Ahmed Omer v. Steel Technologies Incorporated ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                    Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    Chief Justice:             Justices:
    Syllabus                                                      Bridget M. McCormack      Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been              Reporter of Decisions:
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.                Kathryn L. Loomis
    OMER v STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC
    Docket No. 161658. Decided July 21, 2021.
    Ahmed Omer filed an action with the Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates,
    seeking compensation from Steel Technologies, Inc., and New Hampshire Insurance Company for
    a work-related lower-back injury. After trial, the magistrate issued an opinion finding that Omer
    sustained an injury on January 3, 2011, arising out of and in the course of his employment and that
    he was totally disabled and entitled to weekly wage benefits for a closed period from April 12,
    2011 through December 29, 2011. The magistrate found that Omer was a credible witness, that a
    physical-therapy report noting Omer’s back-pain complaint was credible, and that the testimony
    of Dr. Nabil Suliman, an internal-medicine specialist who testified that Omer was “totally
    disabled,” was credible. The magistrate also found credible the deposition testimony of Barbara
    Feldman, a vocational-rehabilitation counselor who testified that Omer would not be capable of
    returning to a job at which he earned his highest wages. Defendants appealed the magistrate’s
    decision to the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (the MCAC), contending that the
    magistrate erred by concluding that Omer had proved he was disabled as a result of a work-related
    incident and that Omer was totally disabled during the identified period. The MCAC reversed the
    magistrate’s decision, denying Omer’s claim for wage-loss benefits on two grounds. First, the
    MCAC reasoned that the magistrate’s finding of total disability was unsupported by competent
    evidence because it was based solely on a physician’s—here, Dr. Suliman’s—conclusory
    declarations of total disability, rather than on a quantification of limitations described through
    physical restrictions that may lead to wage loss. Second, the MCAC concluded that Omer had
    failed to meet his burden of establishing that he was entitled to total disability benefits. Omer
    appealed by leave granted. The Court of Appeals, JANSEN and GLEICHER, JJ. (O’BRIEN, P.J.,
    concurring), reversed the MCAC’s opinion and order and remanded for entry of an order in Omer’s
    favor. The Court reasoned that (1) there was no legal basis for the MCAC’s legal conclusion that,
    standing alone, a treating physician cannot provide competent evidence (or a competent opinion)
    regarding a claimant’s disability and (2) the MCAC erred by determining that the evidence
    underlying the magistrate’s decision was incompetent and, in turn, by holding that Omer had failed
    to establish that he had a “disability” as defined by MCL 418.301(4)(a) of the Worker’s Disability
    Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. 
    332 Mich 120
     (2020). Defendants sought
    leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.
    In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal
    and without hearing oral argument, held:
    Under MCL 418.301(4)(a), the term “disability” means a limitation of an employee’s wage
    earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a personal
    injury or work-related disease. In light of this definition, establishing a disability requires more
    than a medical diagnosis or a physician’s testimony that the claimant can no longer perform their
    existing job duties. Even though there are no absolute requirements in proving entitlement to
    workers’ compensation benefits and a claimant may prove entitlement to those benefits using any
    method the claimant chooses, given the WDCA’s definition of “disability”—i.e., the necessity of
    establishing that there is a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to
    his or her qualifications—claimants typically offer additional evidence about employment
    opportunities and suitability. In this case, Omer offered more than a minimal medical diagnosis
    to support a finding of disability under MCL 418.301(4)(a); specifically, the magistrate’s
    determination was based on the credible testimony of Omer, Suliman, and Feldman and on
    supporting medical records establishing how Omer’s injuries prevented him from performing the
    jobs for which he was qualified and trained. Feldman’s testimony was significant and credible,
    and there was competent, material, and substantial evidence to support the magistrate’s findings.
    Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the MCAC should have affirmed the
    magistrate’s finding of disability for the closed period. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals
    speculated about whether a magistrate’s disability finding could be supported solely on medical
    testimony; because that speculation was not necessary to its holding, Part IV of the Court of
    Appeals’ opinion was vacated.
    Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
    Michigan Supreme Court
    Lansing, Michigan
    Chief Justice:                 Justices:
    OPINION                                              Bridget M. McCormack          Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    FILED July 21, 2021
    STATE OF MICHIGAN
    SUPREME COURT
    AHMED OMER,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                                  No. 161658
    STEEL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
    and NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
    PER CURIAM.
    The defendant-employer, Steel Technologies, Inc., asks this Court to consider
    whether a medical professional’s conclusory declaration of a claimant’s total disability,
    without more, can provide competent, material, and substantial evidence of “disability,” as
    defined by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. We
    decline to do so because under the facts of this case, it is unnecessary to reach that issue.
    We instead vacate Part IV of the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussing the issue, 1 but we
    affirm its result: the magistrate relied on competent, material, and substantial evidence to
    find that the plaintiff-claimant, Ahmed Omer, had established a disability and was entitled
    to wage-loss benefits.
    The WDCA defines the term “disability” as a “limitation of an employee’s wage
    earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a
    personal injury or work-related disease.” MCL 418.301(4)(a). Establishing a disability,
    then, requires more than a medical diagnosis or a physician’s testimony that the claimant
    can no longer perform their existing job duties. See Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 
    481 Mich 266
    ,
    281; 750 NW2d 129 (2008). Though “there are no absolute requirements, and a claimant
    may choose whatever method he sees fit to prove an entitlement to workers’ compensation
    benefits,” 
    id. at 282
    , the statutory definition of “disability”—i.e., the requirement of
    establishing that there is a “limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work
    suitable to his or her qualifications and training” 2—explains why claimants typically offer
    additional evidence about employment opportunities and suitability. And, contrary to the
    findings of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC), 3 that is precisely
    what the claimant did in this case. The claimant offered more than a mere medical
    diagnosis to support a finding of a compensable disability.
    1
    Omer v Steel Technologies, Inc, 
    332 Mich App 120
    , 135-142; 955 NW2d 575 (2021).
    2
    MCL 418.301(4)(a).
    3
    The MCAC has been replaced, in part, by the Workers’ Disability Compensation Appeals
    Commission. Executive Reorganization Order No. 2019-13.
    2
    The claimant suffered a workplace lower-back injury in January 2011.              He
    aggravated the injury at work two months later and did not work from April 4, 2011 until
    January 2012. After a trial that featured testimony from the claimant, vocational experts,
    and various doctors, the magistrate ruled in the claimant’s favor. He concluded that the
    injury arose out of and was in the course of employment, that the claimant was totally
    disabled, and that he was entitled to weekly wage benefits from April 12 through December
    29, 2011. The magistrate cited, among other evidence: (1) a statement from the deposition
    testimony of the claimant’s doctor, Dr. Nabil Suliman, asserting that the claimant was
    unable to perform his work and was “totally disabled,” and (2) disability slips from the
    claimant’s chiropractor, Dr. Mohamed Saleh, indicating that the claimant was unable to
    work.
    On appeal, the MCAC seized on the magistrate’s reliance on Dr. Suliman’s
    testimony and Dr. Saleh’s disability slips to reverse the wage-loss benefit award. “[W]here
    a magistrate’s finding of total disability is based upon [a] physician[’s] conclusory
    declarations of total disability, rather than quantification of limitations, described through
    physical restrictions, which may lead to wage loss, that finding is unsupported by
    competent evidence.” Omer v Steel Technologies, Inc, 2018 Mich ACO 15, p 6. But the
    magistrate’s determination was based on more than the conclusory declarations of medical
    professionals. Indeed, the magistrate’s opinion expressly relied on the credible testimonies
    of the claimant, Dr. Suliman, vocational expert Barbara Feldman, and medical records that
    spoke to how the claimant’s injury prevented him from performing all the jobs within his
    qualifications and training.
    3
    We find the deposition testimony of the claimant’s vocational expert particularly
    significant.   The MCAC downplayed the significance of this testimony, noting that
    Feldman admitted that she did not perform a labor-market survey. But Feldman also
    testified that the restrictions medical professionals placed on the claimant meant he was
    capable of performing only sedentary work. Given that restriction, she opined that the
    claimant would not be capable of returning to a job at which he earned his highest wages,
    and she “was not able to find a job that pays his maximum pre-injury rate of pay.” Indeed,
    Feldman’s testimony traced, step-by-step, the multifactor test required to establish
    disability that this Court laid out in Stokes. Stokes, 
    481 Mich at 281-284
    . The magistrate
    deemed this expert’s testimony credible, and we won’t second-guess that credibility
    determination. The claimant’s own testimony, in which he stated that he did not think he
    could perform any job, because of the severity of pain, further supported the magistrate’s
    total-disability finding. There is competent, material, and substantial evidence to support
    the magistrate’s findings. 4
    The Court of Appeals’ speculation about whether a magistrate’s disability finding
    could be based exclusively on medical testimony was not necessary to its holding. Because
    this case does not present that question, we vacate Part IV of the Court of Appeals’ opinion,
    though we agree with its ultimate result: the claimant’s evidence—which included medical
    testimony, medical records, and testimony from a vocational expert and the claimant
    4
    See Omer, 332 Mich App at 133 (explaining that the MCAC must consider as conclusive
    the findings of fact made by a workers’ compensation magistrate as long as those facts are
    supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record).
    4
    himself—satisfied the substantial-and-competent-evidence requirement and should have
    been affirmed by the MCAC.
    Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
    Bridget M. McCormack
    Brian K. Zahra
    David F. Viviano
    Richard H. Bernstein
    Elizabeth T. Clement
    Megan K. Cavanagh
    Elizabeth M. Welch
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 161658

Filed Date: 7/21/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2022