United States v. Solomon , 72 M.J. 176 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Allen J. SOLOMON, Private First Class
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 13-0025
Crim. App. No. 201100582
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 20, 2013
Decided May 8, 2013
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BAKER,
C.J., ERDMANN and RYAN, JJ., and EFFRON, S.J., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Ryan C. Mattina, JAGC, USN (argued).
For Appellee: Major David N. Roberts, USMC (argued); Major Paul
M. Ervasti, USMC, and Major William C. Kirby, USMC (on brief);
Colonel Stephen C. Newman, USMC, and Brian K. Keller, Esq.
Military Judges: G. L. Simmons and Stephen F. Keane
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Solomon, No. 13-0025/MC
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court: 1
We granted review to determine whether the military judge
abused his discretion when he admitted evidence under Military
Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 413, and whether trial counsel’s
closing arguments on findings constituted prosecutorial
misconduct amounting to plain error. We hold that the military
judge’s admission of M.R.E. 413 evidence was an abuse of
discretion. We therefore need not decide whether trial
counsel’s closing arguments were error.
I.
Appellant, who was tried at a general court-martial
composed of members with enlisted representation, entered mixed
pleas. He was convicted pursuant to his pleas of violating a
lawful general order and wrongful use of a controlled substance
in violation of Articles 92 and 112a, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 912a (2006). Contrary to his
pleas, Appellant was convicted of abusive sexual contact,
indecent conduct, drunk and disorderly conduct, and obstruction
of justice in violation of Articles 120 and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 920, 934 (2006). The convening authority approved the
1
We heard oral argument in this case at the United States Naval
Academy as part of the Court’s “Project Outreach.” See United
States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346, 347 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2003). This
practice was developed as part of a public awareness program to
demonstrate the operation of a federal court of appeals and the
military justice system.
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adjudged sentence of a dishonorable discharge, confinement for
six years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction
to the lowest enlisted grade. The United States Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) set aside and dismissed
the Article 134 specifications, and affirmed the remaining
findings. United States v. Solomon, No. NMCCA 201100582, 2012
CCA LEXIS 291, at *16–*17, 2012 WL 3106790, at *6 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. July 31, 2012). After reassessment, the CCA affirmed a
term of four years of confinement and the remainder of the
approved sentence. Id. at *22, 2013 WL 3106790, at *8.
II.
A.
In December 2010, Appellant and Lance Corporal (LCpl) K
were roommates. LCpl K testified that in the early morning of
17 December 2010, he:
woke up at approximately 0320–0330 with his belted jeans
open and pulled down to his ankles, along with his boxer
shorts; the appellant was lying on top of him between his
knees and rubbing his exposed genitals against LCpl K’s.
LCpl K testified that he pushed the appellant off and asked
what he was doing. The appellant did not respond, but
returned to his own bed. LCpl K turned on the light,
pulled up his pants, and walked over to the appellant’s bed
to confront him. The appellant was lying on the bed naked
and clutching a cell phone to his chest. LCpl K took the
phone from the appellant and found three photos of his
exposed genitals.
LCpl K left the room to show the Duty Noncommissioned
Officer (DNCO) the photos. LCpl K stepped back in to
retrieve his own cell phone, at which time the appellant
attempted to grab his phone from LCpl K’s hand. A short
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struggle ensued, but ultimately the appellant regained
possession of his cell phone and deleted the photos in
front of LCpl K. LCpl K then left and made his report.
Id. at *2–*3, 2012 WL 3106790, at *1.
B.
Prior to trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of
three previous incidents proffered by the Government under
M.R.E. 413 and alternatively under M.R.E. 404(b). The military
judge held a hearing pursuant to Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 839 (2006), to consider the motion. The military judge
granted the motion to suppress evidence of the first two
incidents.
At the Article 39(a) hearing, the military judge heard
arguments relating to the third incident -- an alleged sexual
assault of LCpls B and R. The Government proffered written
statements that LCpls B and R made to Naval Criminal
Investigative Services (NCIS) on November 17, 2009. Those
statements alleged that on November 14, 2009, LCpl B awoke in
her barracks room at approximately 2:30–3:00 a.m. to someone
touching her inside her panties. As she rolled over, LCpl B saw
an unidentified male walk over to where her roommate, LCpl R,
lay sleeping, and saw him grabbing LCpl R’s feet or ankles.
LCpl B shouted and startled the intruder, who ran out through
the bathroom into an adjoining room. As the intruder passed
through the lighted bathroom, LCpl B recognized Appellant: he
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lived on the same hallway, and she had daily contact with him
during the preceding month. LCpl R, who was roused by LCpl B’s
shout, pursued the intruder into the adjoining room. When LCpl
R returned, she told LCpl B that a window was loose in the
adjoining room. The two did not report the incident to anyone
that night. Two days later, LCpl R and LCpl B discovered that
Appellant was apprehended for a DUI that night, “a few hours
after our incident.” A noncommissioned officer overheard them
discussing the incident in the barracks room, and they then
initiated the report of the assault through their chain of
command. Appellant was acquitted of these allegations at an
August 2010 general court-martial.
In addition to submitting the statements of LCpls B and R,
the Government called one witness to testify at the Article
39(a) hearing about the incident -– Dr. Nancy Slicner, an expert
in the forensic psychology of sexually deviant behavior.
Slicner reviewed all three prior incident allegations and
testified that Appellant had exhibited patterns of voyeurism
escalating to the point of contact offenses, his predatory
actions had several common characteristics, and he had the
propensity to commit the sort of misconduct alleged in the
instant case.
Defense counsel argued that Appellant’s August 2010
acquittal of the alleged assaults against LCpls B and R greatly
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reduced the strength of proof of that incident and its probative
value. In addition to the acquittal, defense counsel presented
evidence of Appellant’s alibi during the time the alleged
assaults occurred. According to an incident report from the
Camp Pendleton Provost Marshal’s Office, Appellant was taken
into military police custody at 1:58 a.m. on November 15, 2009,
for driving under the influence after a gate sentry observed his
erratic approach to the San Luis Ray Gate to Camp Pendleton. He
was not released until 3:26 a.m. Both of the lance corporals’
statements allege that the assaults occurred between 2:30 and
3:00 a.m. Defense counsel also submitted an e-mail from
Appellant’s defense counsel at the previous court-martial. The
e-mail detailed the factors the prior defense counsel believed
contributed to Appellant’s acquittal including, inter alia, that
Appellant “was arrested for DUI 45 minutes away coming on to
base (not off) at the San Luis Rey Gate at 0152 [sic] by MPs” at
the same time LCpls B and R claim to have been assaulted.
The military judge overruled the suppression motion,
determining that, pursuant to United States v. Berry, 61 M.J. 91(C.A.A.F. 2005), and United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476(C.A.A.F. 2000), evidence of the alleged assaults of LCpls B and
R was admissible under M.R.E. 413. 2
2
The military judge alternatively ruled that the evidence was
admissible under M.R.E 404(b) to show a common modus operandi.
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C.
Appellant challenged the military judge’s evidentiary
ruling before the CCA. The CCA held that the military judge did
not abuse his discretion, but rather properly determined that
the threshold requirements for admitting M.R.E 413 evidence were
satisfied. Noting that the military judge did not explicitly
reconcile Appellant’s alibi evidence with LCpl B’s and LCpl R’s
testimony, the CCA determined that “[i]t is implicit in his
findings of fact that the military judge concluded that the
appellant entered the female Marines’ room earlier than they
recall and was apprehended subsequently,” and the CCA
“decline[d] to disturb the factual findings of the judge on the
grounds that they are unsupported by the record or clearly
erroneous.” Solomon, 2012 CCA LEXIS 291, at *12–*13, 2012 WL
3106790, at *4.
III.
This Court reviews a military judge’s decision to admit
evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ediger,
68 M.J. 243, 248 (C.A.A.F. 2010). “The abuse of discretion
standard is a strict one, calling for more than a mere
difference of opinion. The challenged action must be arbitrary,
The CCA appropriately declined to uphold the admission of
evidence on that ground, and that ruling is not at issue in this
appeal. Solomon, 2012 CCA LEXIS 291, at *7–*8 n.1, 2012 WL
3106790, at *3 n.1.
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fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” United
States v. White, 69 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
M.R.E. 413(a) provides that “[i]n a court-martial in which
the accused is charged with an offense of sexual assault,
evidence of the accused’s commission of one or more offenses of
sexual assault is admissible and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” “This court has
noted that inherent in M.R.E. 413 is a general presumption in
favor of admission.” Berry, 61 M.J. at 94–95.
There are three threshold requirements for admitting
evidence of similar offenses in sexual assault cases under
M.R.E. 413: (1) the accused must be charged with an offense of
sexual assault; (2) the proffered evidence must be evidence of
the accused’s commission of another offense of sexual assault;
and (3) the evidence must be relevant under M.R.E. 401 and
M.R.E. 402. Id. at 95; Wright, 53 M.J. at 482. For (2), the
Court must conclude that the members could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the offenses occurred.
Wright, 53 M.J. at 483 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681, 689–90 (1988)).
Once these three findings are made, the military judge is
constitutionally required to also apply a balancing test under
M.R.E. 403. Berry, 61 M.J. at 95. M.R.E. 403 provides that
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“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the members,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” In the M.R.E. 413
context, “[t]he Rule 403 balancing test should be applied in
light of the strong legislative judgment that evidence of prior
sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible[.]” Wright, 53
M.J. at 482 (second alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, in conducting
the balancing test, the military judge should consider the
following non-exhaustive factors to determine whether the
evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice: strength of proof of the prior act
(i.e., conviction versus gossip); probative weight of the
evidence; potential for less prejudicial evidence; distraction
of the factfinder; time needed for proof of the prior conduct;
temporal proximity; frequency of the acts; presence or lack of
intervening circumstances; and the relationship between the
parties. Id. When a military judge articulates his properly
conducted M.R.E. 403 balancing test on the record, the decision
will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.
United States v. Manns, 54 M.J. 164, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
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IV.
In this case, the military judge clearly abused his
discretion in admitting evidence of the alleged assaults of
LCpls B and R under M.R.E. 413. The problem is not that an
incident for which an accused has been previously acquitted may
never be admitted under M.R.E. 413; rather, the problem is that
the military judge altogether failed to mention or reconcile
Appellant’s important alibi evidence and gave little or no
weight to the fact of the prior acquittal.
The military judge in this case appropriately made findings
of fact and law on the record, in which he enunciated a full
M.R.E. 413 analysis, including consideration of each of the
Wright factors, and conducted a balancing test under M.R.E. 403.
However, the content of these supplemental findings of fact and
conclusions of law reveals a clear abuse of judicial discretion.
A.
We turn first to the military judge’s supplemental findings
of fact. First, the military judge found that “a preponderance
of evidence establishes” as a fact that “[i]n mid-November,
2009, at night or in the early morning hours, the accused broke
into the barracks rooms of two sleeping female Marines.”
(emphasis added). In fact, no question existed from the
evidence presented to the military judge as to the timeframe of
the assaults. The evidence before the military judge at the
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Article 39(a) hearing included two unequivocal statements made
by LCpl B and LCpl R under oath: LCpl B stated that she awoke
to the intruder “[a]t approx. 230-300 [sic] in the morning,” and
LCpl R stated that she “woke up around 0230-0300” when her
roommate cried out. The uncontroverted evidence before the
military judge was that LCpls B and R were assaulted between
2:30 and 3:00 a.m.
The military judge went on to find, as fact, that “[w]hen
[LCpl R] awoke, [Appellant] ran out of the room, got in his car,
and promptly drove away, ultimately receiving a citation for
driving under the influence of alcohol.” However, none of the
evidence presented supports the military judge’s finding that
Appellant got in his car and promptly drove away. According to
the statements of LCpls B and R, they last saw the intruder
running through the head and their headmate’s room. No evidence
was presented as to what the intruder did next. The evidence
actually before the military judge, however, established that
Appellant was apprehended by the police as he was entering, not
leaving, the base at 1:58 a.m., and that he remained in police
custody until 3:26 a.m., a period of time covering the entirety
of the timeframe alleged by LCpls B and R. The military judge
failed to address this discrepancy in his findings.
In making unexplained and unreconciled leaps from the
evidence presented to his findings of fact, the military judge
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clearly erred. Although he did find as fact that “[Appellant]
was acquitted of sexually assaulting [LCpl R] and [LCpl B] at a
previous General Court-Martial,” he failed to reconcile, or even
mention, the fact that an uncontroverted military police report
situates Appellant in police custody for the entire period of
time that LCpls B and R allege they were being assaulted. We
find no support for the CCA’s conclusion that “[i]t is implicit
in his findings of fact that the military judge concluded that
the appellant entered the female Marines’ room earlier than they
recall and was apprehended subsequently,” and that these
implicit findings are not “unsupported by the record or clearly
erroneous.” Solomon, 2012 CCA LEXIS 291, at *12–*13, 2012 WL
3106790, at *4. The military judge’s findings of fact are
contradictory to record evidence and wholly fail to grapple with
the important alibi evidence presented by Appellant.
Accordingly, we find that the military judge clearly abused his
discretion.
B.
We turn now to the military judge’s conclusions of law.
The military judge appropriately conducted a full M.R.E. 413
analysis, including balancing under M.R.E. 403, on the record,
but the content of that analysis is problematic. Most
problematic is the military judge’s determination that the
evidence’s probative value outweighs the risk of unfair
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prejudice under M.R.E. 403. M.R.E. 403 provides that
“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the members.”
This Court has recognized that:
inherent in M.R.E. 413 is a general presumption in favor of
admission. However, we have also noted that it is a
constitutional requirement that evidence offered under Rule
413 be subjected to a thorough balancing test under M.R.E.
403. Where that balancing test requires exclusion of the
evidence, the presumption of admissibility is overcome.
Berry, 61 M.J. at 95 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “The importance of a careful balancing arises from
the potential for undue prejudice that is inevitably present
when dealing with propensity evidence.” United States v. James,
63 M.J. 217, 222 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
The M.R.E. 403 balancing in this case was incomplete. When
considering the strength of proof of the prior act, the military
judge found that “[a]lthough the members at [the prior] General
Court-Martial did not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
testimonial evidence of [LCpl B] and [LCpl R] is compelling. A
fact finder could easily find beyond a preponderance that the
proffered offense occurred and that the accused committed it.”
In determining that the strength of proof of the prior act was
“easily beyond a preponderance” the military judge again omitted
any discussion of the military police report’s tendency to
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establish Appellant’s alibi. Combined with the acquittal, the
alibi evidence greatly reduces the strength of the proof of the
prior act; failing to deal with that fact was error. Because
the strength of the proof is significantly lower than the
military judge determined, its probative weight is similarly
reduced.
Additionally, when considering the risk of distraction, the
military judge determined that “[t]here is little if any risk of
distraction. It will take a fair amount of time to hear the
testimony but this alone does not warrant its exclusion.” On
the contrary, admitting the evidence in this case resulted in a
classic example of a “distracting mini-trial” on the prior
alleged assaults. Berry, 61 M.J. at 97 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Trial counsel began his opening
argument by telling the members that “[e]verything that is
hidden will eventually be brought into the open, and every
secret will eventually be brought into the light,” and he spent
almost half of his opening statement detailing the alleged
assault of LCpls B and R, arguing that “this isn’t the first
time the accused has done something similar.” He then
summarized the Government theory of the case:
The most important thing we have is a fingerprint. We have
a fingerprint of the accused. And what is that
fingerprint? Not a physical print, but we have
similarities of actions. Some people call it modus
operandi, sexual propensity, similarities of actions. And
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I ask all of you to take notes and notice the similarities
of actions at a barracks room, at night, the next day is a
work day. Look at the similarities of actions and you will
see the fingerprint of the accused in all three of these
cases.
LCpls B and R were the first two witnesses called and provided
detailed testimony of the November 2009 incident; approximately
one-fourth of the trial was spent establishing the prior
incident. During closing arguments, trial counsel emphasized
the “three secrets” Appellant tried to keep, repeatedly
comparing the assaults of LCpls B, R, and K. In rebuttal
arguments, trial counsel again emphasized the similarity of the
prior assaults of LCpls B and R to the present case, and the
likelihood that Appellant had a propensity to assault LCpl K:
Is there any doubt that [Appellant] was in [LCpls B and
R’s] room on 15 November 2009? Absolutely not. Is there
any doubt there was touching that night? Absolutely not.
Is there any doubt that they IDed him in their room and in
the head? Absolutely not.
And let’s move forward to the case at hand. Is there
any doubt that [Appellant] was in that room that night?
Absolutely not.
Evidence of the prior offenses in this case devolved into
exactly the sort of sidetracking of the factfinder that should
be avoided when admitting M.R.E. 413 evidence. See Berry, 61
M.J. at 97 (finding it evident that a “distracting mini-trial”
occurred where trial counsel’s opening statement began with
reference to the M.R.E. 413 prior act and his closing statement
emphasized the prior act) (citation and internal quotation marks
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omitted); cf. James, 63 M.J. at 222 (where the military judge
limited the scope of admissible propensity evidence to brief
testimony); United States v. Bailey, 55 M.J. 38, 41 (C.A.A.F.
2001) (where the military judge “kept the witness’ testimony
abbreviated and focused” to ensure a minimum amount of time
would be spent on M.R.E. 413 evidence). Although we recognize
that the military judge would not have known when he admitted
the M.R.E. 413 evidence that trial counsel would overdo it in
this manner, the military judge failed to take actions during
trial to limit its overuse, including declining to take judicial
notice of the acquittal. The military judge also declined to
heed the specific request of the Government to “negate any
possible danger of unfair prejudice” to Appellant by providing a
limiting instruction noting Appellant’s acquittal. The result
was that a great deal of time was spent in a distracting mini-
trial on a collateral matter of low probative value, without the
ameliorative effect of judicial recognition of the acquittal via
limiting instruction or judicial notice.
Applying the appropriate deference to the ruling of a
military judge, we find that in this case the military judge’s
failure to address or reconcile Appellant’s alibi evidence or
give due weight to Appellant’s acquittal undermined his M.R.E.
403 balancing analysis such that the decision to admit the
evidence was an abuse of discretion.
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C.
“A finding or sentence of a court-martial may not be held
incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless the error
materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused.”
Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) (2006). When a military
judge abuses his discretion in the M.R.E. 403 balancing
analysis, the error is nonconstitutional. Berry, 61 M.J. at 97.
“For a nonconstitutional error such as this one, the Government
has the burden of demonstrating that ‘the error did not have a
substantial influence on the findings.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 342 (C.A.A.F. 2003)).
The Government conceded that if it were error to admit the
M.R.E. 413 evidence in this case, then it would not be harmless.
The Government’s entire theory of the case was that Appellant
engaged in an escalating pattern of deviant sexual behavior.
Without the testimony of LCpls B and R, the Government’s case-
in-chief consisted of LCpl K’s account of the assault and
restatements of his initial report. The erroneously admitted
evidence was material to the Government’s otherwise weak case.
We hold that the Government has failed to demonstrate the error
did not have a substantial influence on the findings in this
case.
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V.
The judgment of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is reversed as to Specifications 1 and 3 of
Charge I and the sentence. The findings of guilty to those
offenses and the sentence are set aside. The judgment as to the
remaining findings is affirmed. The record of trial is returned
to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. A rehearing is
authorized.
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