United States v. Miergrimado , 66 M.J. 34 ( 2008 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Jose C. MIERGRIMADO, Corporal
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 07-0436
Crim. App. No. 200501128
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 11, 2007
Decided February 20, 2008
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
EFFRON, C.J., and BAKER, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: J. W. Carver, Esq. (argued).
For Appellee: Captain Roger E. Mattioli, USMC (argued);
Commander Paul C. LeBlanc, JAGC, USN (on brief).
Military Judge: R. S. Chester
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Miergrimado, No. 07-0436/MC
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
Corporal Jose Miergrimado was charged with attempted
premeditated murder. He entered a plea of not guilty and was
tried before a general court-martial comprised of officer
members. The military judge instructed, over defense objection,
on the lesser included offenses of attempted unpremeditated
murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault
with intent to commit grievous bodily harm with a loaded
firearm.
The members found Miergrimado not guilty of attempted
premeditated murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter. He was sentenced to reduction
to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement for
six years, and a dishonorable discharge. The United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. United
States v. Miergrimado, No. NMCCA 200501128, 2007 CCA LEXIS 60,
at *10, 2007 WL 1702510, at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 22,
2007) (unpublished).
We granted review to consider whether the military judge
committed error by instructing the members on the lesser
included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter over the
defense objection. 65 M.J. 324 (C.A.A.F. 2007). We hold that
the military judge did not err and affirm the decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals.
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BACKGROUND
While Miergrimado’s unit was located in Kuwait awaiting
redeployment to the United States, he and Corporal Steven
Eichenberger engaged in a heated exchange over keys to a
military vehicle. Miergrimado wanted the keys to the vehicle to
retrieve an item. Eichenberger was safeguarding the keys and
refused to release them. Following this initial verbal
exchange, Miergrimado returned with his sergeant who directed
Eichenberger to give Miergrimado the keys. A second verbal
exchange between the two escalated into a physical confrontation
which was broken up by other Marines. Miergrimado left with the
keys and when he returned them a short time later, another
verbal and physical confrontation ensued. This altercation
ended when Miergrimado shot Eichenberger in the neck with his
rifle. Eichenberger sustained life-threatening injuries but
intervening medical care saved his life.
Miergrimado was charged with attempted premeditated murder.
At trial, defense counsel intended to use an “all or nothing”
strategy based on a theory of self-defense. During the trial
the defense counsel objected when the trial counsel tried to
elicit information from a witness that went to the lesser
included offense of attempted unpremeditated murder. Defense
counsel argued that the defense had opted for an “all or
nothing” defense and would waive any instructions on lesser
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included offenses. Under these circumstances, defense counsel
argued, it was inappropriate for the members to be instructed on
a lesser included offense. Following further argument the
military judge indicated that he would instruct on lesser
included offenses and overruled the objection.
At the close of the evidence, after noting the defense
objection, the military judge instructed on attempted
premeditated murder and the lesser included offenses of
attempted unpremeditated murder, attempted voluntary
manslaughter, and aggravated assault with intent to commit
grievous bodily harm with a loaded firearm. The members found
Miergrimado not guilty of the greater offense of attempted
premeditated murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter.
On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Miergrimado
unsuccessfully argued, inter alia, that it was error for the
military judge to instruct on the lesser included offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter. Miergrimado, 2007 CCA LEXIS
60, at *2, 2007 WL 1702510, at *1. Miergrimado has renewed that
contention before this court.
Miergrimado has not, however, renewed his contention from
the trial level that instructions on lesser included offenses
are inappropriate when defense opts for an “all or nothing”
strategy and waives such instructions. Rather, in his brief
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before this court, Miergrimado argued that the lesser included
offense instruction was given in error because there is no
factual element in dispute that would distinguish the greater
offense of attempted premeditated murder from the lesser offense
of attempted voluntary manslaughter. At oral argument
Miergrimado changed course again, contending that there is
insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support the finding
that the crime was committed “in the heat of sudden passion
caused by adequate provocation,” which distinguishes voluntary
manslaughter from murder under Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States pt. IV, para. 44.c. (2005 ed.) (MCM).
In response, the Government argued that premeditation is
the disputed factual element distinguishing the greater offense
from the lesser offense at issue. The Government also
summarized evidence from the record in an effort to establish
the legal sufficiency of the finding of guilty as to attempted
voluntary manslaughter.
ANALYSIS
A military judge has a sua sponte duty to instruct the
members on lesser included offenses reasonably raised by the
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 62 M.J. 264, 266
(C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 480,
481 (C.A.A.F. 1999)); see also Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)
920(e)(3). However, consistent with the standard set out in
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Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350 (1965), this court
has long recognized that a military judge can only instruct on a
lesser included offense where the greater offense requires the
members to find a disputed factual element which is not required
for conviction of the lesser violation. See, e.g., Griffin, 50
M.J. at 482; United States v. Jackson, 12 M.J. 163, 167 (C.M.A.
1981); see also R.C.M. 920(e) Discussion.
Cases that call on an appellate court to apply the Sansone
standard appear to arise more commonly in the context of an
accused’s contention that the judge committed error by failing
to include a lesser included offense instruction. See, e.g.,
Griffin, 50 M.J. at 481-82; United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d
250, 255-258 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gonzalez, 122
F.3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1997). We find that the Sansone
standard is appropriate in the context presented in this case,
where a lesser included offense instruction desired by the
Government was submitted to the members over defense objection.
See United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 1972).1
1
This court has previously applied the Sansone standard in at
least two cases involving an accused’s contention that the
lesser included offense instruction was given in error over the
accused’s objection. See United States v. Emmons, 31 M.J. 108,
110-11 (C.M.A. 1990); United States v. Waldron, 11 M.J. 36, 37
(C.M.A. 1981). In neither case, however, did a majority of the
three-judge court join the lead opinion. To the extent these
cases left open any question about whether Sansone applies in
these circumstances, we resolve that question here and make
clear that the standard applies.
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This is in keeping with the principle that an instruction on a
lesser included offense may appropriately be requested by either
the government or the defense. Cf. United States v. Wells, 52
M.J. 126, 129 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (commenting that this principle is
well established in federal courts) (citation and quotation
marks omitted); see also R.C.M. 920(c) (providing that “any
party may request that the military judge instruct the members
on the law as set forth in the request”).
With this backdrop, we first consider whether there is a
disputed factual element that distinguishes the greater offense
of attempted premeditated murder from the lesser offense of
attempted voluntary manslaughter. This issue presents a
question of law that we review de novo. See United States v.
Schroder, 65 M.J. 49, 54 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (noting that whether
the members were properly instructed is a question of law that
this court reviews de novo).
To sustain a conviction for attempted premeditated murder,
the Government must prove that “at the time of the killing, the
accused had a premeditated design to kill.” MCM pt. IV, para.
43.b.(1)(d). “Premeditated murder is murder committed after the
formation of a specific intent to kill someone and consideration
of the act intended.” Id. at para 43.c.(2)(a). The offense of
voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, requires the “intent
to kill or inflict great bodily harm,” and does not require
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premeditation. Id. at para. 44.b.(d). We agree with the
Government that premeditation is a distinguishing factual
element.
We also have no difficulty concluding that the premeditated
design to kill Eichenberger at the time of the shooting was a
disputed element at trial. After the Government rested, defense
counsel unsuccessfully moved for a finding of not guilty on the
charged offense, arguing that the Government had not produced
any substantial evidence to establish the element of
premeditation. The defense counsel further argued, “This case
might be an attempted voluntary manslaughter but it clearly
isn’t an attempted premeditated murder.” Indeed, in his brief
before this court Miergrimado concedes that premeditation was
one of three contested elements in this case.
Nor do we see merit to Miergrimado’s contention at oral
argument that as a matter of law, the evidence is legally
insufficient to support a finding that the crime was committed
“in the heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation.”
MCM pt. IV, para. 44.c.(1)(a). In considering this contention,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and decide whether any rational trier of fact could
have found this essential element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); United States
v. Brown, 65 M.J. 227, 229 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
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The MCM provides, inter alia, that “heat of passion” may
result from fear or rage. MCM pt. IV, para. 44.c.(1)(a). The
provocation must be adequate to excite uncontrollable passion in
a reasonable person and the act of killing must be committed
under and because of that passion. Id. at para. 44.c.(1)(b).
Although the MCM does not allow a “slight blow with the hand or
fist” to serve as adequate provocation, it does explain that in
certain circumstances the “unlawful infliction of great bodily
harm” may constitute adequate provocation. Id.Testimony from both Miergrimado and Eichenberger
established that the two were insulting and swearing at each
other before and during the fight. According to Miergrimado’s
testimony, towards the end of the fight, he felt a “hard hit.”
Miergrimado testified that he had never been hit that hard in
his life and that he was “terrified for [his] life.” At that
point, he “automatically switched” into “sort of a preservation
mode” and he raised his weapon and pointed it at Eichenberger.
After Eichenberger pushed the rifle away and gave him “another
hard throw,” Miergrimado regained his balance, saw Eichenberger
coming at him, raised his weapon and shot. Viewing all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we
believe that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the heat of
sudden passion caused by adequate provocation.
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In addition to these specific legal arguments,
Miergrimado’s brief also complains that he was convicted of an
offense for which he was not charged. The brief asserts that
defense counsel was unable to address the offense of attempted
voluntary manslaughter during opening statement or closing
argument or to discover and present evidence on it. The brief
also contends that Miergrimado had no reason to contest the
offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter during his own
testimony. We find these assertions unfounded.
Article 79, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 879 (2000), which provides
that an accused may be found guilty of an offense necessarily
included in the offense charged, puts a defense attorney on
notice that a lesser included offense instruction may be given.
See also United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir.
1977) (recognizing that Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c), the federal
civilian equivalent of Article 79, UCMJ, gives notice of a
lesser included offense instruction). Miergrimado has not
claimed that attempted voluntary manslaughter is not a lesser
included offense of attempted premeditated murder, nor do we
believe that such a claim would have merit in this case. See
MCM pt. IV, para. 43.d.(3)(b) (listing voluntary manslaughter as
a lesser included offense of unpremeditated murder); MCM pt. IV,
para. 4.d. (explaining what offenses ordinarily constitute
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lesser included offenses for charges brought under Article 80,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (2000)).2
Furthermore, after the military judge made it clear that he
intended to instruct on lesser included offenses during the
Government’s case-in-chief and prior to Miergrimado’s testimony,
he gave defense counsel the option to continue the case for
several days. The military judge was concerned that defense
counsel had mistakenly based his “all or nothing” trial strategy
on the belief that the military judge would not instruct on
lesser included offenses.
The defense counsel accepted the additional time. The
military judge told the members that it was the military judge
who needed the continuance and any frustration about it should
be focused toward him and not directed at either party. In this
legal and factual context, we have no concerns that Miergrimado
was provided fair notice and adequate opportunity to defend on
the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
2
During oral argument, however, appellate defense counsel
contended that this court should not recognize attempted
voluntary manslaughter as a legally cognizable offense. We do
not agree. See United States v. Jackson, 6 M.J. 261, 262-63
(C.M.A. 1979).
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