction
of Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-37-113. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(4) (2014). Because the appeal is moot, we dismiss it.
The present case dates back to a dispute that arose in 2012 regarding the length of term
for municipal offices in the city of Pine Bluff. A mayoral election was scheduled to appear
on the November 2012 ballot. Prior to that election, Redus, who was then the mayor of
Pine Bluff, filed an action in the Jefferson County Circuit Court requesting a declaration of
when the next mayoral election should be held and requesting a writ of mandamus to prohibit
the county clerk from counting any votes in the 2012 mayoral election or certifying the
winner. The circuit court entered an order on October 5, 2012, finding that the Pine Bluff
mayoral election was properly scheduled for November 2012 and denying Redus’s motion
for a writ of mandamus. No appeal was taken from that order.
2
Appellee’s complaint also named as defendants Carl A. Redus, Jr., former Pine Bluff
mayor; Lloyd Franklin, Sr., who sought the Democratic party nomination for office of Pine
Bluff City Treasurer; and Loretta Whitfield, the current Pine Bluff City Clerk who was
elected to a four-year term but filed for the Democratic nomination for that same office.
None of these parties appealed the circuit court’s order and, thus, are not parties to the
instant appeal. The only notice of appeal filed in this case was filed on behalf of the above-
listed Appellants, identified as the “Jefferson County Defendants” in that notice of appeal.
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The election took place as scheduled in November 2012, and Hollingsworth defeated
Redus in the mayoral election. On December 3, 2012, the Pine Bluff City Council passed
a resolution stating in relevant part as follows:
Section 1. That the party committees of the recognized political parties under the laws
of the State of Arkansas which are operating in Jefferson County, Arkansas, are hereby
requested to conduct primary elections for the municipal officers of the City of Pine
Bluff, Arkansas, beginning in 2014 and for all subsequent municipal elections.
City of Pine Bluff, Ark., City Council Res. No. 3551, § 1 (Dec. 3, 2012). Nevertheless,
Hollingsworth took office on January 1, 2013, and her oath of office stated that her term
began in 2013 and ends in 2016.
Prior to the filing deadline for the 2014 primary elections, Redus filed as an unopposed
Democratic candidate for the office of Pine Bluff mayor. Franklin filed as a Democratic
candidate for city treasurer, and Whitfield, the current city clerk who was elected in 2012,
filed as a Democratic candidate for the city clerk position.
Thereafter, on March 25, 2014, Hollingsworth filed a complaint seeking injunctive
relief, issuance of a preliminary/permanent injunction, writ of mandamus/prohibition,
declaratory judgment, and attorney’s fees. Specifically, she asked for injunctive relief
mandating that any plans for a mayoral election be nullified and cancelled. She requested a
writ of mandamus/prohibition directing the Commission “to take necessary and appropriate
action to nullify and cancel the scheduling” of elections for the offices of mayor, city clerk,
and city treasurer until 2016. Finally, she requested a declaratory judgment that she was
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elected to a four-year term expiring on December 31, 2016, and where no vacancy existed,
the Commission could not lawfully schedule elections for any city offices.
Appellants filed a motion to dismiss Appellee’s complaint on April 3, 2014. In that
motion, Appellants claimed that Appellee had failed to plead facts sufficient to state a cause
of action, failed to state facts that showed a clear right to the requested relief, and failed to
include necessary parties.
The circuit court held a hearing that same day. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
circuit court announced from the bench that the October 5, 2012 circuit-court order finding
that the municipal elections were to be held every four years was res judicata. The circuit
court further announced that Appellee was “entitled to a writ of prohibition prohibiting the
election, declaring that it’s a four-year term for the mayor.”
Following its oral ruling, the circuit court entered a written order on April 21, 2014,
granting a “Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition.” Therein, the court stated that the
Commission’s plans to conduct a May 2014 primary election and a November 2014 general
election for the Pine Bluff municipal offices of mayor, treasurer, and city clerk were null and
void. The court ordered the Commission to cancel any such arrangements, desist from future
action to call for or conduct said elections, and refrain from the counting of any votes cast in
such elections.
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal and also filed a motion requesting that the
circuit court’s order be stayed pending their appeal of the court’s decision. The circuit court
entered an order on May 5, 2014, denying the motion for stay. That same day, Appellants
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lodged the record with our court and filed an emergency petition for a stay pending appeal
and a motion to expedite consideration of the stay motion. This court granted the motion
for expedited consideration but denied Appellants’ request for a stay pending appeal. Briefing
commenced, and the case is now submitted for our consideration.
As a threshold matter, this court must determine whether the instant appeal is moot.
As a general rule, the appellate courts of this state will not review issues that are moot because
to do so would be to render an advisory opinion, which this court will not do. See Kinchen
v. Wilkins, 367 Ark. 71, 238 S.W.3d 94 (2006). Generally, a case becomes moot when any
judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then existing legal controversy.
Id. We have, however, recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Id. The first
exception involves issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review, and the second
exception concerns issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if
addressed, would prevent future litigation. Id.
Here, the instant litigation began when Appellee, the current mayor, filed a complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment that she holds the office of mayor through 2016, and a writ
of mandamus to prohibit Appellants from taking any actions with regard to municipal
elections in either the primary or general elections in 2014. The circuit court found in her
favor, but its written order was limited to granting the requested relief of a writ of mandamus
that prohibited election officials from conducting any elections for the municipal offices of
mayor, treasurer, and city clerk and directing those officials to not count or certify any votes
that may be cast for those offices. After the circuit court entered its order, Appellants filed a
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motion requesting the court to stay its order. The circuit court denied the motion.
Appellants then filed a motion for stay with this court and requested expedited consideration
of their motion. This court granted the motion to expedite but denied the motion for stay.
Thus, at the time of the May primary, the circuit court’s order prohibiting Appellants from
holding the municipal elections and directing them to not count votes or certify winners in
such races was in effect. We take judicial notice of the primary-election results, as reported
by the Arkansas Secretary of State following the May 20, 2014 primary election, which show
that no candidate was certified as the winner of any of those three municipal offices.
Moreover, the three Democratic candidates who filed for the municipal offices did not file
an appeal of the circuit court’s order in this case. Thus, any review of this appeal as it relates
to the May 20, 2014 primary election is necessarily moot.
Next, we must decide whether a decision by this court could have any practical legal
effect with regard to the impending November 4, 2014 election. The answer is no. Arkansas
Code Annotated section 7-5-203 governs certification of candidate lists and provides in
relevant part as follows:
(b)(1) Not less than seventy-five (75) days before each general election day, the
clerk of each county shall certify to the county board of his or her county a full list of
all candidates to be voted for in the county as the nominations have been certified or
otherwise properly submitted to him or her.
Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-203(b)(1) (Repl. 2011). Moreover, Arkansas Code Annotated section
7-5-207, the statute outlining certain ballot procedures, provides in relevant part as follows:
(a)(1) Except as provided in subdivisions (a)(2) and (3) of this section, all
election ballots provided by the county board of election commissioners of any county
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in this state for any election shall contain in the proper place the name of every
candidate whose nomination for any office to be filled at that election has been
certified to the county board and shall not contain the name of any candidate or person
who has not been certified.
Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-207(a)(1) (Supp. 2013). Again, taking judicial notice of the ballot as
prepared and certified by the Jefferson County Election Commission, it reveals that no
candidates have been certified and listed on the ballot for these three municipal offices. Thus,
the circuit court’s order prohibiting Appellants from holding elections in November 2014 is
also moot.
Before leaving this point, it is necessary to determine whether either of the exceptions
to the mootness doctrine applies: issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review, or
issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent
future litigation. The only way one of these exceptions would apply is if the circuit court had
granted Appellee’s requested declaratory relief. Although the circuit court announced from
the bench that the mayoral term was for four years, there was nothing in the written order
to reflect this ruling. The written ruling most certainly did not declare that Appellee was
entitled to hold the office through 2016.
This court has made clear that an oral order announced from the bench does not
become effective until reduced to writing and filed in accordance with the requirements of
Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2(b)(2). McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of
Collection Agencies, 368 Ark. 60, 243 S.W.3d 278 (2006) (refusing to address the
constitutionality of the Check-cashers Act where no written order was entered following the
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circuit court’s ruling from the bench that the Act was unconstitutional). This rule eliminates
or reduces disputes between litigants over what a trial court’s oral decision in open court
entailed. See Price v. Price, 341 Ark. 311, 16 S.W.3d 248 (2000). If a circuit court’s ruling
from the bench is not reduced to writing and filed of record, it is free to alter its decision
upon further consideration of the matter. McGhee, 368 Ark. 60, 243 S.W.3d 278. Simply
put, the written order controls. Accordingly, in the absence of a written ruling, there is
nothing for this court to review with regard to the declaratory-judgment issue that might fall
within one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
Appeal dismissed.
McKissic & Associates, PLLC, by: Jackie B. Harris, for appellant.
Gibson Law Office, by: Charles Sidney Gibson and Charles Sidney Gibson II, for appellee.
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