United States v. Freeman , 65 M.J. 451 ( 2008 )


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  •                          UNITED STATES, Appellee
    v.
    John S. FREEMAN, Senior Airman
    U.S. Air Force, Appellant
    No. 06-0833
    Crim. App. No. 35822
    United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
    Argued November 5, 2007
    Decided February 1, 2008
    STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
    C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
    Counsel
    For Appellant: Captain Vicki A. Belleau (argued); Lieutenant
    Colonel Mark R. Strickland and Captain John S. Fredland (on
    brief).
    For Appellee: Captain Brendon K. Tukey (argued); Colonel Gerald
    R. Bruce and Major Matthew S. Ward (on brief); Lieutenant
    Colonel Robert V. Combs.
    Military Judges:    Patrick M. Rosenow and Kurt D. Schuman
    THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
    We granted review to determine whether the military judge
    committed prejudicial error by failing to suppress Appellant’s
    confession, by denying the defense request for the appointment
    of a forensically-qualified expert consultant at government
    expense, and by admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct and
    bad character in violation of Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.)
    404(b).    We conclude the military judge did not commit
    prejudicial error and affirm the decision of the United States
    Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.
    I.   Facts
    Appellant met KS at a New Year’s Eve party on December 31,
    2001, and she moved in with Appellant the next day.   One month
    later, KS moved out.
    On February 6, 2002, KS spent the evening with friends, one
    female and three male, at her apartment.   During the evening, KS
    smoked marijuana and consumed fourteen to fifteen shots of
    alcohol.   She got sick at about 11:15 p.m., but rejoined the
    group for five minutes before leaving the room to lie down.     The
    last thing KS remembered before passing out was looking at the
    clock just after midnight.
    The only other woman at the apartment, Ms. Dawn Montoya,
    asked the men to leave, and locked two doors to the apartment;
    after awakening KS, Ms. Montoya observed KS appear to lock the
    2
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    front door.   Once in her car, Ms. Montoya waited five to ten
    minutes, until the men drove away, before she left.
    KS woke up in the shower with blood on her head, pain in
    her left hand, and the tip of her finger almost severed.    She
    recalled that light from a flashlight was blinding her and a man
    was telling her that she had twenty-four minutes to shower and
    then she was “going to die.”   At the time, she thought the
    person speaking to her was Private First Class (PFC) Bob Garmon,
    one of the friends she had been drinking with earlier that
    night.    KS fled to her neighbor’s house and was taken to the
    hospital.
    A physical examination at the hospital revealed KS had
    suffered a two-inch cut on her forehead, two black eyes, a
    broken nose, cuts on her head needing sutures, an amputated
    fingertip, bruises on her back and chest, abrasions on her
    forearms, other head injuries requiring staples, and significant
    blood loss.
    The next day, KS told the police and Ms. Montoya that three
    Hispanic men had broken into her house and raped her.     She
    identified PFC Garmon as a possible suspect.   KS never
    identified Appellant as being at her home on the night of the
    attack.
    A general court-martial with members convicted Appellant of
    making a false official statement and assault with a means or
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    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    force likely to cause death or grievous bodily injury.      Articles
    107 and 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
    10 U.S.C. §§ 907
    , 928 (2000).    The convening authority approved
    Appellant’s sentence to a dishonorable discharge, confinement
    for five years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
    reduction to the lowest enlisted grade.     The United States Air
    Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and
    sentence.   United States v. Freeman, ACM No. 35822, 
    2006 CCA LEXIS 160
    , 
    2006 WL 1976504
     (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jun. 13, 2006)
    (unpublished).
    II.   Admission of Evidence
    Appellant asserts that the military judge erred by
    admitting both uncharged misconduct and his involuntary
    confession into evidence.     We review a military judge’s decision
    to deny a motion to suppress evidence -- like other decisions to
    admit or exclude evidence -- for an abuse of discretion.     United
    States v. Ayala, 
    43 M.J. 296
    , 298 (C.A.A.F. 1995).     “Abuse of
    discretion” is a term of art applied to appellate review of the
    discretionary judgments of a trial court.     An abuse of
    discretion occurs when the trial court’s findings of fact are
    clearly erroneous or if the court’s decision is influenced by an
    erroneous view of the law.     See United States v. Rader, 
    65 M.J. 30
    , 32 (C.A.A.F. 2007).     “Further, the abuse of discretion
    standard of review recognizes that a judge has a range of
    4
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    choices and will not be reversed so long as the decision remains
    within that range.”   United States v. Gore, 
    60 M.J. 178
    , 187
    (C.A.A.F. 2004) (citing United States v. Wallace, 
    964 F.2d 1214
    ,
    1217 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
    A.   The Confession
    (1)       Law
    A confession is involuntary, and thus inadmissible, if it
    was obtained “in violation of the self-incrimination privilege
    or due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
    of the United States, Article 31, or through the use of
    coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement.”    M.R.E.
    304(a), (c)(3); see Article 31(d), UCMJ, 
    10 U.S.C. § 831
    (d)
    (2000).   The prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.
    United States v. Bubonics, 
    45 M.J. 93
     (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citing
    M.R.E. 304(e); United States v. D.F., 
    63 F.3d 671
    , 679 (7th Cir.
    1995)).   The voluntariness of a confession is a question of law
    that we review de novo.    Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    ,
    287 (1991); United States v. Bresnahan, 
    62 M.J. 137
    , 141
    (C.A.A.F. 2005).
    We examine “the totality of the surrounding circumstances”
    to determine “whether the confession is the product of an
    essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.”
    Bubonics, 45 M.J. at 95.
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    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    In determining whether a defendant’s will was over-
    borne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the
    totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both
    the characteristics of the accused and the details of
    the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into
    account have included the youth of the accused, e.g.,
    Haley v. Ohio, 
    332 U.S. 596
    ; his lack of education,
    e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 
    356 U.S. 560
    ; or his low
    intelligence, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 
    352 U.S. 191
    ;
    the lack of any advice to the accused of his
    constitutional rights, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina,
    
    384 U.S. 737
    ; the length of detention, e.g., Chambers
    v. Florida, supra; the repeated and prolonged nature
    of the questioning, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 
    322 U.S. 143
    ; and the use of physical punishment such as
    the deprivation of food or sleep, e.g., Reck v. Pate,
    
    367 U.S. 433
    . In all these cases, the Court
    determined the factual circumstances surrounding the
    confession, assessed the psychological impact on the
    accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how
    the accused reacted. Culombe v. Connecticut, supra,
    at 603.
    Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 226 (1973) (concerning
    voluntariness of consent to search) (footnote omitted); United
    States v. Ellis, 
    57 M.J. 375
    , 379 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (plurality
    opinion).
    If we find the confession involuntary, we must set aside
    the conviction unless we determine the error in admitting the
    confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   Fulminante,
    
    499 U.S. at 285
    .
    (2)   Discussion
    Appellant neither contests the military judge’s findings,
    nor asserts that he was not advised of his Article 31,
    UCMJ/M.R.E. 305 rights or that he did not knowingly and
    6
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    intelligently waive those rights.      Instead, Appellant avers that
    his confession was obtained by the interrogators’ “use of
    coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement,” Article
    31(d), UCMJ; M.R.E. 304(c)(3), and that the military judge
    incorrectly applied the law to the facts of this case.     He
    claims his will was overborne by the following:
    (1)   The length of the interview;
    (2)   The interrogators’ intimidation of Appellant by
    invading his personal space;
    (3)   The interrogators’ use of the following lies, threats,
    and promises:
    (a)   That they would tell Appellant’s commander
    whether or not he cooperated;
    (b)   That witness and fingerprint evidence
    contradicted his denials;
    (c)   That the sooner they completed the interrogation,
    the sooner everyone could go home and Appellant could
    get on with his life;
    (d)   That they would turn Appellant over to civilian
    authorities if he did not cooperate;
    (e)   That civilian punishment would be harsher,
    especially since the victim was a civilian; and
    (f)   That he would be sent to jail for a long time if
    he did not cooperate.
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    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    To determine the voluntariness of Appellant’s confession,
    we apply the two-part test from Schneckloth.
    (a) The characteristics of the accused favor a finding of
    voluntariness.
    The military judge found that Appellant was a twenty-three-
    year-old E-4 when he was first questioned by Special Agent (SA)
    James Bogle of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
    (AFOSI) on March 8, 2002.   Appellant was advised of his rights
    to counsel and to remain silent, and waived those rights.
    Appellant personally prepared a seven-page typed statement in
    which he revealed the nature of his relationship with KS, but
    denied any wrongdoing or knowledge of the attack.   Appellant
    also agreed to a polygraph examination.    Between the first
    interview and the March 21, 2002, polygraph examination,
    Appellant had thirteen days to seek counsel or decline further
    interviews.   He did not do so.   There was no evidence that he
    was not of average intelligence, had not completed high school,
    could not read and write, or was in any way mentally impaired.
    Appellant claimed he had six hours of sleep before reporting for
    the polygraph and denied any fatigue, hunger, thirst, or other
    problems.   He never complained about the process, never asked
    for an attorney, never asked to stop the interview or leave, or
    in any other way indicated that he felt coerced or pressured
    into making a statement.
    8
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    (b) The details of the interrogation, while less definitive,
    also favor a finding of voluntariness.
    At 9:06 a.m. on March 21, 2002, when Appellant presented
    himself at the AFOSI office for the polygraph examination, SA
    Steven Larson advised Appellant of his rights.    Appellant
    acknowledged those rights, waived them, and agreed to answer
    questions.   SA Larson explained a form consenting to a polygraph
    which contained an additional rights advisement.   Appellant
    waived his rights in writing and consented to the examination.
    During the pre-polygraph interview, which took
    approximately one hour, SA Larson advised Appellant of the
    procedures for administering the polygraph and requested
    personal, medical, and psychological information from Appellant.
    Appellant was then given a twenty-minute break.
    After the first test, which took thirty minutes (from 10:26
    a.m. to 10:58 a.m.), SA Larson gave Appellant a one-hour break
    so SA Larson could analyze the charts.   Appellant, permitted to
    leave the interview room, went outside and smoked.    When SA
    Larson returned, he informed Appellant that the results were
    “indiscernible” and he would have to retest.   Appellant agreed
    to a second exam which was conducted between 11:52 a.m. and
    12:16 p.m.   After the second polygraph exam, Appellant was given
    another break, until 12:45 p.m., while SA Larson reviewed the
    9
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    charts.   SA Larson concluded that Appellant was deceptive with
    regard to his denial of any knowledge of KS’s injuries.
    When the interview resumed at 12:45 p.m., SA Larson
    rearranged the furniture in the room so that Appellant was
    directly in front of him.   He told Appellant that the polygraph
    exam results indicated he had been deceptive.   Here, the
    interview turned into more of an interrogation, but SA Larson
    did not shout or curse at Appellant.   After an hour, there was a
    seven-minute break, during which time Appellant was given water.
    After the break, SA Bogle took over the questioning.    SA Bogle
    began by asking if Appellant understood he was still under
    rights advisement; Appellant responded affirmatively.   At 3:03
    p.m., they took another break.   SA Larson left and SA Scott Mann
    joined SA Bogle.   The interview continued from 3:40 p.m. until
    5:30 p.m. and then from 5:50 p.m. until 6:10 p.m.   At that time,
    SA Bogle left Appellant alone with a computer so he could type
    out his statement.   During the interrogation, SA Bogle raised
    his voice slightly above a conversational level only once.
    After he completed the statement, SA Bogle asked Appellant if he
    wanted to include the oral statements he had already made about
    the injuries shown in the photographs.   Appellant included it in
    his statement, which was completed at 7:30 p.m.
    10
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    During the interview, Appellant was offered food, water,
    and other beverages.   He accepted the offer of water but
    declined any food or other beverages.
    The military judge also found the following:
    Over the course of the interview, SA Bogle
    suggested to the accused that everyone makes mistakes
    and the best thing to do is admit it and get it behind
    you. He promised the accused that if he cooperated,
    they could tell his commander about it and it might
    help. On the other hand, he told the accused, if you
    don’t tell the truth, the case will go downtown and
    with a civilian victim you could get five years in
    jail. When the accused denied being out that night,
    SA Bogle lied to him and told him a witness saw him
    out. He also told the accused that his fingerprints
    were found at the scene.
    There has been considerable controversy over the treatment
    of threats and promises in assessing the voluntariness of a
    confession.   Before Fulminante was decided in 1991, a confession
    “‘obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,’”
    was not voluntary.   Bram v. United States, 
    168 U.S. 532
    , 542-43
    (1897) (quoting 3 H. Smith & A. Keep, Russell on Crimes and
    Misdemeanors 478 (6th ed. 1896)).    Thus, in Lynumn v. Illinois,
    
    372 U.S. 528
    , 534 (1963), the Supreme Court held that a
    confession was coerced when the defendant was told she could
    lose her welfare payments and the custody of her children, but
    if she cooperated the police would help her and recommend
    leniency.   The Court reiterated that a coerced confession
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    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    required reversal of the conviction even when there was
    sufficient other evidence to convict.   
    Id. at 537
    .
    Since Fulminante, however, promises are considered only a
    factor in the equation; they are not of themselves determinative
    of involuntariness.   See, e.g., United States v. Gaskin, 190 F.
    App’x 204, 206 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Jacobs, 
    431 F.3d 99
    , 109 (3d Cir. 2005).   Similarly, lies, threats, or
    inducements are not determinative either.   See, e.g., United
    States v. Mendoza, 
    85 F.3d 1347
    , 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1996)
    (holding that an investigator’s threat of immediate arrest if he
    did not cooperate did not overbear the accused’s will);
    Ledbetter v. Edwards, 
    35 F.3d 1062
    , 1069-70 (6th Cir. 1994)
    (holding that an investigator’s use of a series of psychological
    ploys, including lying about evidence, staging a phony
    identification, and showing charts and graphs allegedly linking
    the accused to the crime did not result in an involuntary
    confession); Welch v. Butler, 
    835 F.2d 92
    , 95 (5th Cir. 1988)
    (holding statements resulting from investigator’s three-hour
    prayer session did not make the accused’s confession
    involuntary).   After all, as the “Miranda rules were issued to
    counter-balance the psychological ploys used by police officials
    to obtain confessions,” the presence of those ploys could hardly
    be considered to per se result in an involuntary confession.
    United States v. Leiker, 
    37 M.J. 418
    , 420 (C.M.A. 1993).
    12
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    Appellant’s argument relies, to a great extent, on two
    cases:   United States v. Bubonics, 
    40 M.J. 734
     (N.M.C.M.R.
    1994), aff’d, 45 M.J. at 93, and United States v. Sennett, 
    42 M.J. 787
     (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).   In both cases, the lower
    court held that the prosecution failed to establish the
    voluntariness of the confession under a totality of the
    circumstances.   In Bubonics, investigators employed a good-
    guy/bad-guy technique and threatened the accused with arrest by
    local authorities unless he cooperated.    45 M.J. at 93.   One of
    the investigators “stormed into the room; vented his wrath;
    ‘yell[ed] at the accused that he didn’t have time for the
    accused, and that he could sign a warrant to have him arrested
    by the [local civilian police]’; and ‘slammed the door when he
    left the door way . . . .’”   Id. at 96.   The Judge Advocate
    General of the Navy certified the issue to this Court and, with
    little explanation, we adopted the lower court’s opinion on this
    issue.   Id.   In Sennett, the accused waived his rights and made
    a brief oral statement to investigators.   42 M.J. at 790.
    Investigators then confronted him with a “booking order” for a
    local civilian jail and “told [him] that a written statement was
    needed or he could ask for a lawyer and be taken to the county
    jail.”   Id.   After the accused made the written statement, the
    investigators delivered him to that civilian jail for
    13
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    incarceration without a warrant or a written agreement required
    by Navy regulations.   Id. at 789.
    We do not find these cases controlling in the context of
    this case.   As the application of the totality of circumstances
    standard rests with the particular facts of each case, a threat
    to turn an accused over to civilian law enforcement is but one
    factor to weigh.   We do not examine each of the facts separately
    but rather in conjunction with all the other facts in the case.
    Ellis, 57 M.J. at 379 (citing United States v. Martinez, 
    38 M.J. 82
    , 87 (C.M.A. 1993)).   Bubonics and Sennett offer little in the
    form of controlling precedent on how to weigh the facts in this
    particularly distinct situation.
    Our decision in Ellis is instructive.    In that case, the
    accused had confessed to abusing his child.   57 M.J. at 378.     We
    held that his confession was voluntary despite the detective’s
    warning that there was sufficient evidence to arrest both the
    accused and his wife for child abuse, potentially resulting in
    their other children being removed from their home and being
    placed in foster care.
    While the detectives’ advice to appellant
    concerning removing the remaining children from the
    home may have contributed to his confession, the mere
    existence of a causal connection does not transform
    appellant’s otherwise voluntary confession into an
    involuntary one. . . .
    Not only must we examine the circumstances
    surrounding the taking of the statement regarding what
    14
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    was done or said, but we must also examine what was
    not done or not said. There were no threats or
    physical abuse. The questioning did not continue for
    days; there was no incommunicado detention, and no
    isolation for a prolonged period of time.
    . . . .
    Viewing all the facts taken together, we agree
    with the Court of Criminal Appeals that they were not
    “so inherently coercive as to overcome the appellant’s
    will to resist.”
    Id. at 379 (citations omitted).
    In the instant case, the interrogation may have lasted
    almost ten hours, but Appellant had several breaks in which he
    left the interrogation room, went outside, and smoked.     He was
    provided water and declined offers for other food and drink.
    Admittedly, the agents lied to Appellant:     They claimed to have
    witnesses who saw him out that night and that his fingerprints
    had been found at the crime scene.     They advised him they would
    tell his commander whether he had cooperated and threatened to
    turn the case over to civilian authorities, where he would face
    stiffer punishment, if he did not cooperate.      But he was neither
    physically abused nor threatened with such abuse.     Although he
    made admissions to law enforcement agents before he prepared the
    written statement, he prepared the statement himself, outside
    the presence of any investigator.      Under the totality of the
    circumstances, Appellant’s confession was voluntary.
    15
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    B.   Uncharged Misconduct
    Over defense objection, the military judge admitted into
    evidence three alleged incidents of Appellant’s prior misconduct
    toward KS:   (1) grabbing KS by her purse and swinging her
    around; (2) following KS into a bathroom to finish an argument,
    at which point she slapped him to get him out of the bathroom;
    and (3) arguing and shoving each other over some french fries.
    The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals held that the military
    judge erred in selecting the particular reason for admitting the
    evidence and in providing a confusing instruction to the
    members.    Freeman, 
    2006 CCA LEXIS 160
     at *9-*10, 
    2006 WL 1976504
    at *4.   Nevertheless, the court concluded the error was
    harmless.    
    2006 CCA LEXIS 160
     at *9-*10, 
    2006 WL 1976504
     at *4-
    *5.
    Assuming the military judge erred in admitting the
    evidence, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the
    error was harmless.   The three acts are relatively minor and, in
    the context of the entire record, and in particular Appellant’s
    confession, we are convinced such error did not have a
    substantial influence on the members’ verdict.    United States v.
    Harrow, 
    65 M.J. 190
    , 200 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing Kotteakos v.
    United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 764-65 (1946)).
    16
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    III.   Expert Consultant
    A.   Facts
    Before trial, Appellant’s counsel asked the convening
    authority to appoint, at government expense, a defense
    confidential consultant in sociology, with a specialty in police
    interrogation techniques.   Appellant claimed he needed the
    assistance of an expert to analyze the oral and written
    statements purportedly made by Appellant, to assist in
    interviewing the AFOSI agents, to help formulate cross-
    examination questions, and to advise the defense on
    interrogation techniques.   He claimed this assistance was
    necessary to help counsel determine whether Appellant’s “rights
    were violated and whether such interrogation techniques
    overwhelmed SrA Freeman’s free will.”     He indicated that the
    expert might be called to testify about interrogation
    techniques, their purpose, and their potential coercive effect.
    The convening authority disapproved the request.
    At trial, the defense counsel renewed the request for an
    expert consultant in police interrogations but modified the
    reasons for the request.
    While the defense intends to raise the issue of
    whether or not the [sic] SrA Freeman’s “statement” was
    voluntary in another motion, the defense does not seek
    to focus the expert’s assistance on whether the
    statement is voluntary. The focus of the request is
    on interrogation techniques not SrA Freeman’s
    personality or compliant nature. . . . Nowhere in the
    17
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    listed duties is the expert requested to do
    “personality tests” on SrA Freeman to explore his
    tendency toward being compliant or over [sic]
    suggestible. Quite to the contrary, the request
    details duties consistent with a focus on the
    interrogation techniques used in this case. . . .
    Furthermore, we are not at this time requesting that
    this expert testify concerning his or her
    findings . . . .
    . . . .
    . . . This expertise is necessary for the
    defense team to determine the likelihood that SrA
    Freeman confessed to a crime he did not commit. . . .
    to reconstruct the interrogations, so the defense team
    can formulate an understanding as to why SrA Freeman
    made statements regarding a crime he did not commit.
    The military judge denied the motion.   He first explained
    the “science” of false confessions as follows:   “(1) the police
    already have incriminating evidence; (2) he’ll be convicted no
    matter what he does; and (3) cooperation and admission will lead
    to leniency; he is much more likely to tell interrogators what
    he thinks they want to hear.”   The military judge concluded that
    “none of the factors/practices identified [in an article] by Dr.
    Ofshe [one of the proponents of the theory] are particularly
    complex or counter-intuitive” and counsel “should require no
    expert assistance or testimony to elicit the pertinent facts and
    argue to the finder of fact why those facts make their client’s
    admissions to the [AF]OSI unreliable . . . .”
    On appeal before this Court, Appellant suggests he needed
    the expert assistance to challenge the admissibility as well as
    18
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    the reliability of the confession.        He focuses on the
    possibility that the expert would testify on the motion or on
    the merits.
    B.    Law
    “[S]ervicemembers are entitled to investigative or other
    expert assistance when necessary for an adequate defense.”
    United States v. Garries, 
    22 M.J. 288
    , 290 (C.M.A. 1986); accord
    Bresnahan, 
    62 M.J. at
    143 (citing United States v. Gunkle, 
    55 M.J. 26
    , 31 (C.A.A.F. 2001)).    The mere possibility of
    assistance is not sufficient to prevail on the request.
    Bresnahan, 
    62 M.J. at 143
    .   Instead, the accused has the burden
    of establishing that a reasonable probability exists that (1) an
    expert would be of assistance to the defense and (2) that denial
    of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair
    trial.   Gunkle, 55 M.J. at 31-32 (citing United States v.
    Robinson, 
    39 M.J. 83
    , 89 (C.M.A. 1994)).        To establish the first
    prong, the accused “must show (1) why the expert assistance is
    needed; (2) what the expert assistance would accomplish for the
    accused; and (3) why the defense counsel were unable to gather
    and present the evidence that the expert assistance would be
    able to develop.”   Bresnahan, 
    62 M.J. at 143
    .       We review the
    military judge’s decision for an abuse of discretion.         
    Id.
    19
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    C.   Discussion
    Appellant failed to establish the third part of the first
    prong of the test.   We will examine the parts separately.
    (1)   Why the expert assistance was needed:
    At trial, Appellant claimed that the expert assistance was
    needed because “[d]efense counsel does not possess the requisite
    knowledge or expertise in this area to ensure that the right
    questions are asked and the correct themes developed to paint a
    realistic picture of what happened during the interrogation and
    the tactics used by the interrogators.”
    (2) What the expert assistance would accomplish for the
    accused:
    At trial, the defense shifted the focus of the expert’s
    utility away from voluntariness of the confession to what
    happened during Appellant’s interrogation:
    While the defense intends to raise the issue of
    whether or not the [sic] SrA Freeman’s “statement” was
    voluntary in another motion, the defense does not seek
    to focus the expert’s assistance on whether the
    statement is voluntary. The focus of the request is
    on interrogation techniques not SrA Freeman’s
    personality or compliant nature. . . .
    . . . .
    . . . This expertise is necessary for the
    defense team to determine the likelihood that SrA
    Freeman confessed to a crime he did not commit. . . .
    to reconstruct the interrogations, so the defense team
    can formulate an understanding as to why SrA Freeman
    made statements regarding a crime he did not commit.
    20
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    The defense included in the motion a citation to an article by
    Dr. Richard Ofshe, which discussed the psychology behind
    interrogation techniques and how they could lead to false
    confessions.
    (3) Why the defense counsel were unable to gather and present
    the evidence that the expert assistance would be able to
    develop:
    At trial, Appellant claimed as follows:
    [T]he defense team does not possess the academic or
    practical experience to perform the necessary analysis
    the expert consultant would be able to perform.
    Reading the literature on the subject and interviewing
    the interrogators is not sufficient to ensure that SrA
    Freeman is able to present a defense in this
    area. . . . It is absolutely vital that an expert in
    the field be appointed to assist the defense in
    knowing which questions to ask and which areas to
    address during their interviews and cross examination.
    An expert who has vast experience in this area of
    science brings elements and abilities to the defense
    team that we can simply “not learn in books.”
    This is not the first time this issue has been before this
    Court.   In Bresnahan, the accused confessed to shaking his
    three-month-old baby in a manner that eventually caused death
    after being told that, in order to save the baby’s life, the
    doctors need to know exactly what he had done.   
    62 M.J. at 140
    .
    At trial, he asked for expert assistance to determine if his
    confession was unreliable because of the techniques employed by
    the interviewing detective.   
    Id. at 139
    .   We accepted arguendo
    that the expert “possessed knowledge and expertise in the area
    of police coercion beyond that of the defense counsel and that
    21
    United States v. Freeman, No. 06-0833/AF
    defense counsel could benefit from his assistance.”      
    Id. at 143
    .
    Nevertheless, we held that the military judge did not abuse his
    discretion in denying the defense request for expert assistance.
    
    Id.
       The defense counsel never established why they themselves
    were unable to gather and present any evidence that the expert
    would have been able to develop.     
    Id. at 143-44
    .
    We accept arguendo the consultant’s expertise.      Although it
    is by no means clear that the expert would add anything that
    could not be expected of experienced defense counsel, we also
    accept arguendo that Appellant’s counsel could benefit from the
    consultant’s assistance.   Nevertheless, we conclude that the
    military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the
    defense request for expert assistance because Appellant failed
    to establish the necessity for that assistance.       After all, what
    defense counsel really wanted was knowledge of interrogations
    that they could have obtained themselves.    They failed to
    establish why they were unable to gather the relevant
    information and cross-examine the investigators on their
    interrogation techniques and their use of those techniques in
    eliciting a confession.
    IV.
    The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
    Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
    22