Lacee Isom v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children , 2022 Ark. App. 159 ( 2022 )


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  •                                  Cite as 
    2022 Ark. App. 159
    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION III
    No. CV-21-538
    LACEE ISOM                                      Opinion Delivered April   13, 2022
    APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
    COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
    V.                                              SMITH DISTRICT
    [NO. 66FJV-20-253]
    ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
    HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR      HONORABLE DIANNA HEWITT
    CHILDREN                      LADD, JUDGE
    APPELLEES
    AFFIRMED
    RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
    Appellant Lacee Isom appeals from the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s termination
    of her parental rights to her children, E.I. (DOB 04-02-13) and R.I. (DOB 04-03-14). On
    appeal, Isom argues that the termination order was not supported by sufficient evidence. She
    challenges only the circuit court’s best-interest finding.1 We affirm.
    On June 30, 2020, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“DHS”) exercised
    emergency custody of E.I. and R.I. due to inadequate supervision. Specifically, DHS alleged
    that Isom knowingly left the juveniles with an inappropriate babysitter; the juveniles were
    found walking on Highway 250 in Waldron, Arkansas, asking for rides from strangers. Prior
    1
    The juveniles’ father, Chad Isom, relinquished his parental rights on June 18, 2021,
    and never withdrew the relinquishment. Lacee Isom is the only party to this appeal.
    to this incident, the juveniles had been in foster care three times within the past five years.
    Following the juveniles’ removal, Isom visited the DHS office, refused a drug screen, and
    made such a scene that security had to escort her out of the DHS office.
    On July 6, 2020, DHS filed a petition for ex parte emergency custody and
    dependency-neglect of the juveniles, and on the same day, the circuit court entered an order
    granting DHS’s petition. Thereafter, the juveniles were placed in a relative foster home with
    their paternal grandparents. The following day, on July 7, the circuit court held a probable-
    cause hearing wherein it found that probable cause existed for the emergency order to remain
    in place.
    On September 29, the circuit court held an adjudication hearing. At this hearing, the
    circuit court adjudicated the juveniles dependent-neglected on the basis of neglect due to
    inadequate supervision. The circuit court also ordered that the case goal be reunification
    and that there be no contact between Isom and the juveniles’ foster-family placement.
    Additionally, the circuit court ordered Isom to maintain stable housing, employment, and
    transportation; to complete parenting and anger-management classes; to complete a drug-
    and-alcohol assessment and a psychological evaluation and follow the recommendations; and
    to submit to random drug screens and hair-follicle tests.
    On November 17, DHS filed a motion to suspend visits between Isom and the
    juveniles because of her frightening behavior. While being transported to one of her visits
    with the children, Isom repeatedly asked the DHS workers the following questions: “What
    keeps you safe from transporting parents like me?” and “What keeps you from worrying
    2
    about someone just grabbing the steering wheel and pulling it to the side of the road?”
    Following these comments––along with other erratic behavior from Isom––the DHS
    workers pulled over on the side of the road, called 911, and had a police officer handcuff
    Isom and transport her to Waldron.
    On December 15, the circuit court held a review hearing. At this hearing, the circuit
    court continued the goal of reunification and noted that Isom did not want visits with her
    children if she had to be transported by DHS. The circuit court further ordered Isom to
    resolve her legal issues and begin services provided by DHS.
    On April 27, 2021, the circuit court held another review hearing and continued the
    goal of reunification. Additionally, the circuit court found that Isom was not in compliance
    with the case plan and court orders and ordered Isom to not visit the juveniles outside of
    DHS supervision and to have no contact with them at their school or at their foster
    placement. On June 22, DHS filed a petition to terminate the Isoms’ parental rights. The
    circuit court held a hearing on the petition on August 10, and in an order entered September
    3, terminated all parental rights in this case. Isom now appeals.
    We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Heath v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
    Servs., 
    2019 Ark. App. 255
    , at 5–6, 
    576 S.W.3d 86
    , 88–89. We review for clear error, and a
    finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
    court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
    been made. 
    Id.
     A court may order termination of parental rights if it finds clear and
    convincing evidence to support one or more statutory grounds listed in the Juvenile Code,
    3
    Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2021), and that termination is
    in the best interest of the child, taking into consideration the likelihood of adoption and the
    potential harm to the health and safety of the child that would be caused by returning him
    or her to the custody of the parent. 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341
    (b)(3)(A).
    On appeal, Isom does not challenge the court’s finding that DHS proved grounds for
    termination.2 Her only argument for reversal relates to best interest. In making a best-interest
    determination, the circuit court must look at all the circumstances, including the potential
    harm of returning the children to their parents’ custody—specifically, the effect on the
    children’s health and safety; and it must consider the likelihood that the children will be
    adopted. 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341
    (b)(3).
    Isom also does not challenge the adoptability finding, so we address only the
    potential-harm prong of the circuit court’s best-interest finding. In assessing the potential-
    harm factor, the circuit court is not required to find that actual harm would result or to
    identify specific potential harm. Gonzalez v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 
    2018 Ark. App. 425
    , at
    12, 
    555 S.W.3d 915
    , 921. Additionally, evidence that supports the statutory grounds may
    also support a potential-harm finding. E.g., Cole v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 
    2020 Ark. App. 481
    , at 9–10, 
    611 S.W.3d 218
    , 223. Further, potential harm includes a child’s lack of
    2
    Because Isom does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination of her
    parental rights, she abandons any challenge to those findings on appeal. Davidson v. Ark.
    Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 
    2019 Ark. App. 402
    , 
    585 S.W.3d 738
    .
    4
    stability in a permanent home; a court may consider a parent’s past behavior as a predictor
    of future behavior. Gonzalez, 
    supra.
    In the case before us, the record is replete with evidence of potential harm. Isom
    essentially refused all court-ordered services throughout the case, she was arrested several
    times during the case, and she failed to maintain stable housing, transportation, and
    employment. E.g., Belt v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 
    2020 Ark. App. 315
    , at 9, 
    603 S.W.3d 203
    , 209 (“Here, both parents failed to fully comply with the court’s orders. Moreover,
    during the case, both parents were repeatedly arrested, and both failed to pay their fines,
    leaving them subject to future arrest.”); Jung v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 
    2014 Ark. App. 523
    ,
    at 6, 
    443 S.W.3d 555
    , 559 (“A parent’s lack of stable housing or employment can
    demonstrate potential harm to a child, as can a parent’s continued illegal-drug usage.”).
    On appeal, Isom maintains that the circuit court’s potential-harm finding was clearly
    erroneous because she had income, would soon have employment, and could pay child
    support. This argument is based solely on Isom’s own testimony, which the circuit court did
    not find credible. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court
    gives due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to assess the witnesses’ credibility.
    Gossett v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 
    2010 Ark. App. 240
    , 
    374 S.W.3d 205
    . Isom admitted
    that she was not ready to care for the children and that it would be in their best interest to
    terminate her parental rights and be adopted by the paternal grandparents. We cannot say
    the circuit court erred here.
    5
    Isom also argues that the circuit court’s entire best-interest finding was erroneous
    because there was a least-restrictive-alternative option available––placing the juveniles in the
    custody or guardianship of their paternal grandparents. However, this argument was never
    made to the circuit court, and we agree with DHS that the argument is not preserved. It is
    well established that if the argument is not made below, it is barred from being raised on
    appeal. See Cole, 
    2020 Ark. App. 481
    , 
    611 S.W.3d 218
    .
    Finally, Isom argues that the circuit court clearly erred because it failed to hold a
    permanency-planning hearing. However, like her relative-placement argument, this
    argument is also not preserved for our review. In the record before us, it appears the
    permanency-planning hearing was set for June 22, 2021, but was neither held nor continued.
    The same date, June 22, DHS filed its petition to terminate Isom’s parental rights. The next
    court date was the August 10 termination hearing. Isom never requested a permanency-
    planning hearing though she could––and for appellate purposes, should–––have requested
    one. Because she did not, the argument is not preserved for our review.
    However, we also note that the outcome of a permanency-planning hearing does not
    prevent the circuit court from ruling on a termination petition, and it also will not change
    the outcome of the circuit court’s final termination order. E.g., McKinney v. Ark. Dep’t of
    Hum. Servs., 
    2017 Ark. App. 475
    , at 16, 
    527 S.W.3d 778
    , 788–89 (“[T]his court agrees with
    DHS that there is no express remedy for such a failure in the juvenile code. When the
    legislature has not seen fit to fashion a remedy, it is not the province of the court of appeals
    to do so.”); 
    Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341
    (b)(1)(B). Accordingly, we affirm.
    6
    Affirmed.
    VIRDEN and MURPHY, JJ., agree.
    Tabitha McNulty, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
    Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
    Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.
    7
    

Document Info

Citation Numbers: 2022 Ark. App. 159

Filed Date: 4/13/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/13/2022