United States v. Washington , 63 M.J. 418 ( 2006 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Keith B. WASHINGTON, Staff Sergeant
U. S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 05-0650
Crim. App. No. 200101011
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 19, 2006
Decided August 9, 2006
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GIERKE,
C.J., and CRAWFORD, EFFRON, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Richard H. McWilliams, JAGC, USNR
(argued); Captain James Valentine, USMC, and Lieutenant
Commander Jason S. Grover, JAGC, USN (on brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Mark H. Herrington, JAGC, USNR
(argued); Commander Charles N. Purnell, JAGC, USN (on brief);
Lieutenant Kathleen A. Helmann, JAGC, USNR.
Military Judge: A. W. Keller
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION.
United States v. Washington, No. 05-0650/MC
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was a Marine Corps staff sergeant stationed at the
Marine Corps Air Station in Cherry Point, North Carolina.
Contrary to his pleas, after a contested general court-martial
before members, he was convicted of carnal knowledge and
indecent acts with a child, in violation of Articles 120 and
134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920,
934 (2000). He was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for nine years and reduction to pay grade E-1. The
convening authority approved the adjudged sentence. The United
States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
United States v. Washington, 61 M.J. 574, 578 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 2005). Upon Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the
following two issues:
I. WHETHER LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO
PROVE THE OFFENSE OF CARNAL KNOWLEDGE.
II. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT A
MILITARY JUDGE MAY ADMINISTER AN OATH OF TRUTHFUL
TESTIMONY TO A CHILD AFTER THE TESTIMONY IS COMPLETE.
On Issue I, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, we conclude that the evidence was legally
sufficient. On Issue II, we conclude that in the context of
this case, Appellant was not materially prejudiced by the
failure to administer the oath in light of the corrective action
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taken. As a result, we affirm the decision of the United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the alleged offenses, Appellant and his
wife, Krystal, lived in on-base housing along with their
triplets, age five, and their daughter, C.B., age eight. At
Appellant’s court-martial, Krystal testified that around 9:30
a.m. on June 27, 1998, she left the house to buy breakfast for
the family at Hardee’s. She returned home a little before 10:00
a.m., and soon afterwards, made arrangements to drive her mother
to Georgia. Krystal intended to drive and spend the night in
Georgia with her mother and a friend, leave the children with
Appellant, and return home the following day. She discussed
child care arrangements with Appellant, and told C.B. to take a
bath. When Krystal and her mother left the house at about 10:30
a.m., Appellant was in bed wearing basketball shorts.
Krystal testified that not long after leaving the house,
she realized she forgot to pack a particular dress. She
returned home and tried to open the screen door. The screen
door was generally left unlocked, but upon her return, she found
it locked. She tapped on the window of the triplets’ room, and
all three came to the door and opened it. Krystal asked where
C.B. was, and the children told her she was “in the room with
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daddy.” Krystal walked into her bedroom to get the dress and
saw Appellant and C.B. in bed together.
Krystal testified that she became angry because she
believed C.B. had ignored her demand to take a bath. She asked
C.B., “[d]idn’t I tell you to take a bath?” When C.B. tried to
get out of bed, Appellant grabbed her and said, “[l]eave the
girl alone. She’s just laying here.” Krystal and Appellant
began to argue, and when Appellant continued to not let C.B. out
of bed, Krystal pulled hard on the bed covers. Before Appellant
could pull the covers back up, Krystal saw that he and C.B. were
“spooned into each other.” C.B.’s underwear and shorts were at
the foot of the bed, and Appellant was totally naked. Krystal
testified that Appellant had a partial erection in that “about-
to-lose-it stage.” She attempted to call the police, but
Appellant disconnected the phone and tried to restrain her,
telling her she was not going to “leave the house thinking
that’s what [she had seen].” Krystal hurriedly ordered all four
children, still in their night clothes and without shoes, into
her car and drove them six to eight hours to Georgia.
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DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant first challenges his conviction on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence to prove he committed
carnal knowledge on June 27, 1998. He argues the offense of
carnal knowledge requires proof of sexual penetration, and the
Government failed to introduce legally sufficient evidence
showing he engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with C.B.
An Article 120(b), UCMJ, violation for carnal knowledge
requires: (1) that the accused commit an act of sexual
intercourse; (2) with a person who is not the accused’s spouse;
and (3) who is under sixteen years old. “Penetration, however
slight, is sufficient to complete” the offense. Article 120
(c), UCMJ.
When determining whether the evidence was legally
sufficient to show an act of sexual intercourse on June 27, we
“‘view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution’” and decide whether “‘any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Brown, 55 M.J. 375, 385
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979)); United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A.
1987).
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At the court-martial, the specification for carnal
knowledge alleged that Appellant, did “on divers occasions,
between on or about 15 April 1998 and 27 June 1998, commit the
offense of carnal knowledge with [C.B.], a child under the age
of 12.” In light of Krystal’s testimony about discovering her
husband naked in bed with C.B. on June 27, the Government’s case
focused on the events of that day. The members found Appellant
guilty of carnal knowledge on June 27, but they did not find he
committed the offense on prior divers occasions. Appellant’s
central argument is that although C.B. testified about acts of
vaginal penetration prior to June 27, the members found him not
guilty of those acts, and therefore those same acts could not be
considered by either the members or the Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals when determining whether he committed carnal
knowledge on June 27. He argues that without the prior acts
evidence, there is insufficient evidence showing vaginal
penetration occurred on June 27.
For the reasons stated below, we disagree. First, the
Government offered some evidence showing vaginal penetration
occurred on June 27. Second, in light of the different
standards necessary to convict, as opposed to admit, other acts
evidence, the members and the lower court might appropriately
consider evidence of those prior divers acts for which Appellant
was found not guilty.
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Evidence Referring to Events on June 27
On the first day of her testimony, C.B. nodded
affirmatively when the Government asked whether Appellant had
“touched [her] private parts with his private part more than
once.” She testified, without reference to any specific day,
that Appellant put his private part “inside [her] private part,”
and that “white stuff” came out of his private part on her
belly. She also testified about the specific events on June 27,
and stated that after her mother left for Georgia, she sat on
her parents’ bed to watch television. After Appellant came in,
he took off their shorts, they got under the covers and “he
started rubbing on [her].”
The following day, the Government recalled C.B. She
reiterated her earlier testimony and also stated that the
penetration did not hurt because it was partial. Trial counsel
elicited the following testimony:
Q. But he did put his private part in your private
part, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn’t it hurt?
A. I don’t know.
Q. You don’t know? Did it go all the way inside
you?
A. No.
Q. Did it go inside you though?
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A. Yes.
. . . .
Q. Do you remember we talked about the one incident
that your mother walked in on you, right?
A. Yes.
. . . .
Q. Did your daddy touch you times before that,
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he also put his private part inside your
private part before that?
A. Yes.
Emphasis added. It is clear from this exchange that trial
counsel asked C.B. questions pertaining specifically to vaginal
penetration. Immediately on the heel of those questions, trial
counsel asked whether Appellant “also put his private part
inside [her] private part before” June 27. (emphasis added).
For sure, this testimony is subject to more than one
interpretation; however, viewing the testimony in the light most
favorable to the Government, a reasonable trier of fact could
infer that the word “also” was inclusive, and meant that acts of
penetration occurred not only before June 27, but also on June
27.
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Evidence of Prior Acts
Appellant also argues that because the members found him
not guilty of carnal knowledge on divers occasions before June
27, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in relying on evidence
regarding those divers acts in upholding the factual and legal
sufficiency of the charge to carnal knowledge on June 27.1
Appellant’s argument that those other acts cannot be
considered fails for two related reasons. First, the
admissibility of other acts evidence is governed by the Military
Rules of Evidence (M.R.E.), and not by the members’ verdict.
Second, Appellant is arguing, in essence, that a finding of not
guilty amounts to a finding of fact –- in this case a finding
that C.B.’s other acts testimony was false. However, a finding
of not guilty is not a finding of fact, but a determination that
the government has not proved all the elements of the charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Watts, 519
U.S. 148, 155 (1997); see also Dowling v. United States, 493
U.S. 342, 348 (1990).
1
In addressing legal and factual sufficiency, the Criminal Court
of Appeals opinion states inter alia:
A careful reading of the record of trial discloses that
sufficient evidence of each and every element of both
offenses was presented to the members through testimony and
other evidence adduced at trial. C.B. testified that the
appellant had touched her “private parts” on more than one
occasion prior to, or on the morning of, the alleged
incident. Washington, 61 M.J. at 577.
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Moreover, with respect to other acts evidence involving
child molestation and sexual assault, M.R.E. 413 and M.R.E. 414
are “intended to provide for more liberal admissibility of
character evidence in criminal cases.” Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, Analysis of the Military Rules of
Evidence app. 22 at A22-36 to A22-37 (2005 ed.) [hereinafter
Drafters’ Analysis]. Specifically, M.R.E. 414(a) provides that
“[i]n a court-martial in which the accused is charged with an
offense of child molestation, evidence of the accused’s
commission of one or more offenses of child molestation is
admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant.”
Before a court may submit evidence of prior charged or
uncharged acts to a jury, it must examine “the evidence in the
case and decide[] whether the jury could reasonably find the
conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.”
United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988); Dowling,
493 U.S. at 348-50. This Court in United States v. Reynolds, 29
M.J. 105, 109 (C.M.A. 1989), while not citing Huddleston, set
forth a “three-prong test [] consistent with Huddleston” to
govern the admissibility of other acts evidence. United States
v. McDonald, 59 M.J. 426, 429 (C.A.A.F. 2004). Although
Reynolds dealt with evidence of uncharged misconduct, its three-
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prong test can apply to evidence of charged misconduct.2 The
test contains the following elements:
1. Does the evidence reasonably support a
finding by the court members that the appellant
committed prior crimes, wrongs or acts?
2. What “fact . . . of consequence” is made
“more” or “less probable” by the existence of
this evidence?
3. Is the “probative value . . . substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”?
Reynolds, 29 M.J. at 109 (citations omitted).
Applying the first prong of the Reynolds analysis to the
facts of this case, we conclude that a jury could reasonably
find that the prior acts occurred. C.B. testified consistently
for over two days that her father had on multiple occasions
before June 27 “put his private part inside [her] private part.”
What distinguishes these other acts from the acts committed on
June 27 is the quantum of evidence offered to prove them, not
the reliability of C.B.’s testimony. The focus of the
Government’s case was on the acts occurring on June 27, not the
other acts, for it was on June 27 that C.B.’s mother discovered
2
In Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689, the Supreme Court concluded
that evidence of uncharged acts is admissible if the jury can
reasonably conclude that the other acts occurred and that the
defendant was the actor. The Supreme Court has applied the
Huddleston analysis to evidence of prior charged acts. See
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348-50; Watts, 519 U.S. at 156 (quoting
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 349). Because Reynolds is consistent with
Huddleston, the Reynolds test also applies to prior charged
acts.
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Appellant in bed with C.B. and her testimony could support
C.B.’s.
As for the second Reynolds prong, evidence is relevant
under M.R.E. 401 when it has “any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” M.R.E. 401; United States v. Berry, 61 M.J. 91,
95 (C.A.A.F. 2005). In this case, evidence that Appellant may
have engaged in the near identical acts with his daughter in the
months prior to June 27 is relevant to the determination of
whether Appellant engaged in similar conduct on June 27.
Applying the M.R.E. 403 balancing test for the third
Reynolds prong, the probative value of this evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It
was integral to the charged conduct, integral to C.B.’s
testimony regarding the events of June 27, and consistent in
detail and tenor with the evidence regarding June 27.
Because the members could reasonably find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the other prior acts
occurred, and the other acts evidence is logically and legally
relevant, the members and lower court could properly consider
evidence of carnal knowledge committed before June 27.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, including C.B.’s testimony, the evidence that
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Appellant was found naked in bed “spooning” C.B. with a partial
erection, and the evidence of carnal knowledge committed before
June 27, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that carnal knowledge occurred
on June 27.
B. Administration of the Oath After Testimony
We now turn to Appellant’s second claim that his conviction
and sentence should be set aside because the witness oath was
administered to C.B. after her first day of testimony was
complete.
The first day C.B. was called to testify, trial counsel
asked her a series of questions about whether she knew the
meaning of telling the truth, and the difference between telling
the truth and telling a lie. The following exchange took place:
Q. Do you know what the truth is?
A. Yes
Q. What is the truth?
A. Telling what really happened.
Q. If I told you –- what is a lie? Do you know what a
lie is? Tell me what a lie is?
A. Not telling the truth.
Q. Not telling the truth. So if I told you the sky was
purple right now, what would that be?
A. A lie.
Q. That would be a lie, right?
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At this point, the military judge interrupted the exchange to
ask trial counsel to stand a little further from C.B. so that
she would speak in a louder voice. After the interruption,
trial counsel commenced with C.B.’s direct examination without
administering the witness oath. At the end of the direct
examination, consisting of nine pages in the record, trial
counsel asked C.B. the following:
Q. Why did you say what you said today?
A. Telling the truth.
Q. You swore that everything you said today was the
truth, correct?
A. Yes.
At this point, trial counsel told the military judge there
was nothing further, but also stated that “[t]he only thing,
sir, if you require me to swear her in, I will. I think we have
pretty much covered it, sir. I didn’t officially do it.” Trial
counsel then engaged in the following exchange with C.B.:
Q. [C.B.], your testimony today, was it the truth?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it the whole truth?
A. Yes.
A. Was it nothing but the truth?
Q. Yes.
A. So help you God?
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Q. Yes.
The following day C.B. was recalled to testify. On
redirect, trial counsel asked whether C.B. remembered that it
was important to tell the truth. C.B. stated that she
remembered and testified that she had told the truth the
previous day. Defense counsel did not object to the failure to
formally swear in C.B. at the beginning of her first day of
testimony, at the close of her testimony, or at the outset of
her testimony on the second day of trial.
M.R.E. 603 provides: “Before testifying, every witness
shall be required to declare that the witness will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken the witness’s conscience and impress the
witness’s mind with the duty to do so.” M.R.E. 603 “requires
that a witness swear or affirm that he will tell the truth,” but
it “establishes no specific colloquy to be used in carrying out
this requirement. Any process that is sufficient to ‘awaken the
witness’s conscience . . .’ is satisfactory.” United States v.
Allen, 13 M.J. 597, 599 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (quoting Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Lee D. Schinasi & David A. Schlueter, Military Rules
of Evidence Manual 276 (1981)). As stated in the Drafters’
Analysis, M.R.E. 603 is taken without change from the Fed. R.
Evid. 603. Drafters’ Analysis app. 22 at A22-45. The Notes of
Advisory Committee on Rules for Fed. R. Evid. 603, states that
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“[t]he rule is designed to afford the flexibility required in
dealing with . . . children” and that “[a]ffirmation is simply a
solemn undertaking to tell the truth . . . .” As with the Fed.
R. Evid. 603, M.R.E. 603 requires no special verbal formula, but
instead requires that the oath be meaningful to the witness,
including a child witness, and impress upon the witness the duty
to tell the truth. See Allen, 13 M.J. at 599-601; see Spigarolo
v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1991) (“When children
testify, the trial court may fashion an oath or affirmation that
is meaningful to the witness.”).
Because Appellant did not object to the failure of trial
counsel to place C.B. under oath, Appellant waived the issue
absent plain error.3 United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 112
(4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 51 (2d
Cir. 1999); see United States v. Powell, 49 M.J. 460, 465
(C.A.A.F. 1998) (in absence of objection, plain error analysis
applies). In this context, the rationale for applying waiver is
twofold: “First, the defect or failure could have been
corrected if a timely objection had been made; second, in the
absence of a waiver rule counsel might deliberately avoid
3
We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals
that whether Appellant’s absence of objection is considered
waiver or forfeiture, the appropriate standard of review is one
of plain error. Washington, 61 M.J. at 576 n.1. Therefore, we
need not and do not address the distinction between forfeiture
and waiver in this case.
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objecting to a witness being unsworn in order to have a ground
of appeal.” Odum, 736 F.2d at 115. Under our plain error
analysis, Appellant must show that there was error, the error
was plain or obvious, and that the error materially prejudiced
his substantial rights. Powell, 49 M.J. at 463-65.
There is no doubt that the failure to administer the oath
before C.B.’s testimony was error, and that the error was
obvious. The plain text of M.R.E. 603 required C.B., by oath or
affirmation, to declare that she would testify truthfully
“before testifying.” The initial colloquy between C.B. and
trial counsel fell short of this requirement. However,
Appellant’s claim fails because he cannot show he was materially
prejudiced by the error.
Trial counsel asked if C.B. knew the difference between the
truth and a lie, and C.B. indicated that she understood. At the
end of her testimony, C.B. stated that she had told the “whole
truth” and “nothing but the truth.” She then swore that
everything she said had been the truth. When C.B. was recalled,
she also stated that she only told the truth the previous day.
Although the colloquy between trial counsel and C.B. was not a
formal oath or affirmation, C.B. demonstrated she understood her
duty to tell the truth. In short, consistent with the purpose
of M.R.E. 603, but not its temporal requirement, the record of
trial reveals that C.B. was alert to the necessity of telling
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the truth both at the beginning of her testimony and at the
outset of the second day of her testimony.
Appellant counters that while C.B. may have been aware of
her obligation to tell the truth, she was not aware of the
consequences of failing to do so, a requirement Appellant
derives from the language of M.R.E. 603 regarding “duty” and the
general knowledge possessed by most adults that those who lie on
the witness stand may be subject to perjury. In addressing this
argument, we need not reach beyond the confines of this case.
The law is clear, both in the text of M.R.E. 603 and its
analysis, and in federal circuit case law. A particular formula
is not required in administering an oath or affirmation,
although adherence to the benchbook formula will minimize
dispute. This is particularly true in the case of children,
where oaths and affirmations may be specially tailored to
impress on the particular child the importance of telling the
truth. This can be accomplished, as it has been accomplished
for many years, without imparting to the child the perils of
perjury.
For these reasons, Appellant has not shown that the error
prejudiced his substantial rights.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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