Goodwin v. Goodwin , 490 S.W.3d 661 ( 2016 )

Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 233
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No.CV-15-949
Opinion Delivered: APRIL 27, 2016
JAMES R. GOODWIN APPEAL FROM THE UNION
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. DR-12-345]
V.
HONORABLE EDWIN KEATON,
JUDGE
ELIZABETH GOODWIN
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellant James R. Goodwin appeals the order entered by the Union County Circuit
Court on August 5, 2015, that awarded his ex-wife, appellee Elizabeth Goodwin,
$42,169.23 as her half of appellant’s lump-sum retirement payment disbursed after the
parties’ divorce. Appellant contends that the trial court clearly erred because this portion of
his retirement accrued prior to the marriage and was nonmarital. Appellee contends that
the trial court properly enforced the agreed and approved terms of the parties’ December
2012 divorce decree. We affirm.
On appeal from domestic-relations proceedings, our review is de novo, but we do
not reverse a trial court’s decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Abbott v. Abbott, 79 Ark.
App. 413, 90 S.W.3d 10 (2002). A trial court has the power to correct a decree to accurately
reflect its original ruling or to interpret its prior decision. Id. Once a settlement agreement
is approved by the trial court regarding property division in a divorce case and incorporated
Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 233
into a decree, this becomes a binding and nonmodifiable contract between the parties, absent
fraud in the inducement or agreement of the parties. Artman v. Hoy, 370 Ark. 173, 257
S.W.3d 864 (2007); Anding v. Anders, 249 Ark. 413, 459 S.W.2d 416 (1970). As a general
rule, judgments are construed like any other instrument; the determinative factor is the
intention of the court, as gathered from the judgment itself and the record. Abbott, supra;
Fox v. Fox, 68 Ark. App. 281, 7 S.W.3d 339 (1999).
The facts of this case are straightforward. The parties married in August 2000, and
their divorce was finalized by a decree filed on December 19, 2012. The parties appeared
before the trial court on December 5, 2012, to recite their agreed terms into the record and
to gain approval from the trial court. The written decree provided in pertinent part:
10. The parties hereto each have retirement accounts with their current employer
and [appellee] has a retirement account with her former employer, El Dorado School
District. The parties’ [sic] are awarded one-half (1/2) of each others [sic] retirement
accounts to be divided by Qualified Domestic Relations Order as of the date of the
hearing on the 5th day of December, 2012.
Appellant’s attorney and appellee’s attorney agreed and consented to the written decree on
behalf of their clients, evidenced by their signatures on the decree. The decree was signed
by the trial court judge and filed of record.
On March 1, 2014, appellant withdrew a lump-sum payout of his retirement
attributable to the benefits that had accrued prior to the marriage. Appellee filed a motion
for contempt on June 17, 2014, asserting that appellant had begun to draw his retirement
from the Arkansas Local Police and Fire Retirement System (hereinafter “LOPFI”) without
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notifying appellee or remitting appellee her one-half portion of it. 1 A Qualified Domestic
Relations Order was filed of record on June 18, 2014, which recited that any lump-sum
withdrawal of appellant’s LOPFI was to be divided in half for “the period of time of the
marriage,” defined as August 12, 2000, to December 19, 2012.
On June 2, 2015, appellant filed a motion to amend the divorce decree nunc pro
tunc, stating that the parties intended that only the marital portion of each party’s retirement
was to be divided equally, not the entirety of each party’s retirement benefits. One
attachment to appellant’s motion was an excerpt from the transcript from the 2012 divorce
hearing wherein appellant’s attorney stated on the record his understanding that “the
retirement accounts, by each party are marital,” to which appellee’s attorney said, “Correct.”
Appellee countered that a nunc pro tunc order should not be entered because the 2012
decree spoke for itself and accurately represented the agreement of the parties.
The trial court conducted a hearing on July 8, 2015. Appellant’s attorney asserted
that the trial court could not divide nonmarital property absent an explanation that would
satisfy the applicable divorce statute, which did not happen at the time of the divorce. At
the outset of the hearing, the trial judge noted that the decree was the result of a negotiated
settlement, not a decision based on findings of the trial court.
The transcript reflecting the recitation of the agreement into the record on December
5, 2012, was entered into evidence. In it, appellee was asked to testify as to the terms of
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Appellant had filed a petition for a change of custody and for a citation of contempt
against appellee in May 2014, and appellee’s countermotion for contempt regarding the
retirement benefits was filed within her response to appellant’s petition. The trial court’s
later denial of appellant’s petition is not advanced as an issue on appeal.
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the agreement, and appellant’s attorney was asked to correct any misstatements. Regarding
appellant’s LOPFI retirement and appellee’s 401K retirement account, appellee’s attorney
queried appellee: “He’s gonna get half of yours and you’re gonna get half of his?” Appellee
responded, “That’s correct.” At the conclusion of the recited agreement, appellant’s
attorney wanted to “clarify a few things,” and in particular “the retirement accounts, by
each party are marital, it will be divided as of today’s date.” Appellee’s attorney then replied,
“Correct.” The divorce decree reflected this understanding in paragraph ten of the decree.
Also at the hearing, appellee’s attorney offered letters between the attorneys on
December 3 and 4, 2012, as further proof of the parties’ intent to divide the entirety of each
other’s retirement accounts. Over appellant’s attorney’s objection, this evidence was
permitted. Appellee’s attorney’s letter proposed that appellant’s LOPFI retirement be
divided by qualified domestic relations order, “giving [appellee] half the value of that at the
time of the divorce.” Appellant’s attorney responded by letter, stating that as to this
proposal, “My client agrees.” The trial judge referenced those letters as supportive of his
determination that the parties agreed to divide the entirety of their retirement accounts as
of the date of the divorce, which agreement the trial court adopted. The trial court orally
denied appellant’s motion to amend the divorce decree nunc pro tunc.
On August 5, 2015, the trial court issued the order on appeal, stating in relevant part
that the divorce decree provided that each party would be entitled to one-half of the other
party’s retirement accounts; that appellant first drew his retirement in a lump-sum payment
in March 2014; that the LOPFI determined that appellee was not entitled to a lump-sum
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payment; and that appellee was entitled to her half of the lump-sum payment in the amount
of $42,169.23. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred because it lacked the authority to divide
appellant’s premarital portion of his retirement absent a written explanation for such a
distribution to his ex-wife that was in compliance with Arkansas Code Annotated section
9-12-315. Pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of that statute, trial courts must provide written
reasons for not returning premarital property to the person who owned it at the time of the
marriage. This statute does not apply in this proceeding because the parties’ retirement
accounts were agreed to be “marital” and evenly divisible; the 2012 settlement agreement
equated to a stipulation of fact between the parties. Appellant entered into a binding
contractual agreement that was approved by the trial court in the divorce decree. That he
determined years later that this agreement appeared to be improvident to him is no ground
for relief. Helms v. Helms, 96 Ark. App. 109, 239 S.W.3d 1 (2006). A trial court is vested
with discretion to interpret and enforce its decree entered pursuant to a settlement
agreement. York v. York, 2010 Ark. App. 343, 374 S.W.3d 827; Abbott, supra. The trial
court did not clearly err in interpreting this divorce decree in line with the parties’ intent at
the time of the agreement, nor did the trial court err in enforcing this agreed decree.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN, C.J., and VAUGHT, J., agree.
F. Mattison Thomas III, for appellant.
Ronald L. Griggs, for appellee.
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