Pennington v. Hobbs , 497 S.W.3d 186 ( 2014 )


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  •                                     Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 441
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CV-13-115
    FREDERICK PENNINGTON, JR.                         Opinion Delivered October   23, 2014
    APPELLANT
    PRO SE PETITION FOR REHEARING
    V.                                                [JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT
    COURT, NO. 35CV-12-671]
    RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS                     HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS,
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION                          JUDGE
    APPELLEE
    PETITION FOR REHEARING
    TREATED AS PETITION FOR
    RECONSIDERATION AND
    GRANTED; DENIAL OF PETITION
    FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
    REVERSED; WRIT OF HABEAS
    CORPUS ISSUED; REMANDED TO
    THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT
    COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
    PER CURIAM
    Now before the court is a pro se petition for rehearing filed by appellant Frederick
    Pennington, Jr. The petition, properly treated as a petition for reconsideration, concerns our
    decision of September 4, 2014, dismissing appellant’s appeal from the denial of habeas relief,
    denying his petition for habeas relief filed directly in this court, and finding his remaining
    motions to be moot. See Pennington v. Hobbs, 
    2014 Ark. 356
    , ___ S.W.3d ___ (per curiam). In
    light of our decision in Hale v. Hobbs, 
    2014 Ark. 405
    , ___ S.W.3d ___, we grant appellant’s
    petition for reconsideration.1
    1
    Appellant and Billy Ray Hale were co-defendants in Pulaski County Circuit Court Case
    Nos. 60CR-77-1933, 60CR-77-1934, and 60CR-77-1939. Like appellant, Hale appealed to this
    court from the denial of habeas relief. On appeal, we reversed and remanded on the ground that
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 441
    On reconsideration, we find that the sentencing orders entered against appellant are
    facially invalid. While the specific issue was not raised by appellant, issues concerning a void or
    illegal sentence are akin to subject-matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived by either party.
    Taylor v. State, 
    354 Ark. 450
    , 
    125 S.W.3d 174
     (2003) (citing Flowers v. State, 
    347 Ark. 760
    , 
    68 S.W.3d 289
     (2002)). This court may review a void or illegal judgment sua sponte regardless of
    whether the issue is raised by a party. See Harness v. State, 
    352 Ark. 335
    , 
    101 S.W.3d 235
     (2003).
    As we noted in Hale, sentencing in Arkansas is entirely a matter of statute, and this court
    has consistently held that sentencing shall not be other than in accordance with the statute in
    effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Hale, 
    2014 Ark. 405
    , ___ S.W.3d ___. When
    the law does not authorize the particular sentence pronounced by a circuit court, that sentence
    is unauthorized and illegal, and the case must be reversed and remanded. 
    Id.
    Here, appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty in the Pulaski County Circuit Court
    to one count of first-degree murder and four counts of aggravated robbery, and he was
    sentenced to life imprisonment for each of the charges. At the time the crimes were committed,
    first-degree murder and aggravated robbery were classified as Class A felonies. Ark. Stat. Ann.
    §§ 41-1502(3), 41-2102 (Repl. 1977). A Class A felony was punishable by “not less than five
    years nor more than fifty years, or life.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-901. The sentencing orders
    entered in appellant’s case referred to appellant’s parole eligibility after serving one-third of his
    life sentences. However, under Arkansas Statutes Annotated section 43-2807(b)(1), which was
    the sentencing orders were facially invalid. Specifically, we held that the circuit court exceeded
    its authority by entering a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. The
    sentencing orders entered against appellant are identical to those entered against Hale.
    2
    Cite as 
    2014 Ark. 441
    in effect at the time the crimes were committed, “[i]ndividuals sentenced to life imprisonment
    prior to March 1, 1968, and those sentenced to life imprisonment after the effective date
    [February 12, 1969] of this Act, shall not be eligible for release on parole unless such sentence
    is commuted to a term of years by executive clemency.” Thus, parole-eligibility was not
    authorized by the statute in effect at the time the crimes were committed, and the sentencing
    orders entered against appellant are facially invalid.
    Because the Pulaski County Circuit Court exceeded its authority in sentencing appellant
    to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, we reverse the denial of the petition for writ
    of habeas corpus, issue the writ, and remand to the Jefferson County Circuit Court with
    instructions to transfer the case to the Pulaski County Circuit Court for resentencing. The
    remaining motions and petition of which we disposed in Pennington, 
    2014 Ark. 356
    , ___ S.W.3d
    ___ (per curiam) are moot.
    Pro se petition for rehearing treated as petition for reconsideration and granted; denial
    of petition for writ of habeas corpus reversed; writ of habeas corpus issued; remanded to the
    Jefferson County Circuit Court with instructions.
    Frederick Pennington, Jr., pro se appellant.
    Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    3