Lyle Farms P'ship v. Lyle , 507 S.W.3d 519 ( 2016 )

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 577
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-16-162
Opinion Delivered November 30, 2016
LYLE FARMS PARTNERSHIP ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE JACKSON
APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 34CV-14-29]
V.
HONORABLE KEVIN KING, JUDGE
CHARLOTTE LYLE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Appellants Lyle Farms Partnership; Katherine Lyle Harbison, individually; Katherine
Lyle Harbison, as the personal representative of the estate of Ann Lyle; and Katherine Lyle
Harbison, as the personal representative under the unprobated will of James Waller Lyle
appeal from the Jackson County Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor
of appellee Charlotte Lyle in Charlotte’s suit for declaratory judgment. On appeal, appellants
argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the basis that the prenuptial
agreement signed by Charlotte and James was not properly acknowledged. We affirm.
Charlotte and James Lyle were married on July 22, 2003, and they each signed the
prenuptial agreement at issue here on that same day. The agreement was notarized and signed
by Jerry Carlew. The language preceding Carlew’s signature stated, “This document was
signed before my [sic] on July 22nd, 2003.” Carlew’s notary seal was attached showing that
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 577
he was commissioned in Jackson County and that it had an expiration date of March 18,
2013. James subsequently died,1 and his sister, Katherine, was named as the personal
representative of his unprobated will.
In a pleading filed on February 2, 2014, Katherine alleged that Charlotte had
contractually signed away her rights to James’s estate in the prenuptial agreement. Charlotte
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment on March 10, 2014, seeking to have the agreement
declared void and unenforceable based on four theories: (1) it was not acknowledged, (2) it
was unconscionable, (3) it was not properly drafted in accordance with Arkansas law, and (4)
it was coercive and fraudulent. Appellants filed an answer on April 21, 2014.2 Charlotte filed
a motion for summary judgment and an accompanying brief on June 29, 2015. Appellants
filed a response and an accompanying brief on July 13, 2015, asking that Charlotte’s motion
be denied and claiming that she should be estopped from having the prenuptial agreement
declared void and unenforceable. Appellants also claimed that any defects in the
acknowledgment were cured by the provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-12-
208. The court entered an order on December 30, 2015, granting Charlotte summary
judgment. In the order, the court stated that the prenuptial agreement did not meet the
1
There is nothing in the record to show when he died.
2
There was also a motion to transfer and a motion to disqualify counsel included with
the answer. In a separate hearing, counsel voluntarily withdrew his representation of appellee
and an order was filed on October 1, 2015, reflecting that due to the withdrawal, appellant’s
motion to disqualify counsel was moot.
2
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 577
requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-11-402.3 The court found that the
prenuptial agreement “was not legally acknowledged and as such must be declared invalid.
The notary only certified that he saw the parties sign the document.” According to the court,
an acknowledgment is “not just proof that they executed the document,” but rather the
whole purpose of an acknowledgment “is to impress upon the parties to a document the
significance of the document being signed . . . the parties declare they are aware of the
importance of the document” and they “realize their execution of the document reflects their
own act or deed.” Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on January 6, 2016. This appeal
followed.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when, in light of the
pleadings and other documents before the circuit court, there is no genuine issue of material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4 The burden of
sustaining a motion for summary judgment is always the responsibility of the moving party.5
When reviewing whether a motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the
appellate court determines whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in
support of the motion left a material question of fact unanswered.6 Once the moving party
has established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by affidavits, depositions, or
3
This statute requires premarital agreements to be in writing and signed and
acknowledged by both parties.
4
Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
5
New Maumelle Harbor v. Rochelle, 338 Ark. 43, 991 S.W.2d 552 (1999).
6
Bomar v. Moser, 369 Ark. 123, 127, 251 S.W.3d 234, 239 (2007).
3
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 577
other supporting documents, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate
the existence of a material issue of fact.7 This court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences
against the moving party.8 This court also evaluates whether reasonable minds could differ
in their interpretation of the facts.9
Looking at the prenuptial agreement, it is clear that the requirements of section 9-11-
402 were not met because the parties did not include an acknowledgment. Appellants argue
that since the parties included the word “acknowledge” in the body of the agreement itself,
and because the notary signed and affixed his seal, this should satisfy the acknowledgment
requirement of the statute.10 However, this argument is without merit. Our supreme court
has long held that an acknowledgment is a formal declaration or admission before an
authorized public officer by a person who has executed an instrument that such instrument
is his act and deed.11 It is distinguished from a jurat in that a jurat is a simple statement that
7
Id.
8
Meadors v. Still, 344 Ark. 307, 40 S.W.3d 294 (2001).
9
Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 60 S.W.3d 415 (2001).
10
Appellants cite to statutes concerning the role of a notary public as well as what
constitutes unlawful acts by a notary. However, those statutes are not material to the issues
before us.
11
Pardo v. Creamer, 228 Ark. 746, 301 S.W.2d 218 (1958).
4
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 577
an instrument is subscribed and sworn to or affirmed before a proper officer without the
further statement that it is the act or deed of the person making it.12
Appellants also contend that any defects in the acknowledgment can be cured by the
curative provisions of section 18-20-208. However, this argument is also without merit.
Here, there was no acknowledgment, defective or otherwise. Therefore, the curative
provisions of the statute cannot be held to supply an acknowledgment when, in fact, there is
none.13
Finally, appellants argue that appellee should be equitably estopped from claiming that
the prenuptial agreement is void and unenforceable, because she entered into the agreement
and accepted the benefits of the marriage until James’s death; and now she seeks to “renege
on her promise . . . and receive benefits which she previously agreed she would not ever
seek.” The court rejected this defense in the order, stating that the “fact that the parties acted
under the assumption for several years that the prenuptial agreement was valid does not
correct the requirement of the statute that the agreement must be properly and legally
acknowledged.” We hold that the trial court correctly rejected appellants’ defense of estoppel
and properly granted Charlotte summary judgment.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
Ogles Law Firm, P.A., by: John Ogles, for appellants.
Dick Jarboe, for appellee.
12
Id.
13
Pardo, supra.
5