United States v. Gorence , 61 M.J. 171 ( 2005 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Thomas M. GORENCE, Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 04-0607
Crim. App. No. S30296
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 1, 2005
Decided June 21, 2005
CRAWFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and EFFRON and BAKER, JJ., joined. ERDMANN, J.,
filed a separate opinion concurring in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain David P. Bennett (argued); Colonel
Carlos L. McDade, Major Terry L. McElyea, and Major James M.
Winner (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Michelle M. Lindo (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Gary F. Spencer and Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs
(on brief).
Military Judge: Patrick M. Rosenow
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Gorence, No. 04-0607/AF
Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
At a special court-martial, a military judge alone
convicted Appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of a single use of
cocaine in violation of Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 912a (2000). The convening
authority approved the sentence of a bad-conduct discharge,
three months of confinement, and reduction to the lowest
enlisted grade. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
findings and sentence. We granted review of the following
issues on November 18, 2004:
I. WHETHER THE AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
IMPROPERLY CONDUCTED ITS APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER
ARTICLE 66(c), UCMJ, BY CONSIDERING EVIDENCE
OUTSIDE THE RECORD IN VIOLATION OF UNITED STATES
v. HOLT, 58 M.J. 227 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
II. WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
BY PERMITTING THE TRIAL COUNSEL TO ELICIT
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE APPELLANT’S PRE-
SERVICE DRUG USE FROM THE APPELLANT’S MOTHER TO
“REBUT” MATTERS TO WHICH THE MILITARY JUDGE
HIMSELF “OPENED THE DOOR.”
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of
the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. If there
was error, it was harmless.
FACTS
During sentencing, the prosecutor offered evidence from
Appellant’s personnel record reflecting three disciplinary
infractions during his seventeen months of military service:
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(1) consumption of alcoholic beverages while under the age of
twenty-one on August 18, 2002; (2) failure to obtain a medical
evaluation on July 8, 2002; and (3) failure to report to duty on
August 7, 2002. The prosecutor also offered a detailed
confession to the use of cocaine that occurred between August 14
and August 22, 2002, and called the interrogator, who discussed
the circumstances of Appellant’s confession.
In addition to his unsworn statement, Appellant offered
several documents from family friends, coworkers, and
supervisors attesting to his rehabilitative potential. His
mother also testified as to Appellant’s interests and
upbringing. When asked by defense counsel about rehabilitative
potential, she replied that her son was not a malicious person
and that his cocaine use was an “error in judgment” from which
he could learn. “[H]e has a lot of integrity . . . and he is
honest . . . . But . . . he’s 19, and teenagers make –- have
some poor judgments [sic] in things because they feel that they
–- they have their whole life, that they are really invincible
and that it won’t really matter this time.” She also recognized
that her son had made mistakes. Defense counsel inquired
further, “But with your son, does he learn from his mistakes?”
She responded, “[H]e always has learned from his mistakes.”
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At the conclusion of her direct examination, there was no
cross-examination by the prosecutor. However, the military
judge began the following colloquy:
Q: [Y]ou had no concerns about the people he was
hanging around with?
A: Not normally, no. Every once in a while, you know,
somebody would do something stupid, and I would say,
you know, guys, get it together, because I’ll call you
on it. Right?
Q: Right. I’m trying to figure out --
A: He didn’t hang out with the jocks, and he didn’t
hang out with the computer geeks. He’s always been
somewhat of a loner . . . .
Q: Okay. Because at least from the evidence I’ve got
so far, it appears the folks that he was hanging out
here with . . . weren’t doing him any favors.
A: No. And that was --
Q: And that’s one concern I have if [he] comes back to
you. I mean, did he have a history of kind of hanging
out with those folks, or maybe it was just because he
was here in San Antonio and didn’t really know anybody
else?
A: I have a feeling that was probably the case.
Q: And did you have any concerns from his prior
history of any sort of substance problems as far as
alcohol beyond I guess what you would normally expect
of high school kids?
A: Nothing beyond what normal high school kids get
involved with, no.
Upon completion of the military judge’s questioning, the
trial counsel posed the following question:
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Q: Do you know if your son ever used marijuana while
he was in high school?
A: He probably --
DC [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. This is
going into uncharged misconduct.
MJ [Military Judge]: Well, the problem is you’ve got
the judge asking questions and I -- you know, I was
mostly thinking about alcohol as much as anything
else. I didn’t realize I was wandering into uncharged
misconduct territory. Probably that would have been
the better place for you to object there when I said,
you know --.
I tell you what, I’m going to overrule the objection,
but only to the extent -- and you can rest assured,
I’m not going to consider it for any uncharged
misconduct purposes. But to the extent it would only
weigh to rebut the question I asked. Okay. So I
asked -- I asked the question about did you have any -
- have any reason to suspect the history of any sort
of substance abuse. And, you know, there wasn’t any
objection to that. I certainly had no reason to know
what the answer was going to be . . . .
[M]y suspicion is the witness is going to say no,
because that’s what she told me, but I’ll go ahead and
allow you to ask the question. But, it’s a bench
trial, you don’t have to worry about non 403-type
[sic] uses. I’m only going to use -- if I consider it
at all, and it will depend on the answer, it will be
for a very limited purpose which I’ll put on the
record.
Go ahead.
[Trial Counsel (TC)]: Ma’am, again, do you know or
are you aware that your son ever used marijuana?
A: I believe he tried it at some point because he’s a
normal high school kid. You know, but as far as
continual use or -- no. No. Would he have at a
party? Let me just put it this way: At every single
high school party that I have known of in the last 20,
30 years, it has been there.
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Emphasis added.
On redirect examination, defense counsel asked:
Q: Just one clarification.
A: Uh-huh.
Q: You just said you’ve been to parties, too?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Is this any time soon or is this back when you
were in high school?
A: Oh. High school, college. Yeah, there is -– not
recently. Actually, I don’t go to too many parties
anymore. But it is -– it is part of the culture.
It’s there. Whether or not your intention is to use
when you go to a party, there is always the
possibility that it is there, you know. And I’d be
silly to say, no, it’s not.
DC: Nothing further.
MJ: Just so the record is clear, my ruling is that
the defense objection is overruled. I opened the door
with my question. But what I’m taking it as that
you’re telling me is that it was experimentation at a
party-type environment in high school and that’s it.
[Witness]: I would assume. I would assume, based on
where we are today.
MJ: That’s fine. And, clearly, I’m not going to impose
any other punishment for an experimental use in high
school. But I will consider it in the context of
everything else.
Emphasis added.
After announcing his sentence, the military judge noted
that Appellant was an “ideal” candidate for the Air Force
Return-to-Duty Program, a rehabilitation program that allows
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convicted airmen to return to duty upon successful completion of
its rigorous requirements. He recommended that the convening
authority approve such a course of action.
The lower court opined that once the door was opened during
discussion of rehabilitative potential, the prosecutor’s
solicitation of the information was proper. Thus, trial
counsel’s question properly clarified the foundational basis for
Appellant’s mother’s opinion testimony. Id.On appeal, the defense did not contest the accuracy of
Appellant’s mother’s statement or the propriety of the military
judge’s question to his mother about “any substance abuse
problems as far as alcohol.” The Court of Criminal Appeals
stated that, assuming the military judge did not open the door
with that question, “other aspects of [Appellant’s mother’s
testimony] brought out by the defense did make the Appellant’s
pre-service marijuana use proper rebuttal.” United States v.
Gorence, No. ACM S30296, 2004 CCA LEXIS 132, at *8, 2004 WL
1239172, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 18, 2004). When the
defense counsel asked Appellant’s mother whether “appellant
learned from his mistakes and whether he had rehabilitative
potential,” this “opened the door to other information
challenging the foundation of her opinion.” Id. It is “not
significant” that this questioning was conducted by the trial
counsel after the judge’s questioning. Id. at *9, 2004 WL
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United States v. Gorence, No. 04-0607/AF
1239172, at *3. The court noted that in the trial by judge
alone, the military judge is presumed to have based his sentence
upon admissible evidence. “The military judge made it clear he
would not increase the punishment he imposed based upon”
Appellant’s mother’s testimony. Id. at *9-10, 2004 WL 1239172,
at *4.
DISCUSSION
As to Issue I, we hold that Holt is distinguishable. In
Holt, the military judge had admitted into evidence certain
sentencing exhibits and clearly ruled that the jury could not
consider them for the truth of the matter asserted in the
exhibits. 58 M.J. at 232. But, the Court of Criminal Appeals
considered these exhibits as substantive evidence. In remanding
Holt, the Court held that a court of criminal appeals “may not
resurrect excluded evidence during appellate review under
Article 66(c).” 58 M.J. at 232-33. In Holt, the Air Force
court’s consideration of the exhibits as substantive evidence
impermissibly changed the evidentiary nature of the exhibits.
Id. That is not what happened here. In this case, the Air
Force court did not resurrect any excluded evidence; rather, it
found an alternative foundational basis for the rebuttal
evidence considered by the military judge.
As to Issue II, we hold that, if there was error, it was
harmless. This was a trial by a military judge alone in which
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Appellant’s mother testified that her son had “a lot of
integrity” but had “learned from his mistakes.” Following this
testimony, the military judge asked questions concerning
Appellant’s future life, his dreams, and what would happen if he
left the Air Force. After the colloquy between the military
judge and Appellant’s mother, the trial counsel asked the
questions that were the subject of the defense counsel’s
objection. While overruling the defense counsel’s objection,
the military judge responded, “[C]learly, I’m not going to
impose any other punishment for experimental use in high school,
but I will consider it in the context of everything else.”
Admittedly, this was not a clear statement as to how the
military judge would use this evidence. In any event, any error
was harmless because this was a trial by military judge alone,
and from the statements made by the judge on the record, we may
infer that he did not give significant weight to Appellant’s
mother’s speculative testimony that Appellant used drugs in high
school. For example, the military judge stated, “it was
experimentation in a party-type environment in high school and
that’s it . . . . I am not going to impose any other punishment
for experimental use in high school.” Additionally, Appellant
gave a detailed confession as to his use of cocaine, and the
military judge recommended that Appellant be returned to duty.
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Based on all of these facts, we affirm the decision of the
United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.
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ERDMANN, J. (concurring in the result):
I agree that any error made by the military judge in
admitting Gorence’s mother’s speculative testimony about her
son’s pre-service drug use was harmless. As to Issue I, in
light of the lack of clarity in the military judge’s ruling, I
cannot be certain how he considered the mother’s testimony, if
at all. Consequently I cannot join in the majority’s conclusion
that the Court of Criminal Appeals “found an alternative
foundational basis for the rebuttal evidence considered by the
military judge.” __ M.J. at __ (8). However, in light of the
fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals found no prejudice “even
if we were to assume there was error,” I would affirm the
decision below on that basis.