United States v. Young , 55 M.J. 193 ( 2001 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Anthony T. YOUNG, Corporal
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 00-0279
Crim. App. No. 98-0505
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 5, 2000
Decided June 29, 2001
GIERKE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., and BAKER, J., joined. EFFRON, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and in the result. SULLIVAN, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in part and in the result and
dissenting in part.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Eric P. Gifford, USMC (argued); Lieutenant
Mari-Rae Sopper, JAGC, USNR (on brief).
For Appellee: Lieutenant James E. Grimes, JAGC, USNR (argued);
Colonel Marc W. Fisher, Jr., USMC, and Lieutenant Commander
Philip L. Sundel (on brief); Colonel Kevin M. Sandkuhler,
USMC, Commander Eugene E. Irvin, JAGC, USN, and Lieutenant
Timothy E. Curley, JAGC, USNR.
Military Judge: T. G. Hess
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE PUBLICATION.
United States v. Young, No. 00-0279/MC
Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of conspiracy
to distribute marijuana and distribution of marijuana, in
violation of Articles 81 and 112a, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 USC §§ 881 and 912a, respectively. The adjudged and
approved sentence provides for a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement and partial forfeiture of pay for 36 months, and
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed.
This Court granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ADMISSION
OF A TAPED CONVERSATION BETWEEN APPELLANT AND A COOPERATING
WITNESS OCCURRING 23 DAYS AFTER THE CHARGED CONSPIRACY,
INCLUDING WHAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS THE PLANNING OF A
FUTURE DRUG TRANSACTION, WAS PROPER TO SHOW APPELLANT’S
INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRIOR CHARGED CONSPIRACY, WHERE
THAT PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION CONSTITUTED EVIDENCE OF
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT.
For the reasons set out below, we affirm.
Factual Background
On December 26, 1997, Private Frank Smith asked appellant if
he could store some marijuana at appellant’s off-base apartment,
and appellant agreed. The following day, Smith and appellant
were approached by Religious Program Specialist Seaman Apprentice
Berrian in the parking lot of the barracks. Berrian asked Smith
if he could obtain two ounces of marijuana for him. Unbeknownst
to appellant and Smith, Berrian was then acting as a cooperating
witness with Naval Criminal Investigative Service. Smith agreed
to return to the base later that night and sell some marijuana to
Berrian.
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United States v. Young, No. 00-0279/MC
Smith and appellant then went to appellant’s apartment,
where the marijuana was stored. Smith testified that at the
apartment, he found two bags of marijuana, including the one he
had stored. Smith offered to split the money with appellant.
Appellant agreed and said, “Go ahead.” Smith then took both bags
of marijuana back to Camp Pendleton and sold them to Berrian for
$100.00. At trial, Berrian corroborated appellant’s part in the
conspiracy by testifying that Smith returned to the base with two
bags of marijuana and told him that one of the bags belonged to
appellant. Appellant’s agreement with Smith to sell the
marijuana and split the money, and Smith’s act of selling the
marijuana to Berrian, were the factual basis for the charges
against appellant.
On January 3, 1996, Berrian approached Smith and complained
that he was shortchanged in the December 27 marijuana purchase.
Smith replied that appellant was the one who measured out the
amounts of marijuana, and he speculated that appellant probably
smoked some of it while it was stored at his apartment.
On January 17, 1996, while wearing a recording device,
Berrian approached appellant and asked to buy more marijuana from
him. A recording of the conversation was introduced and played
at trial. A written transcript also was provided to the court
members. The transcript identifies Berrian as “CW” (cooperating
witness) and appellant as “Young.” It reads as follows:
CW: Hey, Young . . . .
* * *
CW: Hey, (unintelligible) . . . about an ounce?
YOUNG: Probably Friday.
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CW: For sure Friday?
YOUNG: I can’t say for sure, cause I ain’t
talked to my boy in a couple of weeks
since s--- happened . . . .
CW: Alright, because Smitty told me that
whatever . . . You, that you pinched off
whatever. From the s--- that I got sold
you know what I’m saying? . . . .
YOUNG: I aint pinch out s--- man . . .
CW: So just ah . . . . if you can . . .
YOUNG: Don’t go to Smitty no more man . . . .
because (unintelligible) . . . I’m
p---ed off at him as it is cause he
didn’t pay me my f----- money.
CW: You want me to just get with you Friday?
YOUNG: Friday . . .
CW: Alright . . . Hey, I’m comin in the morning of
Friday . . .
YOUNG: Alright . . .
CW: So we can do it at lunch or whatever . . . .
YOUNG: Yeah . . .
CW: Alright . . . .
At trial, defense counsel made a limited objection to the
tape and transcript under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b), Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2000 ed.).1 Defense counsel
conceded that part of the taped conversation was admissible to
show appellant’s role in the conspiracy; however, he objected to
the part of the conversation concerning the subsequent uncharged
drug transaction. The prosecution argued that it was not
1
All Manual provisions are identical to the ones in effect at the
time of appellant’s trial.
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offering the evidence to show that appellant was a bad person or
a drug dealer. Instead, it argued that during the conversation
on January 17, appellant admitted his role in the December 27
drug transaction, and it was necessary to show that the January
17 conversation occurred during a drug negotiation in order for
the members to understand that appellant was admitting his
participation in the December 27 drug transaction. Trial counsel
argued “[t]hat you can’t understand the accused’s statements
about the 27 December drug deal unless you know [that on 17
January] they’re talking about a drug deal.” Trial counsel
argued that statements like “Don’t go to him anymore” and “I
didn’t pinch out anything” were meaningless without evidence that
they were uttered during a subsequent drug transaction.
The military judge overruled the defense objection and
admitted the evidence. Immediately after the members heard the
tape and read the transcript, the military judge gave the
following limiting instruction:
Now, members of the court, before we proceed, there’s a
matter I want to bring to your attention. Based on a
reading of Prosecution Exhibit 6 for identification
that we just retrieved [the transcript], and listening
to Prosecution Exhibit 5 [the tape], this evidence may
suggest to you that Berrian was attempting to set up
another drug transaction with the accused, and that the
accused may have tentatively agreed to do so.
Now this evidence may be considered by you for its
limited purpose of its tendency to show that the
accused intended to join in a conspiracy, and that is
the conspiracy that he is charged with.
You’ll be told when I instruct you on the law of
conspiracy that one’s intent must embrace each and
every element of the target offense and in this case
that would be distribution.
Secondly, this information or this evidence has been
provided to you to show the context in which the
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statements were made about the transaction which
Berrian testified took place on 27 December 1995, I
believe.
Now, the accused has not been charged with
participating in or attempting to participate in a
second drug transaction. It will be unfair in the
extreme to punish him for that.
We’re only to concern ourselves with the charged
offenses. You may not consider this evidence for any
other purpose, other than whatever his original intent
may have been on the alleged conspiracy or for the
context of conversation and you may not conclude from
this evidence that the accused is a bad person or his
criminal tendency and he, therefore, committed the
charged offenses.
Do you understand that? If so, please raise your hand.
An affirmative response from all the members.
The defense case focused on attacking the credibility of
Smith and Berrian. Appellant did not testify. In closing
arguments on findings, the prosecution repeatedly argued that
appellant admitted his guilt during the tape-recorded
conversation with Berrian.
Discussion
Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) provides: “Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” The
rule permits such evidence, however, “for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]” This
Court has consistently held that Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) is a “rule
of inclusion.” See, e.g., United States v. Tanksley, 54 M.J. 169,
175-76 (2000); United States v. Baumann, 54 M.J. 100, 104 (2000);
United States v. Browning, 54 M.J. 1, 6 (2000).
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United States v. Young, No. 00-0279/MC
The test for admissibility of evidence of uncharged crimes
is “whether the evidence of the misconduct is offered for some
purpose other than to demonstrate the accused’s predisposition to
crime[.]” United States v. Taylor, 53 M.J. 195, 199 (2000),
quoting United States v. Castillo, 29 M.J. 145, 150 (CMA 1989). In
United States v. Reynolds, 29 M.J. 105, 109 (CMA 1989), this Court
adopted the following three-pronged test for admissibility of
evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts”: (1) the evidence
must reasonably support a finding that the appellant committed
the crime, wrong, or act; (2) it must make a fact of consequence
more or less probable; and (3) its probative value must not be
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Although most cases, including Reynolds, have involved
evidence of a crime, wrong, or act that preceded the charged
crime, this Court has applied the Reynolds test to subsequent
acts as well. See United States v. Dorsey, 38 M.J. 244, 246 (CMA
1993) (subsequent bribery of a witness admitted to show intent to
obstruct justice by earlier bribery of another witness). This
approach is consistent with prevailing federal practice under
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), on which the military rule is based. See
United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
United States v. Buckner, 91 F.3d 34, 36 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1046 (1996); United States v. Olivo, 69 F.3d 1057, 1063
(10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 906 (1996); United
States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1065 (1996); United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d
876, 881 (9th Cir. 1994); 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 415 (1994)
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United States v. Young, No. 00-0279/MC
(“Under FRE Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts may include acts committed prior to, simultaneous to, or
after the charged offense . . . .”) (footnotes omitted);
Drafters’ Analysis of Mil. R. Evid. 404(b), Manual, supra at A22-
34.2
The third prong of the Reynolds test requires application of
the balancing test under Mil. R. Evid. 403. A military judge
enjoys wide discretion under Mil. R. Evid. 403. United States v.
Phillips, 52 M.J. 268, 272 (2000). Where the military judge
properly weighs the evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 403 and
articulates the reasons for admitting the evidence, we will
reverse only for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v.
Browning, 54 M.J. 1, 7 (2000).
Applying the foregoing principles, we hold that the military
judge did not abuse his discretion. We need not decide whether
the military judge’s theory, that appellant’s willingness to sell
drugs to Berrian on January 17 related back to appellant’s intent
to conspire with Smith on December 27, passes muster under
Reynolds, because the uncharged misconduct was admissible for a
2
We recognize the danger of unfair prejudice in admitting
subsequent acts of misconduct. This danger was articulated as
follows in United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir.
1994):
When jurors hear that a defendant has on [another]
occasion[] committed essentially the same crime as that
for which he is on trial, the information
unquestionably has a powerful and prejudicial
impact. . . . When prior act[] evidence is introduced,
regardless of the stated purpose, the likelihood is
very great that the jurors will use the evidence
precisely for the purpose it may not be considered; to
suggest that the defendant is a bad person . . . and
that if he “did it [once] he probably did it again.”
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separate limited purpose, to show the subject matter and context
of a conversation in which appellant admitted the charged
conspiracy. See United States v. Taylor, supra (military judge
did not abuse discretion by admitting unredacted confession
containing evidence of uncharged misconduct); cf. United States
v. Matthews, 53 M.J. 465 (2000) (unrelated subsequent drug
ingestion not admissible to show previous knowing use of drugs);
United States v. Hoggard, 43 M.J. 1 (1995) (lustful intent in
indecent assault 3-6 months after charged indecent act with
another victim not admissible to show lustful intent during
charged indecent assault).
We also are satisfied that any overbreadth in the military
judge’s limiting instruction was harmless error. Appellant’s
tape-recorded admission of guilt was powerful evidence. It
greatly overshadowed any suggestion in the limiting instruction
that appellant’s willingness to sell drugs on January 17 might
relate back to appellant’s intent to conspire with Smith on
December 27. The prosecution did not rely on this tenuous
theory. Instead, the prosecution forcefully and repeatedly
emphasized appellant’s tape-recorded admission of guilt,
“probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be
admitted” against an accused. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 292 (1991). On the basis of the entire record, we are
satisfied that any overbreadth in the limiting instruction did
not substantially influence the findings or sentence. Art.
59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a); Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 765 (1946).
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Decision
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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EFFRON, Judge (concurring in part and in the result):
I disagree with the majority’s theory that consideration of
the entire conversation between appellant and the confidential
informant was necessary in order to understand the context of
two admissions made in the course of the conversation. Ample
evidence of the context already had been introduced through the
confidential informant's testimony. Under these circumstances,
it was not necessary to admit into evidence the statements
involving uncharged misconduct in order to understand the
admissible portions of the conversation. Nonetheless, I agree
with the majority’s view that any error in this case was
rendered harmless by the substantial weight of appellant’s
admissions regarding the charged offenses.
United States v. Young, 00-0279/MC
SULLIVAN, Judge (concurring in part and in the result and
dissenting in part):
Appellant was forced to defend against two separate incidents
of drug dealings while only being charged with one. In my view,
the discussion of the “ounce sale” on January 17, 1997, should
have been redacted from the tape-conversation evidence. I
conclude, as I did in United States v. Matthews, 53 M.J. 465, 472
(2000) (Sullivan, J., concurring in the result), that the
probative value of this evidence (to show the context of a
conversation) clearly was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. Nevertheless, I agree that appellant’s
tape-recorded admission of guilt renders this error harmless.
Art. 59(a).