United States v. Elfayoumi , 66 M.J. 354 ( 2008 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Ahmed M. ELFAYOUMI, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 07-0346
Crim. App. No. 20010415
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 26, 2008
Decided June 4, 2008
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and STUCKY, J., joined. ERDMANN, J., filed a separate
dissenting opinion in which RYAN, J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Frank J. Spinner, Esq. (argued); Major Teresa L.
Raymond (on brief); Major Sean F. Mangan and Captain Tyeshe
Elizabeth Lowery.
For Appellee: Captain Michael G. Pond (argued); Major Elizabeth
G. Marotta and Captain Michael C. Friess (on brief); Captain
Andrew C. Baum.
Military Judge: James L. Pohl
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Elfayoumi, No. 07-0346/AR
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
At a court-martial composed of members, Appellant was
convicted, contrary to his pleas, of forcible sodomy, assault
and battery upon a military prison guard and three
specifications of indecent assault in violation of Articles 125,
128, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§§ 925, 928, 934 (2000), respectively. The adjudged and
approved sentence included a dishonorable discharge, confinement
for fifteen years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
reduction in grade to E-1. The United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed. United States v. Elfayoumi, No. ARMY
20010415 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Jan 18, 2007) (unpublished). The
question presented is whether a member, having expressed a view
that homosexuality and pornography were “morally wrong,” should
have been excused on the basis of implied bias. We conclude the
military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the
challenge for cause and affirm.
BACKGROUND
During general voir dire Major (MAJ) G stated that he had
moral and religious objections to homosexuality. In addition,
during individual voir dire he responded to the military judge’s
questions in the following manner:
MJ: Earlier you indicated you had some strong objections
to homosexuality?
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MEM: That is correct, sir.
MJ: Could you explain a little bit about that.
MEM: I feel that it is morally wrong. It is against what
I believe as a Christian and I do have some strong
opinions against it.
MJ: You notice[] on the [charge sheet] that the word
“homosexual” is not there?
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: But there are male on male sexual touchings alleged.1
MEM: Yes, sir.
1
The relevant portions of the offenses to which the military
judge was referring read as follows:
Charge: I VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 125
SPECIFICATION: In that [Appellant] . . . did . . . commit
sodomy with Private Mark [H] by force and without the
consent of the said Private Mark [H].
. . . .
Charge: III VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 134
SPECIFICATION 1: In that [Appellant] . . . did . . .
commit an indecent assault upon Alexander [G] . . . by
rubbing his hand against the leg and private parts of
Alexander [G] . . . .
. . . .
SPECIFICATION 3: In that [Appellant] . . . did . . .
commit an indecent assault upon Charles [N] . . . by
massaging his shoulders and attempting to massage his groin
area . . . .
SPECIFICATION 4: In that [Appellant] . . . did . . .
commit an indecent assault upon Keith [B] . . . by placing
his hand on Keith [B]’s inner thigh . . . .
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MJ: Do you think, with your moral beliefs that you can
fairly evaluate the evidence of this case given the
nature of the allegations?
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: Let’s say we get to sentencing and the accused is
convicted of some or all of the [offenses] . . . .
Let’s talk about these offenses involving indecent
assault and the forcible sodomy. If it got to that
point in the trial and the accused was convicted of
some or all of those offenses, do you think you could
fairly consider the full range of punishments?
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: Do you think you could honestly consider not
discharging the accused even with that kind of
conviction?
MEM: I would have a hard time with that, sir.
MJ: Could you consider it though?
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: After hearing the entire case, you wouldn’t
[categorically] exclude that?
MEM: No, sir.
MJ: Now understanding there may be administrative[]
consequences and we all know those, but as a court
member, that’s not your concern. Do you understand
that?
MEM: Yes, sir.
On the question of pornography, MAJ G responded:
[DC:] In response to one of the questions, you stated
that you had a moral aversion to pornography.
[Mem:] Yes, I believe it is wrong also.
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[DC:] Would you consider someone who possessed or used
pornography more likely to commit an immoral act
. . . just because they have possessed that?
[MEM:] No.
[DC:] What about an act that you might perceive to be
sexually immoral?
{MEM:] If I knew someone who watched pornography, are
they more apt to do a sexual act that I consider
to be immoral?
[DC:] Yes, sir.
[MEM:] Does that make them immoral, no.
Based on these responses, Appellant argues that MAJ G should
have been removed for cause based on implied bias. According to
Appellant, “[r]egardless of the court member responses in this
case, there is a widespread view” among the public that the
military, generally, is biased against homosexuals serving in
the military. According to Appellant, it follows that when a
member expresses strongly held views against homosexuality in a
case where “the evidence is so closely connected to allegations
of homosexual behavior,” it puts “too much of a strain on the
military justice system” to allow such a member to sit. With
respect to MAJ G’s views on pornography, Appellant argues, MAJ G
exhibited an inelastic attitude, which prejudged the punitive
outcome.
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DISCUSSION
“‘As a matter of due process, an accused has a
constitutional right, as well as a regulatory right, to a fair
and impartial panel.’” United States v. Downing, 56 M.J. 419,
421 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted); United States v. Moreno,
63 M.J. 129, 132 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 912(f)(1)(N) requires an excusal for cause where it
appears an individual “[s]hould not sit as a member in the
interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt
as to legality, fairness, and impartiality.” This rule
encompasses challenges based upon both actual and implied bias.
United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274, 276 (C.A.A.F. 2007); see
United States v. Ai, 49 M.J. 1, 4-5 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Implied
bias exists when most people in the same position as the court
member would be prejudiced. United States v. Napolitano, 53
M.J. 162, 167 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Warden, 51 M.J.
78, 81 (C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Daulton, 45 M.J. 212,
217 (C.A.A.F. 1996). To test whether there is substantial doubt
about the fairness of the trial, we evaluate implied bias
objectively, “‘through the eyes of the public,’” reviewing “‘the
perception or appearance of fairness of the military justice
system.’” United States v. Townsend, 65 M.J. 460, 463 (C.A.A.F.
2008) (quoting United States v. Schlamer, 52 M.J. 80, 92-93
(C.A.A.F. 1999); United States v. Dale, 42 M.J. 384, 386
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(C.A.A.F. 1995)). This review is based on the “totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Terry, 64 M.J. 295, 302
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Although we review issues of implied bias for an abuse of
discretion, because we apply an objective test, we apply a less
deferential standard than we would when reviewing a claim of
actual bias. United States v. Armstrong, 54 M.J. 51, 54
(C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Napoleon, 46 M.J. 279, 283
(C.A.A.F. 1997).
As Appellant notes, the question of homosexuality and
military service may evoke strongly held moral, legal, and
religious views. The range and depth of these views is
reflected in debate over those personnel policies identified by
the rubric “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” These personnel policies,
like the military criminal code, are set in law by the political
branches –- the Congress and the Executive.
The duty of judges is to uphold the law in constitutional
context. This includes the constitutional and statutory duty to
ensure that an accused receives a fair trial. That means, among
other things, that where a court-martial is conducted with
members, deliberations will be based on the four corners of the
law and not the personal views of members. To accomplish this
end, the military judge has a number of tools, including the
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authority to oversee and conduct voir dire and to instruct
members on the law and their deliberations.
In this case, the military judge used those tools. Faced
with MAJ G’s initial statements expressing a moral and religious
objection to homosexuality as well as pornography, the military
judge tested for personal bias that might manifest itself during
the members’ deliberations, regardless of the military judge’s
instructions on the law. Among other things, the military judge
disaggregated the question of homosexuality from the charged
criminal conduct at issue –- forcible sodomy. The military
judge also permitted defense counsel to question MAJ G and did
not restrict that questioning. MAJ G’s answers to defense
counsel’s questions about his views on pornography revealed that
MAJ G could distinguish between that which he might find immoral
and that which the law might deem criminal. Further, defense
counsel was permitted to ask questions, and there is no
indication that defense counsel was precluded from asking any
additional questions.
As a general matter, moral or religious views are not per
se disqualifying where a member otherwise demonstrates a
capacity to hear a case based on the four corners of the law and
as instructed by the military judge. But recognizing the human
condition, the law gives a military judge the added flexibility,
and duty, to err on the side of caution where there is
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substantial doubt as to the fairness of having a member sit.
Thus, the military judge need not impugn the integrity or values
of a member in finding actual bias, but can in context rely on
the implied bias/liberal grant doctrine if substantial doubt
arises that a member can put his or her views aside.
It would not be unusual for members to have strongly held
views about lawful conduct involving sex or pornography.
Indeed, in today’s society it will be hard to find a member who
does not hold such views, one way or another. So too, a member
might have a strongly held view about unlawful conduct --
murder, shoplifting, forcible sodomy, etc. We expect that most,
if not all members, would. Also, we surmise that most members
would have a natural propensity to be either lenient or punitive
depending on their personal views on these subjects. The law
anticipates this human condition. Thus, the question is not
whether they have views about certain kinds of conduct and
inclinations regarding punishment, but whether they can put
their views aside and judge each particular case on its own
merits and the law, such that appellate courts, in applying
R.C.M. 912, are not left in substantial doubt as to the fairness
or impartiality of the members. Here, because the military
judge specifically questioned MAJ G on his ability to separate
his personal views from the facts of the case, and in light of
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MAJ G’s responses, we conclude that the military judge did not
abuse his discretion in denying the challenge for cause.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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ERDMANN, Judge, with whom RYAN, Judge, joins (dissenting):
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 912 encompasses challenges
based upon both actual bias and implied bias. United States v.
Clay, 64 M.J. 274, 276 (C.A.A.F. 2007); United States v. Ai, 49
M.J. 1, 4-5 (C.A.A.F. 1998). R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N) provides a
challenge for implied bias where it appears an individual
“[s]hould not sit as a member in the interest of having the
court-martial free from substantial doubt as to legality,
fairness, and impartiality.” The focus of a challenge for
implied bias is upon “the perception or appearance of fairness
of the military justice system” as viewed objectively “through
the eyes of the public.” United States v. Schlamer, 52 M.J. 80,
93 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Dale, 42 M.J. 384, 386 (C.A.A.F. 1995). As I
noted in United States v. Townsend, 65 M.J. 460, 463 (C.A.A.F.
2008): “Our inquiry is to determine whether the risk that the
public will perceive that the accused received something less
than a court of fair, impartial members is too high.” I
conclude that a reasonable member of the public would have
serious doubts about the fairness of Elfayoumi’s trial with
Major (MAJ) G sitting on the panel.
Religious, moral, and personal beliefs are relevant
considerations in determining whether an individual should serve
as a juror or court member. “The right to examine jurors on the
United States v. Elfayoumi, No. 07-0346/AR
voir dire as to the existence of a disqualifying state of mind,
has been upheld . . . in relation to religious and other
prejudices of a serious character.” Aldridge v. United States,
283 U.S. 308, 313 (1931). If moral or religious principles are
so strong that they will not yield and permit a potential member
to adjudicate the case without violating those principles, there
is cause to excuse that member. See United States v. Decoud,
456 F.3d 996, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Geffrard,
87 F.3d 448, 451-52 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hoffman,
806 F.2d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1986). It follows that if moral or
religious conviction can serve to disqualify a member, those
same traits can also create a perception of unfairness in the
eyes of the public when those traits may prejudice a member’s
adjudication of the case or that member’s view of the accused.
The charges in this case and the evidence ultimately
presented leave no question that homosexual conduct and
pornography were at the core of the case. MAJ G left no doubt
about his views and aversions to both. He stated without
qualification that: he had “religious or other strong
objections to homosexuality”; he had a “religious or moral
aversion to pornography”; he felt that “a person who possesses
pornographic material is immoral”; he had “Christian” feelings
that homosexuality was morally wrong; he held strong opinions
against homosexuality; he would have a “hard time” not
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considering a discharge on sentencing; and he believed
pornography was “wrong.” In light of these unwavering
responses, a reasonable observer could conclude that MAJ G’s
“strong,” “moral” and “Christian” beliefs would influence his
adjudication of the offenses and his perception of Elfayoumi
who: inferentially was homosexual; rented and viewed
pornographic materials; touched another male while viewing
pornography; indecently touched three other males at distinct
times; and committed forcible sodomy upon a male who refused his
sexual advances.
The military judge did engage MAJ G in questioning about
his beliefs and convictions and he did obtain an assurance from
MAJ G that he could follow the law as given by the military
judge. However, review for implied bias is undertaken “despite
a disclaimer.” Townsend, 65 M.J. at 463. In addition, the
military judge’s ruling does not reflect that he considered the
liberal grant mandate. Where a military judge does not indicate
on the record that he has considered the liberal grant mandate
in ruling on a challenge, we will accord that decision less
deference during our review of the ruling. See Clay, 64 M.J. at
277; United States v. Hollings, 65 M.J. 116, 119 (C.A.A.F.
2007); United States v. Terry, 64 M.J. 295, 296 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
Under the circumstances of this case, I conclude there was
a substantial risk that the public would feel that this trial
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was not conducted with a fair and impartial panel. This is the
type of case in which the military judge should have applied the
liberal grant mandate and utilized the “added flexibility, and
duty, to err on the side of caution where there is substantial
doubt as to the fairness of having [MAJ G] sit.” United States
v. Elfayoumi, __ M.J. __ (8-9) (C.A.A.F. 2008). I therefore
dissent.
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