Safaa Al-Rawaby Company ( 2023 )


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  •                ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
    Appeal of -                                    )
    )
    Safaa Al-Rawaby Company                        )   
    ASBCA No. 63146
    )
    Under Contract No. H92277-21-C-0013            )
    APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT:                      Bayrak Abbas Fadel
    General Manager
    APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT:                    Caryl A. Potter, III, Esq.
    Air Force Deputy Chief Trial Attorney
    Maj James B. Leighton, USAF
    Trial Attorney
    OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MCLISH
    In this appeal, Appellant, Safaa al-Rawaby Company (Safaa) seeks relief under
    the above-captioned contract (Contract), issued by U.S. Special Operations Command
    Central Forward Headquarters (SOCCENT FWD HQ). The Contract required Safaa to
    provide and deliver millable wheat grain to a mill in Syria for use by the Syrian
    Defense Forces, for a firm-fixed price of $1,689,589.20. The Contract required four
    monthly deliveries. The Contract was terminated for default on the ground that Safaa
    failed to make the first required delivery.
    Appellant claims “Compensation for losses” in the amount of $212,313 it
    allegedly incurred due to its “non-purchase of wheat” under a “prior agreement” with
    “the Al-Ubaidi Agricultural Office” (compl. ¶ 1-2). Appellant alleges that the
    non-purchase occurred because the quote from Appellant’s “suppliers went up to
    $6,944,000 which is a 400% increase” and that it was “the reason the first quantity was
    detained for more than a month” (id. at 1). Appellant also requests a “contract
    modification” and “price[] increase” to enable it to “buy wheat as per global market
    prices” and to “[r]eview prices . . . [s]o if our contract [is increased] up to $6,944,000
    which is a 400% increase, we will be successful in delivery” (id. at 1-2).
    Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on August 10, 2022.
    Appellant did not file an opposition. On January 10, 2023, the Board issued an order
    to show cause, requiring appellant to file either a response to the motion for summary
    judgment or a request for a further extension of time to file a response. The order
    informed appellant that the appeal may be dismissed without further notice if appellant
    did not make one of those filings within 30 days. In an email to the Board on
    January 27, 2023, appellant indicated that it had lost money on the contract and
    therefore could not afford counsel to prepare a response to the government’s motion.
    Appellant stated that it “was waiting for any compensation for this issue.” (Bd. corr.
    email dtd. Jan. 27, 2023) 1
    We grant the government’s motion for summary judgment. 2
    STATEMENT OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF THE MOTION
    The following facts asserted by the government in accordance with Board Rule 7(c)
    have not been disputed by appellant and are therefore accepted as undisputed for purposes
    of deciding the present motion. See Board Rule 7(c)(2).
    1. Effective September 30, 2021, SOCCENT FWD HQ awarded the Contract
    to Safaa requiring the delivery of 7,827,600 kg of millable wheat over a period of four
    months (1,956,900 kg per month) to one specified location in Syria at a price of
    $424,647.30 per month (net price of $1,698,589.20). The initial delivery was due
    between October 19 and 28, 2021. The Contract was a firm-fixed price contract for a
    commercial item and incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause
    52.212-4, Contract Terms and Conditions – Commercial Products and Commercial
    Services, by reference. (R4, tab 2 at 1, 4, 10, 13)
    2. Safaa produced a document purporting to be an invoice dated October 28,
    2021, from Al-Ubaidi Agricultural Office for “$212,323 Dollar” for “Fines for not
    buying wheat” addressed to Mr. Bayrak Abbas Fadel (R4, tab 7).
    3. Safaa admits in its complaint that “the first [delivery] quantity was detained
    for more than a month” and that all its “means and solutions . . . in order to avoid
    losses and to supply the contract . . . [were] rejected and [Safaa was] notified to Stop
    Work.” (compl. ¶ 1).
    4. On November 2, 2021, the contracting officer issued a memorandum labeled
    a “Cure Notice” via email “for lack of performance” on the Contract. The attached
    notice stated that Safaa was notified verbally and via email on October 16, 2021, of the
    1
    Although Appellant did not file a formal response to the summary judgment motion,
    we take its recent communications to indicate a desire to continue the appeal.
    (Bd. corr. emails dtd. Jan. 27, 2023, Feb. 13, 2023, and Feb. 26, 2023). In this
    instance, we have chosen to address the merits of the claim rather than dismiss
    it for failure to prosecute.
    2
    The government filed a motion on February 24, 2023, seeking dismissal on the
    ground that appellant had not complied with the Board’s Order of January 10,
    2023. Because we grant summary judgment, we deny the motion to dismiss as
    moot.
    2
    need to complete its contractual obligations. It stated further that Safaa failed to
    deliver the required wheat supplies on October 28, 2021 and warned that the
    Government might terminate the Contract for cause under FAR 52.212-4, unless Safaa
    delivered the wheat within ten days. (R4, tabs 3, 4 at 1)
    5. On November 24, 2021, the contracting officer terminated the Contract for
    cause in its entirety pursuant to FAR 52.212-4(m) for its “default with the terms and
    conditions of the delivery schedule and quantities outlined in the Performance Work
    Statement,” effective that day, and directed Safaa to stop work on the Contract (R4,
    tab 5). Safaa acknowledged the Termination for Cause on November 30, 2021 (id.).
    DECISION
    A. Standard of Review
    Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material
    fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. First Commerce
    Corp. v. United States, 
    335 F.3d 1373
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The party seeking
    summary judgment is initially burdened with establishing the absence of any genuine
    issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323 (1986). All
    significant doubt over factual issues must be resolved in favor of the party opposing
    summary judgment. Mingus Constructors v. United States, 
    812 F.2d 1387
    , 1390 (Fed.
    Cir. 1987). A party challenging a motion for summary judgment “must set forth
    specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty
    Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
    Co., 
    391 U.S. 253
    , 288 (1968)).
    B. The Termination for Default
    A default termination is “a drastic sanction which should be imposed . . . only
    for good grounds and on solid evidence.” J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States,
    
    408 F.2d 424
    , 431 (Ct. Cl. 1969). The government bears the burden of establishing
    that its termination of the contract was proper. Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    828 F.2d 759
    , 765 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The contracting officer’s default decision
    must not be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion. Cent. Co., 
    ASBCA No. 62624
    , 
    22-1 BCA ¶ 38,057
     at 184,790; Darwin Constr. Co. v. United States,
    
    811 F.2d 593
    , 597 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The government must reasonably demonstrate
    that the contractor’s deficient performance is the actual cause of the termination and
    not a mere pretext. Goodloe Marine, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 62106
    , 
    22-1 BCA ¶ 38,053
     at 184,776.
    3
    Once the government has established that the contractor’s deficient
    performance was the cause of the termination, the burden shifts to the appellant to
    demonstrate that the default was excusable. DCX, Inc. v. Perry, 
    79 F.3d 132
    ,
    134 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 992
     (1996). At this stage the appellant
    must show that the default was excusable. Id.; Switlik Parachute Co. v. United States,
    
    573 F.2d 1228
    , 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
    On the undisputed facts, the government has met its burden to show that the
    termination was justified by appellant’s failure to perform. The government may
    terminate the contract for cause “in the event of any default by the Contractor, or if the
    Contractor fails to comply with any contract terms and conditions . . . .” FAR 52.212-
    4(m). Safaa defaulted on its obligation to make its first delivery of wheat by
    October 28, 2021. Safaa further failed to deliver the wheat within the 10-day grace
    period provided by the government’s Cure Notice. Safaa was provided with both
    written and verbal warnings of the need to complete deliveries as specified in the
    Contract or risk termination. When it did not make the delivery as required,
    termination was justified.
    Safaa also made clear that it would not or could not make any of the other
    required deliveries without an increase in the contract price. Safaa repeatedly
    communicated that it needed a substantial increase in the price to be able to purchase
    the wheat. On October 13, 2021, Safaa informed the government, “so we need
    additional prices to keep going delivery . . . [.]” Safaa repeated that warning on
    October 14, 2021, and, on October 16, 2021, Safaa sent an email to the contracting
    officer stating “[t]he first shipment of 2000 tons will be fixed as mentioned in contract,
    but remaining quantities and shipments will be increase 1$ each kilogram as we deal
    with new suppliers, the first agreement with dealers canceled from their side causes the
    taxes and customs.” (R4, tab 9 at 5-8) Safaa’s announcements to the government that
    it would not deliver the wheat at the agreed upon price constituted anticipatory breach
    and justified termination for default. See, e.g., New Era Cont. Sales, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 56204
    , 
    09-2 BCA ¶ 34,147
     at 168,795. (“New Era’s 5 July 2006 unequivocal
    refusal to perform under Delivery Order No. 0001A months before the 21 November
    2006 delivery date was an anticipatory repudiation which would have justified its
    termination for default at that time.”)
    The government having demonstrated that the termination was justified by
    Safaa’s non-performance, the burden shifts to Safaa to demonstrate that its
    non-performance was excusable. By the terms of the Excusable Delays clause, FAR
    52.212-4(f), the contractor is liable for default unless nonperformance is caused by an
    occurrence beyond the reasonable control of the contractor and without its fault or
    negligence. See also Gargoyles Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 57515
    , 
    13 BCA ¶ 35,330
    at 173,413.
    4
    Safaa has failed to meet its burden. Safaa alleges in its complaint that “the
    reason the first quantity was detained for more than a month” was because of an
    increase in wheat prices and a fine levied by Safaa’s supplier for Safaa’s non-purchase
    of wheat under an agreement with the supplier (compl. ¶ 1; SOF ¶ 2). The inability to
    finance the increased cost of performance does not excuse default under a firm-fixed
    price contract. A “firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to
    any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in performing the
    contract.” FAR 16.202-1. It “places upon the contractor maximum risk and full
    responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.” Id.; see Lakeshore Eng’g
    Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    748 F.3d 1341
    , 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The essence of a
    firm fixed-price contract is that the contractor, not the government, assumes the risk of
    unexpected costs.”); see also New Era Cont. Sales, Inc., 
    ASBCA No. 56661
    ,
    
    11-1 BCA ¶ 34,738
     at 171,023. The Contract did not contain an economic price
    adjustment clause. Accordingly, increases in the price of wheat, even if dramatic, do
    not excuse Safaa’s non-performance. “The normal risk of a fixed price contract is that
    the market price will change.” Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 
    308 F.3d 1283
    ,
    1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co.,
    
    799 F.2d 265
    , 275 (7th Cir. 1986)).
    Accordingly, there are no disputed issues of material fact, and the government
    is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
    CONCLUSION
    The government’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the appeal is
    denied.
    Dated: March 15, 2023
    THOMAS P. MCLISH
    Administrative Judge
    Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals
    (Signatures continued)
    5
    I concur                                          I concur
    RICHARD SHACKLEFORD                               J. REID PROUTY
    Administrative Judge                              Administrative Judge
    Acting Chairman                                   Vice Chairman
    Armed Services Board                              Armed Services Board
    of Contract Appeals                               of Contract Appeals
    I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the
    Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in 
    ASBCA No. 63146
    , Appeal of Safaa
    Al-Rawaby Company, rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter.
    Dated: March 16, 2023
    PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS
    Recorder, Armed Services
    Board of Contract Appeals
    6