Kathryn Sue Evans v. Little Rock School District , 2022 Ark. App. 443 ( 2022 )

Cite as 2022 Ark. App. 443ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-21-444
KATHRYN SUE EVANS
Opinion Delivered November 2, 2022
APPELLANT
V. APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
ELEVENTH DIVISION
[NO. 60CV-19-6603]
LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT
HONORABLE CASEY R. TUCKER,
APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
This case concerns appellant Kathryn Evans’s termination from the Little Rock
School District (LRSD). On appeal, Evans argues that the court erred in dismissing her claim
under the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (ATFDA) because her claim was timely. We
affirm.
Evans was employed with the LRSD since August 1990. She had a written contract
with the LRSD for the 2019–2020 school year. On or about August 6, 2019, Evans was
informed that she was being terminated for job abandonment. Evans sent a letter to Johnny
Key, who at the time was exercising the authority of the board of directors for LRSD and
Mike Poore, the superintendent, appealing the recommendation that she be terminated and
requested a hearing under the “grievance policy.” On August 12, Jordan Eason responded
on behalf of the LRSD stating that Evans was not entitled to an appeal process because the
termination was for job abandonment. On September 11, Evans filed a complaint in the
Pulaski County Circuit Court alleging violations of the ATFDA, due process, and equal
protection.
On December 12, the LRSD offered Evans a hearing by the LRSD Community
Advisory Board. On December 17, Key approved the Board’s recommendation to terminate
Evans’s contract.
On February 23, 2021, about fourteen months later, Evans filed an amended
complaint alleging a breach of contract in violation of both the ATFDA and her teacher’s
contract apart from the ATFDA and dropped the due-process and equal-protection claims.
In response, the LRSD filed a motion to dismiss and an incorporated brief in support. The
LRSD argued that Evans’s ATFDA claim was untimely because the amended complaint was
filed more than seventy-five days after she had received written notice of her termination as
required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-1510(d)(1) (Repl. 2021). The LRSD also
contended that Evans’s separate breach-of-contract claim failed as a matter of law because
there is no common-law cause of action for breach of contract when the ATFDA applies.
Evans responded that her claim under the ATFDA was timely. She contended that
her original complaint was filed within seventy-five days of the August 6, 2019 termination
and that there was no requirement to file another notice of appeal or amend the complaint
within a seventy-five-day period from the December 17 termination.
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On June 15, the court entered an order granting the LRSD’s motion to dismiss,
finding that the ATFDA requires that an appeal of the decision to terminate should have
been filed within seventy-five days of the decision. It found that Evans filed her original
complaint on September 11, 2019, approximately three months prior to the decision to
terminate her. Because she filed her amended complaint on February 23, 2021—well outside
the seventy-five-day window—it was untimely. Additionally, the court found that Evans could
not state a claim for breach of contract because the ATFDA is the exclusive contractual
remedy for nonprobationary teachers in Arkansas. Evans appealed.
The standard of review for the granting of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit
court abused its discretion, and we consider questions of law de novo. Brown v. Towell, 2021
Ark. 60, 619 S.W.3d 17.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-1510 provides in pertinent part,
(b)(1) Any licensed teacher who has been employed continuously by the school
district three (3) or more years or who may have achieved nonprobationary status
pursuant to § 6-17-1502 may be terminated or the board of directors may refuse to
renew the contract of the teacher only when there is a reduction in force created by
districtwide reduction in licensed personnel, for incompetent performance, conduct
which materially interferes with the continued performance of the teacher’s duties,
repeated or material neglect of duty, or other just and reasonable cause.
....
(d)(1) The exclusive remedy for any nonprobationary teacher aggrieved by the
decision made by the board of directors shall be an appeal therefrom to the circuit
court of the county in which the school district is located, within seventy-five (75)
days of the date of written notice of the action of the board of directors.
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Evans had been employed with the LRSD since 1990, qualifying her as a
nonprobationary teacher. Key approved the recommendation to terminate her contract, and
Evans received written notice on December 17, 2019. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated
section 6-17-1510(d)(1), Evans had until March 1, 2020, to appeal the decision to the circuit
court. She did not take action on the decision until February 23, 2021, well past the seventy-
five-day window. Accordingly, the court did not err in dismissing Evans’s claim for
untimeliness.
Evans contends that she made a timely filing of her ATFDA claim by virtue of her
original complaint filed on September 11, 2019. She claims she filed her original complaint
in response to the LRSD’s denial of her initial request for a hearing pursuant to the ATFDA.
The complaint alleged that she was denied a hearing in violation of the ATFDA’s procedural
requirement and that she was terminated without “just, proper, or reasonable cause.” Evans
analogizes her circumstance to a procedural due-process claim. Using this analogy, Evans
argues that the subsequent hearing and decision on her termination did not require her to
either amend her complaint or to file a new lawsuit. Essentially, she argues that her ATFDA
claim in her original complaint is not void simply because she received a full hearing. We
disagree.
Evans’s original complaint filed September 11, 2019, was not legally operative to
appeal a decision that had not yet been made. Put another way, her complaint preceded the
cause of action. Evans has not cited persuasive authority supporting the proposition that her
obligation to file a timely complaint was fulfilled by way of this earlier claim.
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Accordingly, the court properly dismissed Evans’s claim as untimely.
Affirmed.
HARRISON, C.J., and BARRETT, J., agree.
Walker & Childs, PLLC, by: Shawn G. Childs, for appellant.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Khayyam M. Eddings, for appellee.
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