Stone v. State , 2015 Ark. App. 133 ( 2015 )


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  •                                  Cite as 
    2015 Ark. App. 133
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION II
    No. CR-14-541
    Opinion Delivered   FEBRUARY 25, 2015
    KENNETH JOHN STONE                                APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
    APPELLANT          COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
    GREENWOOD DISTRICT
    V.                                                [NO. CR-12-189]
    HONORABLE STEPHEN TABOR,
    STATE OF ARKANSAS                                 JUDGE
    APPELLEE
    AFFIRMED
    KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
    Appellant Kenneth John Stone appeals his conviction for second-degree domestic
    battery of his eleven-year-old son SS, following a jury trial in Sebastian County Circuit Court.
    Appellant was sentenced to three years in prison and a $5000 fine. On appeal, appellant
    challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence that he acted “knowingly” in causing bruises
    to his son’s thigh when he bit his son. Because the sufficiency of the evidence is not
    preserved for review, we affirm without reaching the merits of his argument.
    As charged, in order to convict appellant of second-degree domestic battery, the State
    was required to prove that appellant knowingly caused physical injury to a family member he
    knew to be twelve years of age or younger. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-304(a)(4) (Repl. 2013).
    The method to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at a criminal jury trial is by a motion
    for directed verdict. See Bennett v. State, 
    308 Ark. 393
    , 
    825 S.W.2d 560
    (1992). According
    Cite as 
    2015 Ark. App. 133
    to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1, if a motion for directed verdict is to be made
    in a jury trial, it must be made at the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the
    evidence. Rule 33.1(a) requires that a motion for directed verdict “state the specific grounds
    therefor.” Failure to comply with the time and manner requirements of Rule 33.1(a) will
    constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
    the verdict. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c). Rule 33.1(c) recites that a directed-verdict motion
    that merely states that the evidence is insufficient does not preserve the issue for appellate
    review. Breeden v. State, 
    2013 Ark. 145
    , 
    427 S.W.3d 5
    . A general motion will not suffice;
    the motion must specifically advise the trial court as to how the evidence was deficient.
    Gillard v. State, 
    372 Ark. 98
    , 
    270 S.W.3d 836
    (2008). The rationale behind this rule is that
    when specific grounds are stated and the absent proof is pinpointed, the circuit court can
    either grant the motion, or, if justice requires, allow the State to reopen its case and supply
    the missing proof. Pinell v. State, 
    364 Ark. 353
    , 
    219 S.W.3d 168
    (2005). Without a trial
    court ruling on a specific motion, there is nothing for our court to review. Maxwell v. State,
    
    373 Ark. 553
    , 
    285 S.W.3d 195
    (2008). Our supreme court has held that Rule 33.1 is to be
    strictly construed. Carey v. State, 
    365 Ark. 379
    , 
    230 S.W.3d 553
    (2006).
    Here, the entirety of appellant’s attorney’s motion for directed verdict was as follows:
    Your Honor, we’ll move for a directed verdict of acquittal. I did see a picture that
    does show a bruise on there, and I did hear testimony that the Defendant caused that.
    We would move for a directed verdict of acquittal, nevertheless.
    Nowhere did appellant pinpoint what element of the offense the State failed to prove, and
    nowhere did appellant challenge the State’s evidence to support his “knowing” intent.
    2
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    2015 Ark. App. 133
    Accordingly, his sufficiency argument is not preserved for appellate review. Bradley v. State,
    
    2013 Ark. 58
    , 
    426 S.W.3d 363
    ; Brown v. State, 
    374 Ark. 324
    , 
    287 S.W.3d 587
    (2008).
    We affirm appellant’s conviction for second-degree domestic battery.
    ABRAMSON and HOOFMAN, JJ., agree.
    David L. Dunagin, for appellant.
    Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Ashley Priest, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CR-14-541

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ark. App. 133

Judges: Kenneth S. Hixson

Filed Date: 2/25/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/25/2015