Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Grace, A. ( 2016 )


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  •                       [J-29A-C-2016][M.O. – Baer, J.]
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    MIDDLE DISTRICT
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,     :   No. 30 MAP 2015
    :
    Appellant          :   Appeal from the Order of the Superior
    :   Court at No. 1420 MDA 2013, dated
    v.                      :   4/14/14 affirming the order of the York
    :   County Court of Common Pleas,
    :   Criminal Division, at No. CP-67-CR-
    GABRIEL J. MARTINEZ,              :   0001486-2010, dated 7/19/13
    :
    Appellee           :
    :
    :   ARGUED: March 8, 2016
    :
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,     :   No. 32 MAP 2015
    :
    Appellant          :   Appeal from the Order of the Superior
    :   Court at No. 1522 MDA 2013 dated
    v.                      :   4/14/14 affirming the order of the York
    :   County Court of Common Pleas,
    :   Criminal Division, at No. CP-67-CR-
    ADAM MACKENZIE GRACE,             :   0000227-2011, dated 7/31/13
    :
    Appellee           :
    :
    :   ARGUED: March 8, 2016
    :
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,     :   No. 34 MAP 2015
    :
    Appellant          :   Appeal from the Order of the Superior
    :   Court at No. 1422 MDA 2013 dated
    v.                      :   4/15/14 affirming the order of the York
    :   County Court of Common Pleas,
    :   Criminal Division, at No. CP-67-CR-
    WAYNE PATRICK SHOWER,             :   0006313-2005, dated 7/19/13
    :
    Appellee           :
    :
    :   ARGUED: March 8, 2016
    CONCURRING OPINION
    CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR                             DECIDED: September 28, 2016
    I agree with much of the majority’s contract-based reasoning and its conclusion
    that appellees are entitled to the benefit of their bargains. However, I am circumspect
    that such relief, exempting appellees from SORNA’s requirements, may be effectuated
    absent a constitutional basis. See Commonwealth v. Killinger, 
    585 Pa. 92
    , 106, 
    888 A.2d 592
    , 601 (2005) (“We will not interfere any more than the constitution requires with
    the Legislature's deliberative process in refining the treatment of sexual offenders to
    best protect the citizens of the Commonwealth.”); see also 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.23(b)(2)
    (“[T]he court shall have no authority to relieve a sexual offender from the duty to register
    under this subchapter or to modify the requirements of this subchapter as they relate to
    the sexual offender.”).
    The Zuber case -- which the majority appears to rely on as authority for the grant
    of specific performance premised on contract principles alone -- involved a plea
    agreement containing terms that violated existing law. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at
    23 n.19 (discussing Commonwealth v. Zuber, 
    466 Pa. 453
    , 
    353 A.2d 441
    (1976)).
    Critically, the Zuber Court, in enforcing the plea agreement, required that the sentence
    be modified in such a manner so as to comply with the pertinent provisions of the law.
    See 
    Zuber, 466 Pa. at 462
    & 
    n.8, 353 A.2d at 446
    & n.8. In contrast, any similar
    modification appears impossible in the present matter, since SORNA facially requires
    registration terms different from those that were incorporated into the plea bargains.
    Accordingly, I believe further analysis is necessitated.
    The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
    Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which have been interpreted as generally
    [J-29A-C-2016][M.O. – Baer, J.] - 2
    coextensive, guarantee the protections of due process. See Commonwealth v. Sims,
    
    591 Pa. 506
    , 523 n.6, 
    919 A.2d 931
    , 941 n.6 (2007). The Court has previously related
    that “[t]he due process inquiry, in its most general form, entails an assessment as to
    whether the challenged proceeding or conduct offends some principle of justice so
    rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental
    and that defines the community's sense of fair play and decency.” Commonwealth v.
    Kratsas, 
    564 Pa. 36
    , 49, 
    764 A.2d 20
    , 27 (2001) (quote marks, citations, and alterations
    omitted); see also Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, 
    577 Pa. 166
    , 183, 
    842 A.2d 936
    , 946 (2004) (“Substantive due process is the esoteric concept interwoven within our
    judicial framework to guarantee fundamental fairness and substantial justice . . ..”
    (internal quotes and citation omitted)).
    As relates to this constitutional protection, the majority develops that plea
    bargaining is an “essential component of the administration of justice,” Majority Opinion,
    slip op. at 21 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 260, 
    92 S. Ct. 495
    , 498
    (1971)), and that the Commonwealth has an affirmative duty to abide by the terms of
    the plea agreement, see 
    id. at 23
    (citing 
    Zuber, 466 Pa. at 458-59
    , 353 A.2d at 444
    (“Our courts have demanded strict compliance . . . in order to avoid any possible
    perversion of the plea bargaining system, evidencing the concern that a defendant
    might be coerced into a bargain or fraudulently induced to give up the very valued
    constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial by jury.”)).
    From my perspective, plea bargaining’s role in our justice system, combined with
    the defendant’s exchanged waiver of constitutional rights, mandates consideration of
    fundamental fairness and attendant due process protections. See State v. Blackwell,
    
    522 S.E.2d 313
    , 315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (“By pleading guilty, a defendant waives
    many constitutional rights, not the least of which is his right to a jury trial. No other right
    [J-29A-C-2016][M.O. – Baer, J.] - 3
    of the individual has been so zealously guarded over the years and so deeply
    embedded in our system of jurisprudence . . .. As such, due process mandates strict
    adherence to any plea agreement.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)), remanded
    on other grounds, 
    538 S.E.2d 929
    (N.C. 2000) (per curiam).1
    It seems evident from this Court’s and other jurisdictions’ precedents that the
    enforcement of plea bargains is rooted in fundamental fairness.                See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Sluss, 
    419 S.E.2d 263
    , 265 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (“[T]o allow the
    government to receive the benefit of its bargain without providing the reciprocal benefit
    contracted for by the defendant would do more than violate the private contractual rights
    of the parties—it would offend all notions of fairness in the related criminal proceedings,
    which are protected by constitutional due process.”). Accordingly, since the parties
    stipulated in these cases that the registration conditions were express terms of
    appellees’ plea agreements, I believe appellees are entitled to the benefit for which they
    bargained as a matter of due process.
    1
    The view that plea bargains must be enforced pursuant to due process principles
    appears to garner support among many state and federal jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cuero
    v. Cate, __ F.3d __, __, 
    2016 WL 3563660
    , at *3 (9th Cir. June 30, 2016) (indicating
    that, where a term in a plea agreement functions as an inducement for the defendant to
    plead guilty, the defendant obtains a vested right under the Due Process Clause to
    enforce it); United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 
    681 F.3d 914
    , 919 (8th Cir. 2012); United States
    v. Al-Arian, 
    514 F.3d 1184
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Randolph, 
    230 F.3d 243
    , 249 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Altro, 
    180 F.3d 372
    , 375 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
    Ingram, 
    979 F.2d 1179
    , 1184 (7th Cir. 1992); People v. Villalobos, 
    277 P.3d 179
    , 182
    (Cal. 2012); Van Buskirk v. State, 
    720 P.2d 1215
    , 1216 (Nev. 1986); State v.
    Howington, 
    907 S.W.2d 403
    , 410 (Tenn. 1995); Commonwealth v. Sandy, 
    509 S.E.2d 492
    , 494 (Va. 1999). But see State v. Kuchenreuther, 
    218 N.W.2d 621
    , 624 (Iowa
    1974) (requiring the state to honor its plea agreement, but concluding that Santobello
    was adjudicated by “application of what may be termed a ‘fair-play standard,’” rather
    than constitutional principles).
    [J-29A-C-2016][M.O. – Baer, J.] - 4