Marshall v. State , 521 S.W.3d 456 ( 2017 )


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  •                                     Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 208
    SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
    No.   CR-17-248
    Opinion Delivered JUNE 1, 2017
    CALVIN LEE MARSHALL
    PETITIONER PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED
    APPEAL [PHILLIPS COUNTY
    V.                                       CIRCUIT COURT, NO. 54CR-91-
    306]
    STATE OF ARKANSAS
    RESPONDENT HONORABLE RICHARD L.
    PROCTOR, JUDGE
    MOTION TREATED AS MOTION
    FOR RULE ON CLERK AND
    DENIED.
    SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice
    Petitioner Calvin Lee Marshall brings a motion for belated appeal of an order entered
    denying his pro se petition for scientific testing under Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas, as
    amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified as Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-
    201 to -208 (Repl. 2016). We treat the motion as one for rule on clerk and deny it.
    In 1992, a jury convicted Marshall on charges that he kidnapped, raped, and
    murdered one victim and murdered another. Marshall received an aggregate sentence of
    life without parole, and this court affirmed the judgment on appeal. Marshall v. State, 
    316 Ark. 753
    , 
    875 S.W.2d 814
    (1994). On March 4, 2016, Marshall filed in the trial court a
    petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on a pro se petition in which he sought
    scientific testing under Act 1780. The Act 1780 petition was also filed on the same date.
    On March 22, 2016, the circuit court entered an order finding that the in forma pauperis
    Cite as 
    2017 Ark. 208
    petition was denied “due to venue issues,” and on October 21, 2016, an order was entered
    denying the Act 1780 habeas petition. Marshall filed a notice of appeal for the October 21
    order on November 8, 2016, and another on November 16, 2016. Both notices were
    timely filed.1
    On December 29, 2016, Marshall filed in the trial court another petition to proceed
    in forma pauperis. This time the petition sought to proceed with a motion for rule on clerk
    in which Marshall sought to have the circuit clerk provide him with the certified record to
    appeal the October 21, 2016 order and alleged that the clerk’s refusal to do so was in
    violation of Act 1780. The motion for rule on clerk submitted with the petition was not
    filed in the trial court, and on February 2, 2017, Marshall filed another in forma pauperis
    petition that sought to proceed with a notice of appeal in which Marshall contended that
    the unfiled motion for rule on clerk had been “deemed denied.” A different judge entered
    an order on February 2, 2017, granting the new in forma pauperis petition to proceed with
    the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was filed that same day, and the record on appeal
    was then tendered to this court on March 20, 2017. The clerk declined to file the record
    on the basis that it was not tendered within ninety days of the November 8, 2016 notice of
    appeal.
    Marshall then filed his pro se motion for belated appeal in this court. In his motion,
    Marshall requests permission to lodge the record and proceed with an appeal of the October
    21, 2016 order denying the Act 1780 petition on the basis that his appeal has been “illegally
    1
    Act 1780 provides that an appealing party must file a notice of appeal within thirty
    calendar days of the entry of an order under the Act.
    2
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    2017 Ark. 208
    thwarted” by the circuit clerk and that Act 1780 required his appeal to go forward without
    cost despite the denial of his petition to proceed as a pauper on the Act 1780 petition.
    Marshall does not request permission to proceed with an appeal on the denial of the in forma
    pauperis petition or contend that he should be permitted to appeal what he had alleged was
    the “deemed denied” order on the unfiled motion for rule on clerk.
    Because the notice of appeal of the October 21, 2016 order was timely, we treat
    Marshall’s motion as one for rule on clerk. Holland v. State, 
    358 Ark. 366
    , 367, 
    190 S.W.3d 904
    , 905 (2004) (per curiam); see also King v. State, 
    2016 Ark. 450
    (per curiam) (holding
    moot a motion for belated appeal when notice of appeal was timely filed). Arkansas Rule
    of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 4(b) (2016) requires that the record be tendered to this
    court within ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal. Even if the earlier of the two
    notices of appeal was invalid and the later filing date for the second notice was used for the
    calculation of the ninety-day deadline to submit the record under Rule 4(b), the time
    expired on February 14, 2017—well before the record was tendered to this court on March
    20, 2017.
    Marshall does not contend that the record was submitted within the required time.
    Instead he alleges that the clerk’s failure to provide him with a certified record caused the
    delay. The duty to conform to procedural rules applies even when the petitioner proceeds
    pro se, as all litigants must bear the responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure
    or demonstrating good cause for not so conforming. King, 
    2016 Ark. 450
    . When a
    petitioner fails to perfect an appeal in accordance with the prevailing rules of procedure, the
    burden is on the petitioner, even if he is proceeding pro se, to establish good cause for failure
    3
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    2017 Ark. 208
    to comply with the procedural rules. Clemons v. State, 
    2014 Ark. 454
    , 
    446 S.W.3d 619
    (per
    curiam). It is true, as Marshall contends, that Act 1780 prohibits any charge for fees or bond
    for costs to bring an appeal of the denial of an order on a petition under the Act. Ark. Code
    Ann. § 16-112-206(c). We need not consider Marshall’s claim that this provided him with
    good cause for the delay in this case, however, because he cannot prevail on appeal.
    An appeal of the denial of postconviction relief, including an appeal from an order
    denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus under Act 1780, will not be permitted to go
    forward when it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Wells v. State, 
    2017 Ark. 88
    ,
    ___ S.W.3d ___ (per curiam). Because Marshall failed to state a basis on which the trial
    court could have ordered scientific testing under the statutes, he cannot prevail on appeal.
    Act 1780 provides that a writ of habeas corpus may be issued based on new scientific
    evidence proving a person actually innocent of the offense for which he was convicted.
    Ark. Code Ann. § 16–112–201; Hill v. State, 
    2016 Ark. 258
    , 
    493 S.W.3d 754
    (per curiam).
    Under the statute, when a petitioner fails to provide factual support for the claim that there
    is scientific evidence that bears on his case, he has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled
    to relief. 
    Id. Arkansas Code
    Annotated section 16-112-202 requires that a petitioner who
    requests relief and who seeks scientific testing to provide the basis for his relief must identify
    evidence for testing that meets specific criteria set out in the statute, and the evidence
    identified must meet certain predicate requirements under the statutes. Clemons, 
    2014 Ark. 454
    , 
    446 S.W.3d 619
    . If the petitioner does not state the specific scientific evidence to be
    tested, then his petition is wholly without merit under the statute. Darrough v. State, 
    2014 Ark. 334
    , 
    439 S.W.3d 50
    (per curiam).
    4
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    2017 Ark. 208
    As in Darrough, Marshall’s pro se Act 1780 petition failed to identify any specific
    evidence that he would have tested, despite the petition indicating that certain attachments
    would do so. The trial court, however, appears to have denied the petition because it found
    that the petition contained no allegations that the judgment in Marshall’s case imposed an
    illegal sentence or was illegal on its face or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the case.
    In addition to his request for scientific testing, Marshall raised claims in the petition
    that were not cognizable under Act 1780. Petitions under the Act are limited to those
    claims related to scientific testing of evidence. Hill, 
    2016 Ark. 258
    , 
    493 S.W.3d 754
    . The
    Act does not provide an opportunity for the petitioner to raise issues outside the purview
    of the Act, and a petition under the Act does not serve as a substitute for the pursuit of other
    remedies. 
    Id. Yet, Marshall
    was incarcerated in Lee County when he filed his petition, and
    because he was not in custody in Phillips County when he filed his petition and specifically
    identified Act 1780, his petition should have been considered under the Act as one for
    scientific testing rather than under Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-101 to -123
    (Repl. 2016). See Clemons v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 18
    (per curiam).
    This court will affirm the circuit court’s decision because it reached the right result,
    albeit for the wrong reason. White v. State, 
    2015 Ark. 100
    , 
    460 S.W.3d 279
    (per curiam);
    Jones v. State, 
    347 Ark. 409
    , 
    64 S.W.3d 728
    (2002). Marshall therefore could not prevail if
    the appeal were permitted to proceed.
    Motion treated as motion for rule on clerk and denied.
    5