Sarah Hooks v. Nationwide Housing Systems , 695 F. App'x 86 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 17-30201      Document: 00514114132         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/14/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 17-30201                              August 14, 2017
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    SARAH HOOKS, individually and on behalf of her minor children, C.H. and
    L.H.; MICHAEL K. KRONLAGE,
    Plaintiffs – Appellants,
    v.
    NATIONWIDE HOUSING SYSTEMS, L.L.C.; OAK CREEK HOMES, L.L.C.,
    formerly known as Oak Creek Homes, L.P.,
    Defendants – Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:15-CV-729
    Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Sarah Hooks, individually and on behalf of her minor children, and her
    father, Michael Kronlage, filed suit against Nationwide Housing Systems,
    L.L.C.; and Oak Creek Homes, L.L.C., formerly known as Oak Creek L.P.
    (“Defendants”) alleging personal injuries stemming from mold contamination
    in the Hooks’s home.         Sarah Hooks’s individual claims were referred to
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 17-30201     Document: 00514114132      Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/14/2017
    No. 17-30201
    arbitration. Her children (through Sarah Hooks as next friend) and her father
    will be referred to as “Plaintiffs.”
    On July 10, 2016, the district court entered an Order and Reasons
    granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in full and dismissing
    Plaintiffs’ claims. No separate judgment document was filed. On August 11,
    2016, Plaintiffs filed an appeal to this court noting the lack of a separate
    judgment but stating that the judgment was “an appealable judgment on its
    face.” On December 8, 2016, this court entered an order dismissing for want
    of appellate jurisdiction and stating: “In this personal injury case, the district
    court entered order and reasons dismissing the case on July 11, 2016.
    Therefore, the final day for filing a timely notice of appeal was August 10,
    2016.” Hooks v. Nationwide Housing Systems, L.L.C., No. 16-30916 (5th Cir.
    Dec. 8, 2016) (Hooks I). In sum, we found the appeal to have been filed a day
    late.
    That same day, December 8 (with a submission date of January 4, 2017),
    Plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of a final judgment under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 58, now contending that the July 10 order was not a final,
    appealable judgment. However, they did not seek a rehearing of this court’s
    decision in Hooks I nor did they file a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
    Court. The district court denied the motion on February 22, 2017, and the
    present appeal was taken from that order on March 17, 2017.
    The parties argue at length about whether a separate judgment was
    necessary for the July 10 order and the effect of our court’s decision in Hooks
    I. However, we pretermit consideration of those issues because even assuming
    arguendo that Hooks I does not foreclose consideration of the relevant notice of
    appeal filed in March of 2017, we conclude that the relief sought is moot.
    In 2002, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 was amended to provide a
    “bright line” cutoff for such arguments. Burnley v. City of San Antonio, 470
    2
    Case: 17-30201     Document: 00514114132      Page: 3    Date Filed: 08/14/2017
    No. 17-30201
    F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 2006). It explains that Rule 58 was amended, along
    with other rules, “to provide . . . an integrated system fostering promptness,
    accuracy, certainty and finality in the entry of judgments by district courts.
    Assuming arguendo that the district court’s Order and Reasons required a
    separate judgment document, if one was not entered within 150 days, the
    judgment is considered to be entered at that time, starting the appellate clock
    running. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); 
    Burnley, 470 F.3d at 194
    .
    Counting 150 days from July 10 brings us (coincidentally) to December
    8, 2016, which would then start the clock running for the appeal, which would
    then have been due January 9, 2017. Thus, even if we were to grant the relief
    sought in this appeal – ordering the entry of a separate document – it would
    be a nullity and would do nothing to further the Plaintiffs’ goal of filing a timely
    appeal. Thus, we conclude that either Plaintiffs’ appeal is barred by Hooks I
    or it is moot. We thus DISMISS the appeal.
    APPEAL DISMISSED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-30201

Citation Numbers: 695 F. App'x 86

Filed Date: 8/14/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023