Greenlee v. Alexander , 2015 Ark. App. 430 ( 2015 )

Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 430
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-15-127
KELLY GREENLEE Opinion Delivered September 2, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV-2014-1113-4]
AUSTIN ALEXANDER HONORABLE CRISTI BEAUMONT,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Kelly Greenlee appeals the Washington County Circuit Court order dismissing her
claims against Austin Alexander. Greenlee asserts that the circuit court erred in finding that
her claims were barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.
On February 19, 2011, Greenlee and Alexander were involved in a car accident. On
February 6, 2014, Greenlee filed a complaint against Alexander in the Washington County
Circuit Court alleging that Alexander’s “neglige[nt] and reckless, intentional behavior” caused
the accident and that she sustained personal injuries. Greenlee did not serve Alexander with
the complaint. Instead, she attempted to negotiate a settlement with Alexander’s insurance
company. When the settlement negotiations required additional time, Greenlee filed a motion
for a nonsuit on June 9, 2014, which the circuit court granted on June 10, 2014. However,
the negotiations were unsuccessful, and on June 17, 2014, Greenlee filed a second lawsuit
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 430
against Alexander, asserting the same claims as her first complaint.
On August 21, 2014, Alexander moved to dismiss Greenlee’s complaint, alleging that
the three-year statute of limitations, as provided in Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-56-
105, barred Greenlee’s claims. The circuit court granted Alexander’s motion and dismissed
Greenlee’s claims with prejudice on October 23, 2014. Greenlee then filed this timely appeal.
On appeal, Greenlee argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the statute of
limitations from section 16-56-105 barred her claims because Arkansas’s savings statute
applies. She notes that pursuant to the savings statute, if a plaintiff timely commences an action
and then suffers a nonsuit, she may commence a new action within one year. See Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-56-126 (Repl. 2005). Greenlee argues that the savings statute applies to her claims
against Alexander because she filed her complaint on February 6, 2014, and then nonsuited
on June 10, 2014, but commenced the second action on June 17, 2014. In other words,
Greenlee asserts that the mere filing of her complaint on February 6, 2014, commenced the
action and tolled the statute of limitations.
Greenlee’s argument is without merit. Our supreme court has considered and rejected
a similar argument in Green v. Wiggins, 304 Ark. 484, 803 S.W.2d 536 (1991). Specifically,
in Green, the plaintiff brought an action against three physicians. Id. The plaintiff served one
of the physicians but did not serve the other two physicians. Id. The plaintiff needed more
time to see whether he sued the correct doctors, so he obtained an order dismissing his suit
without prejudice. Id. The plaintiff then filed a second complaint outside the applicable
limitations period against the two unserved physicians. Id. The second action was dismissed
2
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 430
as untimely, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. On appeal, our supreme court affirmed the circuit
court’s dismissal, holding that the plaintiff could not avail himself of the savings statute with
respect to his second complaint against the two physicians because he had failed to serve them
with his first complaint. Id. The court noted that the commencement date is subject to the
plaintiff’s completing service within 120 days from the date of filing the complaint, unless the
time for service has been extended by the court. Id.
Thus, in this case, even though Greenlee filed her first complaint against Alexander
within the statute of limitations, the action never commenced because she did not serve him
within 120 days. Accordingly, the savings statute did not apply to Greenlee’s claims against
Alexander, and the circuit court properly dismissed them as time-barred.
Affirmed.
GRUBER and HOOFMAN, JJ., agree.
Mark Freeman, for appellant.
Benson & Associates, P.L.C., by: Justin Bennett and Joe Benson, for appellee.
3