In the Interest of L.P., G.J., N.J., N.J., G.J., R.J., L.J., M.J., & R.J., Minor Children ( 2022 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 21-1473
    Filed January 27, 2022
    IN THE INTEREST OF L.P., G.J., N.J., N.J., G.J., R.J., L.J., M.J. & R.J.,
    Minor Children,
    J.P., Mother,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. Straka,
    Associate Juvenile Judge.
    A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to nine children.
    AFFIRMED.
    Gina L. Kramer of Kramer Law Office, PLLC, Dubuque, for appellant
    mother.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Kristy L. Hefel of the State Public Defender’s Office, Dubuque, attorney and
    guardian ad litem for minor children.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
    2
    BADDING, Judge.
    Faced with numerous reports of child neglect, lack of supervision, and
    substance abuse by the mother and father, the juvenile court terminated their
    parental rights to nine children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f), (h), and (l)
    (2021). Only the mother appeals.1 She contests each of the three steps in the
    termination process, see In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40 (Iowa 2010), and requests
    more time to work toward reunification. After independently reviewing the record,
    we reach the same conclusions as the juvenile court and affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    In July 2020, the Iowa Department of Human Services began to piece
    together a troubling pattern of inadequate supervision by the parents after
    receiving four consecutive police reports regarding their middle children, ranging
    from ages four and ten. The first incident occurred in early May. Four of the
    children were found wandering unsupervised two miles from home in chilly weather
    without their parents’ knowledge. Only one of the children was wearing a coat,
    and another one was not wearing shoes. When the children were returned home,
    the parents admitted not knowing they had left. Upon referral, the department got
    involved. The investigation led to a founded child abuse report against the parents
    for denial of critical care and failure to provide proper supervision.
    1 Eight of the children have the same biological father, whose rights were
    terminated. He filed a notice of appeal, but the supreme court dismissed his appeal
    as untimely. The biological father of the oldest child, L.P., was not part of the
    juvenile proceedings. Thus, neither father’s rights are at issue here. This appeal
    concerns only the termination of the mother’s parental rights to all nine children.
    3
    That same month, police responded to a report that two of the children, R.J.
    and G.J., then ages six and four, were “walking around in their PJs” without adult
    supervision for the second time in a week. An officer transported the children back
    home and woke the parents, who were asleep in their bedroom. When the officer
    informed them about their children’s whereabouts, the father responded, “[T]his
    isn’t the first time.” Nor would it be the last time.
    A third incident involving these same two children happened in
    mid-July. R.J. and G.J. were caught stealing candy at a gas station several blocks
    from home. When an officer approached the children, he noticed they were
    “barefoot, very dirty, and smelled as if they had not bathed in days.” As before,
    the parents had no idea where the children were. Another child abuse assessment
    followed and was founded against the parents for denial of critical care. Both
    parents were charged with neglect or abandonment of a dependent person, a class
    “C” felony under Iowa Code section 726.3 (2020).
    Around the same time, the State filed child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA)
    petitions for each of the nine children. While awaiting the adjudicatory hearing, the
    department obtained court approval to conduct a safety check at the family’s
    home.    Upon entering the home, the child protective worker documented
    significant safety and sanitary concerns, including bedrooms with animal feces and
    urine, inoperable bathtubs, a sink that didn’t drain properly, and a broken
    refrigerator. There was minimal food in the home for the family, although the infant
    twins did have formula and baby food. While there were several couches in the
    home, there were no beds for anyone to sleep on. The department followed up
    4
    with a safety plan that required the parents to comply with drug testing and family
    preservation services.
    Meanwhile, less than two weeks after the last incident, four-year-old G.J.
    escaped once more. His whereabouts were unknown for an hour before he was
    spotted by security personnel on a nearby college campus. Although the parents
    had screwed the front door shut to prevent the children from leaving the house, it
    appeared G.J. had climbed through one of the door’s glass panels that could be
    pushed open. Yet, according to police, the mother “blamed the older kids for [G.J.]
    getting out.”
    Thereafter, new allegations emerged that the parents were using
    methamphetamine in the children’s presence.         A service provider noticed a
    “puncture mark scabbed over” on the mother’s arm and symptoms of drug
    withdrawal. But the department could not confirm the allegations “due to [the
    parents] not complying with drug testing.” This raised immediate concerns for the
    department, given the parents’ history of substance abuse. This history dated back
    to 2016 when G.J., who was only six months old at the time, tested positive for
    methamphetamine and amphetamines by ingestion and exposure.
    Beyond drug testing, the parents ignored “[a]ll other aspects of the safety
    plan” and refused voluntary services.        Citing their lack of cooperation, the
    department sought a temporary removal order, which the juvenile court entered in
    early August. The children were removed from the parents’ custody and placed in
    various family foster care homes, except for the oldest child who went to live with
    her biological father. The court ordered drug screens of the children at the time of
    removal, and three of them, including one of the youngest twins born in December
    5
    2019, tested positive for methamphetamine. As a result, the department filed an
    addendum to the founded July report based on the presence of illegal drugs in the
    three children, naming both parents as the perpetrators.
    By September, the children were adjudicated in need of assistance under
    Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2), (e), (n), and (o). The juvenile court found the
    State’s evidence “clearly establish[ed] the repeated inadequate supervision
    provided by the parents; the unsanitary conditions of the home; the parents’ refusal
    to allow access to the children; and the parents’ refusal to cooperate with
    assessments and services in order to ensure the safety of the children.” The court
    also noted that some of the children had not received necessary medical and
    dental care, and all of them “appeared very hungry and ate significant amounts of
    food while at the department offices.” The children were confirmed CINA after a
    dispositional hearing in late October, when the court set the permanency goal to
    reunification.
    Concerns about the parents’ substance abuse and lack of supervision
    persisted as the case progressed. As highlighted in a January 2021 report to the
    court, they remained unwilling to cooperate with the department or participate in
    services.    They continued to refuse drug testing and failed to complete
    mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations, in violation of court orders. They
    made excuses for their noncompliance, taking no “accountability for their own
    actions or inactions in regard to their children.” By the time of the dispositional
    review hearing in February, they had been evicted from their home and were living
    in a van. Given their “complete lack of progress,” the court scheduled a second
    6
    dispositional review hearing for May while encouraging the parents to request
    additional services if needed.
    That hearing came and went without much improvement. Based on the
    case progress reports since the last hearing, the juvenile court determined that
    “[t]he biggest area of progress for the parents was obtaining appropriate
    housing.” They had regressed on all other fronts. Both the father and mother had
    two positive sweat-patch tests—one in February and one in March 2021. Yet they
    repeatedly denied using and blamed others for their children’s exposure to
    drugs. They missed many drug tests.          While the mother did complete a
    substance-abuse evaluation, the treatment provider reported: “The counselor was
    unable to make an accurate assessment, as the client denied all current and past
    substance or alcohol use, despite her also self-reporting positive drug screens,
    which she insisted were inaccurate.” Much like their attitude toward drug testing,
    the parents resisted the department’s efforts to help them.
    Two months later, the State petitioned to terminate parental rights. An
    August hearing on the petition was continued because the mother had just given
    birth to her tenth child. History repeated itself when the newborn tested positive
    for amphetamines and methamphetamine at the hospital and was “showing some
    twitching or jittery movements consistent with withdrawal from stimulants.” The
    mother also tested positive for amphetamines as well as opiates, but she again
    denied drug use. Given these circumstances, another child abuse assessment
    was founded against the mother for the presence of illegal drugs in the child.
    The juvenile court held the rescheduled termination hearing in late
    September. Due to the pending criminal charges, neither parent testified. Three
    7
    witnesses testified for the State, including two family support specialists who
    supervised visits and the department case manager. Both specialists described
    the visits as “chaotic.” They attributed the chaos in part to the children “constantly
    running around, screaming, fighting, [and] playing,” and the parents failing to
    monitor them. Two to three service providers had to attend each visit to make up
    for the parents’ continual lack of supervision. Even so, the parents complained “no
    one’s doing anything to help them.” According to the case manager, the parents
    never stopped blaming the department, service providers, and police for the
    removal of their children.
    Based on the evidence presented, the court granted the State’s petition to
    terminate the parents’ rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f), (h), and (l)
    and rejected the parents’ requests for an extension. The mother appeals.
    II. Analysis
    In conducting our de novo review of the termination of the mother’s parental
    rights, we consider three steps: (1) whether the State’s evidence supports a
    ground for termination under section 232.116(1); (2) whether termination is in the
    children’s best interests based on the factors in section 232.116(2); and
    (3) whether any exceptions to termination apply under section 232.116(3). In re
    M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    , 219–20 (Iowa 2016). The mother contests each step,
    starting with the grounds for termination.
    A. Statutory Grounds
    The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under paragraph
    (h) for the two youngest children, paragraph (f) for the remaining seven children,
    and paragraph (l) for all nine children. “On appeal, we may affirm the juvenile
    8
    court’s termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and
    convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 707 (Iowa 2010). Because
    the mother challenges a common element under both paragraphs (f) and (h)—that
    the children cannot be safely returned to her custody at the present time—we
    choose to focus on these two grounds. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1)(f)(4), (h)(4);
    see also In re A.S., 
    906 N.W.2d 467
    , 473 (Iowa 2018).
    The mother argues the State failed to sufficiently prove that element
    because the evidence did not establish that safety risks existed in her new home
    and that “[she] was the cause of any of the children . . . testing positive for
    controlled substances.” She also contends the juvenile court relied too heavily on
    her “prior bad acts.” Specifically, she claims the court erred in concluding she
    posed a present danger to the children based on concerns raised about her
    methamphetamine use in 2016. Both arguments miss their mark.
    Starting with the last argument, the mother’s methamphetamine use was
    not in her rearview mirror as she would have us believe. Since the department
    has been involved with this family, five of the children have tested positive for
    methamphetamine, now including the youngest, who tested positive at birth just a
    month before the termination hearing. Yet the mother continues to deny any drug
    use despite several test results showing otherwise. Although the mother deflects
    responsibility for her children’s proven drug exposure, we find it significant that she
    thwarted the department’s and the court’s ability to confirm her sobriety by
    repeatedly avoiding drug testing. See In re I.J., No. 20-0036, 
    2020 WL 1550702
    ,
    at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020) (“We presume these missed drug tests would
    have resulted in positive tests.”). Her denial and lack of insight into her addiction
    9
    in itself present a danger to the children. See In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 
    2020 WL 110425
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (affirming statutory ground based solely
    on parent’s consistent methamphetamine use and lack of engagement in
    treatment).
    Just as the mother fails to recognize the harm caused by her substance
    abuse, she demonstrates a lack of self-awareness in her role as a parent. For
    instance, she highlights that she “provide[d] food, drinks, clothing, diapers, wipes,
    and toys at visits” and obtained safe housing for the children. But the concerns
    preventing reunification were deeper than that. The mother was unable to keep
    her children safe without intervention from either the department, police, or service
    providers. She needed help supervising and monitoring the children at every turn.
    After a year of services, the mother’s visits with the children only became
    more chaotic. The family support specialists testified they never reached their goal
    of reducing the number of providers at each visit because “[t]he parents weren’t
    supervising their visits at all,” instead viewing the providers as “just being
    babysitters for them.”   The mother had to be reminded to feed the children
    appropriate   food,    change    their   diapers,   and    attend    their   medical
    appointments.2 She relied on providers to care for her children rather than gaining
    the skills necessary to care for them on her own. See In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    ,
    111–12 (Iowa 2014) (finding termination appropriate where parents could not
    internalize necessary skills to keep their child safe and developing properly
    2One of the children was diagnosed with muscular dystrophy and another has
    cerebral palsy.
    10
    “without the hovering supervision of [department] workers”). All the providers
    agreed the mother could not safely supervise the children on her own.
    With this record, we agree that the children could not be safely returned to
    the mother’s care at the time of the termination hearing.        The grounds for
    termination were therefore established under section 232.116(1)(f) and (h).
    B. Best Interests and Exceptions
    Combining the remaining two steps in the analysis, the mother argues
    termination is not in the children’s best interests because of the bond she shares
    with each of them and them with each other. She suggests both the parental and
    sibling bond would be disrupted to the children’s detriment because they have
    been split up into four separate foster homes. We believe this argument is more
    properly considered in two parts as the closeness of the parent-child relationship
    is a permissive exception to termination under section 232.116(3)(c) and not a
    factor in the best-interests framework. See In re J.C., No. 19-1985, 
    2020 WL 1049840
    , at *2 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020) (reiterating natural sequence of
    three-step analysis).
    In determining whether termination is in the children’s best interests, we
    must “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement
    for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the
    physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2).   We have emphasized that the children’s safety and need for
    permanency are the touchstones of our best-interests analysis. See In re J.E.,
    
    723 N.W.2d 793
    , 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). For the reasons
    already discussed, we reject the mother’s implicit assertion that returning the
    11
    children to her care would be in their best interests. The record establishes the
    mother has not taken the steps necessary to show the children would be safe with
    her either in the short-term or the long-term without ongoing involvement.
    And while it is lamentable that the nine siblings cannot all be placed
    together, it is unclear what the mother would have us do.         See In re W.A.,
    No. 16-1774, 
    2017 WL 104975
    , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017). Whether the
    children are in one or multiple placements, “they cannot return to the mother’s care
    at this time, and they need permanency.” 
    Id.
     “We cannot place the importance of
    the sibling bond over the individual safety and well-being of each of the
    children.” 
    Id.
    We likewise find the closeness of the parent-child relationship is not enough
    to override the children’s need for a safe and permanent home. The record shows
    the children have all been adjusting well in their placements and their needs are
    being met by their foster parents.     As the guardian ad litem reported to the
    court: “The children hav[e] exhibited noticeable growth physically and emotionally
    during the time that they have been in family foster care presumably enjoying a
    stable, secure and loving environment.” We decline to interrupt their growth when
    the mother has been unwilling to do her part.
    C. Additional Time for Reunification
    We turn then to the mother’s final argument that the juvenile court should
    have given her more time to achieve reunification. She insists that she has
    “substantially complied with the department’s expectations for substance abuse
    and mental health counseling” and again notes that she “effectively eliminated any
    concern about instability of housing for the family.” Even if her contentions were
    12
    true, which they are not, the record reveals significant concerns about her lack of
    basic parenting skills, failure to take accountability, and general disregard for her
    children’s safety, none of which she addresses.        The few steps she took to
    appease the department did not negate or eradicate those concerns. While she
    claims an extension would allow her to meet the department’s expectations, there
    is no evidence in the record to support her claim. Rather than repeat our findings,
    we find it apt to end our discussion with a passage written by this court in In re
    H.L.B.R., 
    567 N.W.2d 675
    , 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997):
    The goal of a [CINA] proceeding is to improve parenting skills and
    maintain the parent-child relationship. When the State seeks
    termination, it is because the State has been unable to furnish the
    help necessary to correct the parent’s deficiencies. An underlying
    issue in a termination action is whether the parent is beyond help. A
    parent does not have an unlimited amount of time in which to correct
    his or her deficiencies.
    Having reviewed the record, we agree with the juvenile court that an extension of
    time is not warranted under these circumstances. For all these reasons, we affirm
    the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-1473

Filed Date: 1/27/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/27/2022